153 N.E. 725 | Ill. | 1926
The city of Chicago objected to the judgment sought by the county collector for the sale of certain property for the payment of delinquent taxes for the year 1924. Nine pieces of property are involved, four of which are used for public playgrounds, three for police department buildings, one as a fire engine house, and one as a hospital, known as the Illinois Memorial Hospital of the city of Chicago. It is not contended as to eight parcels that they are owned by the city, as they are all leased to it. There is, however, a claim that as to the hospital the lease may, by election, run for a period of ninety-nine years, and that therefore such a lease is, in effect, a species of title thereto. There is no dispute as to the uses of the properties nor is it claimed that such uses are not proper municipal purposes. By the terms of the leases relating to the four playground properties the city is to pay one dollar per year and assume and pay all taxes and assessments thereon during the terms of the leases. As to the other five properties, substantial rentals are by the terms of the leases to be paid by the city to the owners of the property, and in addition thereto the city assumes and agrees to pay all taxes thereon. The court overruled the objections and entered judgment of sale, and the cause comes here for review.
The city contends that by the provisions of the ninth clause of section 2 of the Revenue act the property in question is exempt from taxation regardless of the ownership thereof. It claims, also, that the use of the playgrounds is, in effect, a use for school purposes. The ninth clause of section 2 of the Revenue act provides that the following property shall be exempted from taxation: "All market houses, public squares or other public grounds used exclusively for public purposes; all works, machinery and fixtures belonging exclusively to any town, village or city." *70 Clause 6 of said section exempts "property owned by any city or village located within the incorporated limits thereof," etc. The city admits that as to all property except the hospital property it has no ownership and such property cannot be exempted as property of the city but that it is to be included in "other public grounds" specified by clause 9 of section 2 as exempt; that this clause does not specifically require ownership and that the use for public purposes is sufficient to make the property exempt.
The exemption of property from taxation is governed primarily by section 3 of article 9 of the constitution, which is as follows: "The property of the State, counties, and other municipal corporations, both real and personal, and such other property as may be used exclusively for agricultural and horticultural societies, for school, religious, cemetery and charitable purposes, may be exempted from taxation; but such exemption shall be only by general law." This section divides property which may be exempted into two classes: that of the State, counties or municipal corporations, and that used exclusively for the purposes specified in the last clause of the section.
Plaintiff in error contends that the use, and not the ownership, is to govern the question of exemption as to this property, and cites People v. Salvation Army,
Nor is the playground property exempt as a part of school property. The playgrounds are not enclosed with or parts of school buildings or grounds nor are they managed by school authorities. They are in the nature of public parks and are open to the use of the public generally, and while playgrounds within the same enclosures with school buildings have been held to be exempt, (People v. St. Francis Academy,
As to the hospital property the city does not show proof of ownership. The record shows that the city holds a lease of that property, dated 1908, for a period of thirty years, with privilege of two renewals amounting to an additional sixty-nine years. The lease, however, is in fact a lease for thirty years and may be terminated at the end of that time by the city. Such does not show title in the city. Clause 6 of section 2 provides for the exemption of property belonging to a city. This is in accordance with the provisions of the constitution, but as it cannot be said this property belongs to the city that clause cannot have application.
It is contended that regardless of that fact the hospital is operated for charitable purposes and should be exempted from taxation. Clause 7 of section 2 of the Revenue act provides for the exemption of "all property of institutions of public charity, all property of beneficent and charitable organizations, whether incorporated in this or in any other State of the United States and all property of old people's homes when such property is actually and exclusively used for such charitable or beneficent purposes, and not leased or otherwise used with a view to profit; and all free public libraries." That a hospital which is not conducted for profit *72
is a charitable institution was decided by this court inSisters of St. Francis v. Board of Review,
The judgment of the court in overruling the objection to the taxes as to all of this property will be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.