28 Mich. 228 | Mich. | 1873
Lead Opinion
The act relating to a public park for the city of Detroit, approved April 15, 1871 (Laws 1871, Vol. 2, p. 1822), created a board of park commissioners, with power and authority to adopt plans for a public park, or boulevard, or both, with the necessary avenues or approaches thereto, for the use of the city of Detroit, and for those purposes to select the needful lands either wholly or in part, within the city or any of the adjacent townships, and to make conditional contracts therefor subject to ratification by the common council and a vote of a citizens’ meeting. All purchases for the purpose were limited to five hundred acres, at a cost of not more than two hundred thousand dollars. The common council was authorized to issue bonds to mako the necessary purchases, after their proposition for the purpose had been submitted to and approved by a citizens’ meeting, and the commissioners were authorized to institute proceedings in the circuit court for the county of Wayne for the appropriation of lands which they could not acquire by purchase. After the lands were acquired, the commissioners were to cause estimates to be made and laid before the council annually, of expenditures proposed for the improvement, embellishment and keeping of the grounds, and the common council were required to provide for such expenditure by an issue and sale of bonds, not exceeding fifty thousand dollars in any one year, as it might think proper, but subject to approval by a citizens’ meeting. The act named six prominent citizens of Detroit as the first members of the commission, who were to be divided by lot
The commissioners were duly organized into a board as provided by the act, and proceeded in the discharge of their duties. -Some question having been made regarding the power of the legislature to appoint them, the attorney general instituted proceedings by quo warranto against one of their number, to determine this question, and it appearing that the official authority of the commissioners had been fully recognized by the common council, in whom, with the mayor, was vested the general power to appoint, this court held that though the appointment could not originally have rightfully been made by the state, yet that the recognition of their official character by the appointing power without objection or dissent, was sufficient to constitute them city officers. — Attorney General v. Lothrop, 24 Mich., 235. Subsequent to this the common council filled two vacancies occurring in the board, by confirmation of the mayor’s nominations.
We are informed by the petition in this case that some time in 1871 the park commissioners selected what they deemed the most eligible site for a park, and entered into conditional contracts for the same on favorable terms; that they reported their action to the common council, and that body ordered the proposition for the issue of the bonds necessary to complete the purchase, to be submitted to a citizens’ meeting. Two successive meetings were held to consider it, but there was so much of noise, confusion and violence at these meetings that no intelligent discussion could be had, and no result was reached.
By an act approved March 14, 1873 (Laws 1873, Vol. 2, p. 100), it is supposed much larger powers have been conferred upon the board. They are permitted to “acquire by purchase” lands not exceeding in cost three hundred thousand dollars, and the act declares that whenever the board
Acting under this legislation, the board reported to the common council on August 13, 1873, that they had located the site of a public park on Jefferson avenue, three miles from the city hall, containing about four hundred and fifty acres; that they had purchased three hundred and seventy-five acres of the four hundred and fifty selected, at a cost of two hundred and twenty-nine thousand one hundred and forty dollars and fourteen cents, and estimated the cost of ¡acquiring the remainder at about seventy thousand dollars, and they requested that the common council would authorize the issue of bonds to an amount not exceeding three hundred thousand dollars, to pay the cost. It is not necessary to state in detail the proceedings of the council on this report; it is sufficient to say that a resolution that ,eity bonds to the amount of three hundred thousand dollars, payable in thirty years, with interest at seven per ¡centum, has failed to receive the approval of that body.
Sufficient has been stated of the legislation on the subject to show that all action of the commissioners, up to the time when an issue of bonds is ordered by the common council, is provisional only, and that no debt is contracted by the city, or legal obligation assumed, until affirmative action is taken by that body upon the report of the commissioners. Why this action was required at all, if the council were, to have no important discretionary power in the premises, it is needless for us to speculate, since both parties concede that the purpose of the last act' was to take away the discretionary power that was vested in the council by the first, and that suitable and peremptory language has been employed for that purpose. And we shall consider this case upon the assumption that the parties have correctly construed this legislation.
The failure, then, of the common council to comply with the request of the board of j)ark commissioners has, in their opinion, imposed a public duty upon the judicial department, which we must perform on the facts being properly reported. That duty — to- state it nakedly — is, by the compulsory process of this court, to coerce the city of Detroit into entering into contracts involving a debt for a very large sum for an object purely of local concern, which the legislative body of the city has refused to make.
