147 N.E. 494 | Ill. | 1925
The city council of East St. Louis on February 5, 1923, levied taxes for general corporate purposes aggregating $398,500 and additional taxes for specific purposes, among which were $60,000 for streets and bridges, $4700 for police pension fund and $12,000 for public benefits. In December, 1923, the county clerk of St. Clair county extended the sum of the city taxes at the rate of $1.96 on each $100 assessed valuation. This rate included $1.33 1/3 for general purposes, twenty-four cents for streets and bridges, two cents for police pensions, four cents for public benefits, and the balance for other purposes. The New York, Chicago and St. Louis Railroad Company refused to pay the taxes extended for the three specific purposes mentioned, and upon application to the county collector for *454 judgment and order of sale filed objections to these taxes. The objections were overruled and judgment was entered. This appeal by the railroad company followed.
Appellant contends that on February 5, 1923, when the tax levy ordinance was passed, there was no statutory authority for the levy of taxes by the city of East St. Louis for street and bridge, police pension or public benefit purposes in addition to the maximum rate of $1.33 1/3 on each $100 assessed valuation prescribed by section I of article 8 of the Cities and Villages act, and that the amendments to the several applicable statutes, (Laws of 1923, pp. 202, 252, 262,) all effective July I, 1923, which authorize additional rates for the specific purposes in question, have no retrospective operation, and cannot be invoked to sustain taxes levied before their enactment in excess of the maximum rates authorized at the time of the tax levy.
Prior to July I, 1923, there was no authority, in a city of the population of East St. Louis, to extend a tax for streets and bridges, police pensions or public benefits, in addition to the maximum rate of $1.33 1/3 on each $100 assessed valuation. (Smith's Stat. 1921, art. 8, sec. I, p. 221.) When the tax levy ordinance here involved was passed, the taxes for the three purposes specified were included within the statutory limitation for general purposes and the excess above that rate was void. (People v. Louisville and Nashville Railroad Co.
Appellant also objected to the tax of the East Side Levee and Sanitary District, and its objection was overruled. The county clerk extended the tax at the rate of $1.02 on each $100 assessed valuation, which rate was required to produce the amount levied. Appellant contends that the tax is within the provisions of "An act concerning *456 