The proposition that there rests in this or any ocher court the authority to compel a municipal body to contract debts for local purposes against its will, is one so momentous in its importance, and so pregnant with possible con
The general proposition we have stated may be said to be deduced by the relators from several minor propositions, which we shall endeavor to condense and state in substance as follows:
1. The legislature creates municipal corporations, defines and limits their powers, enlarges or diminishes them at will, points out the agencies which are to exercise them, and exercises a general supervision and control of them as it shall deem proper and needful for the public welfare.
2. The legislature confers upon the bodies it has created the power to make contracts and to levy taxes for their performance, but in matters of public concern it is not limited to conferring a discretionary power, but may exercise compulsory authority where the local officers or agencies neglect or refuse to discharge their public duty in providing for the public needs of the locality, or in voting or levying the proper taxes for public purposes.
3. While the state cannot appoint the officers who are to have charge and management of local affairs, it may apportion the local powers among them as it sees fit, and confide them from time to time to such as are thought most likely to exercise them in accordance with the law and for the public good.
5. The common council haring only a ministerial duty to perform after the board had acted, they may be compelled to perform that duty by the usual process.
This is beliered to be an accurate statement, in substance and in our own language, of the positions so ably presented and urged on behalf of the relators; and it must be conceded that if the first four are sound, the fifth must follow logically. The performance of a mere ministerial duty may as well be enforced when it rests upon an aggregate body like the common council, as when incumbent upon a single officer. Tfe may therefore address ourselres at once to the propositions which are supposed to fix upon the council the duty which this proceeding seeks to compel that body to perform.
In People v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich., 44, we considered at some length the proposition which asserts the amplitude of legislatiTe control oxer municipal corporations, and we there conceded that when confined, as it should be, to such corporations as agencies of the state in its gOTernment, the-
But we also endeavored to show in People v. Hurlbut, that though municipal authorities are made use of in state government, and as such are under complete state control, they are not created exclusively for that purpose, but have other objects and purposes peculiarly local, and in which the state at large, except in conferring the power and regulating its exercise, is legally no more concerned than it is in the individual and private concerns of its several citizens. Indeed, it would be easy to show that it is not from the standpoint of state interest, but from that of local interest, that the necessity of incorporating cities and villages most distinctly appears. State duties of a local
We also referred, in People v. Hurlbut, to several decisions in the federal supreme court, and elsewhere, to show
We should not discuss this subject in the present case
But it cannot be contended that authority in the legislature to determine what shall be the extent of capacity in a city to acquire and hold property, is equivalent to, or contains within itself the authority to deprive the city of property actually acquired by legislative permission. As to the property it thus holds for its own private purposes, a city is to be regarded as a constituent in state government, and is entitled to the like protection in its property rights as any natural person who is also a constituent. The right of the state as regards such property, is a right of regulation, and though broader than exists in the case of
Whoever insists upon the right of the state to interfere and control by compulsory legislation the action of the local constituency in matters exclusively' of local concern, should be prepared to defend a like interference in the action of private corporations and of natural persons. It is as easy to justify on principle, a law which permits the rest of the community to dictate to an individual what he shall eat, and what he shall drink, and what he shall wear, as to show any constitutional basis for one under which the people of other parts of the state, through their representatives, dictate to the city of Detroit what fountains • shall be erected at its expense for the use of its citizens, or at what cost it shall purchase, and how it shall improve and embellish a park or boulevard for the recreation and enjoyment of its citizens. The one law would rest upon the same fallacy as the other, and the reasons for opposing and contesting it would be the same in each case. And while it may be entirely possible that in any particular instance the interference would be beneficial to the person or the community whose rights are invaded, it is not to be overlooked that an interference to compel a person to sub
We affirm, then, that the city of Detroit has the right to decide for itself upon the purchase of a public park. The next question concerns the agency by which this decision shall be made. Dnder the act of 1871 the final decision was to be made in a citizens’ meeting, but this
The argument on this branch of the case is, that the park commissioners, being city officers, the legislature, when they took from the common council and the citizens’ meeting the power to decide finally on the purchase of a park, and conferred it on these commissioners, was only exercising an unquestioned authority in the apportionment of local powers and duties among local officers, as should be deemed most for the local good. The common council, it is claimed, not being a body provided for in the constitution, can have no vested rights in any particular powers or duties, and the rights of local government are just as much regarded, and presumptively as well protected, when the local powers and duties are apportioned among other officers, as when all are left to the judgment and discretion of the council. But whether this is so or not, the right of the legislature to make the apportionment, it is insisted, is unquestionable, and from the nature of the case, unless particular restraints can be pointed out in the constitution itself, must be unlimited.
Conceding, as we already have, the general right of the legislature to prescribe the duties and authority of municipal officers, it would nevertheless be easy to demonstrate
We desire to guard in this case against expressing opinions on abstract questions, or upon any not directly involved; and therefore shall avoid the utterance of any views which either of us may possibly hold upon the question which has been suggested, whether the common council may not be so far a distinctive feature in municipal government as to be understood and by implication retained when that government is provided for. The case before us will be disposed of without reaching any such question. This is one in which the powers in question have been •conferred upon the park commissioners after its members were chosen, and it obviously presents a different question from what it would had the powers taken from the common council and the people by the act of 1873 been transferred to the board before the appointment of its members, and the choice been made with reference to the powers to be exercised. The point now to be determined is, whether for the purposes of the purchase proposed the park commissioners can be regarded as the representatives of the people of Detroit chosen to make it.
The case supposed is of course extreme and wholly
The city of Detroit is found to have accepted the state appointees as its representatives in the park commission; but for what purpose and on what understanding? Obviously it was with the purpose and on the understanding that
The powers specified in the act of 1871, though requiring for their proper discharge a high order of intelligence and cultivation, were nevertheless purely advisory at first and administrative afterwards. How is it with the powers specified in the act of 1873 ? Are they the same in nature or alike in grade ? In one sense it may be said they are similar in kind, because they relate to the same subject, that is to say, to the establishment of a city park. But obviously a power to advise the city to buy property if its citizens shall choose to do so, and shall voluntarily incur the cost, is not the same in degree or iii nature with a power to bind the city irrevocably to a purchase which its citizens may protest against, and to compel them to incur a heavy debt for an object they may not desire. An agency to advise one to make a purchase has no relationship to a power to make it for him whether he will or no, and forcibly, by the aid of legal process, to appropriate his property to pay for it.
There is indeed no real similarity in the powers to be exercised under the act of 1873 to those specified in the
We eannot therefore say that'the board of park commissioners are representatives of the city of Detroit for the purpose named, because to do so would be to hold that the shadow is the same as the substance, and that servant and ruler are convertible terms. The high and responsible trust created by the act of 1873, which concerns and will concern the happiness and prosperity, the health and comfort of that city for an indefinite future, the people of Detroit have not been permitted to fill. The persons named for it are the appointees of the legislature, and not of the city, and however disinterested and honorable may have been their course, and however wise and beneficent their contemplated action, we have no power to aid it by legal process, because, concerning as it does the private corporate interests of the city, it has been had without the consent of the city expressly or by implication given.
The mandamus prayed for must be denied.
Concurrence Opinion
How far the property already actually owned by municipalities is exempt from state legislation as private property,, in the strict sense of the term, it is not necessary to consider in this case. There is very great reason for holding it exempt from any arbitrary interference so long as the municipal jurisdiction remains fixed. But possibly there may be valuable interests in the nature of property belonging to such bodies, which are subject to be affected injuriously by legislation without as large a right to compensation or immunity, as that which may be asserted by other corporations.
I concur entirely in all that has been said by my brother Cooley in demonstration of the right of cities to use their own discretion in regard to the purchase or acquisition of property or improvements of local concern. And I agree with him that in giving to these commissioners the power of binding the city by their doings in the purchase and selection of lauds, the state has to all intents and purposes made them its own agents, and not agents of the city, and that their action is in no sense city action. It has been settled by our previous decisions that the state cannot put its own agencies in. charge of any such functions.
I am not willing, however, to leave out of view an objection which has seemed to me quite as fundamental as the one referred to, and more dangerous, if that be possible, in its tendencies. I think that the very essence of municipal existence consists in a government which allows no discretionary power beyond that of mere administration to be exercised without the immediate or ultimate control of the freemen or their immediate representatives. A city is, and must be, as I conceive, a unit for purposes of government; and all bodies employed in the service of the municipality, and not directly representing the freemen, must act as agencies subordinate'to the council. If powers in any way involv
Concurring entirely in the general views óf my brother
I therefore agree in the conclusion of my brethren.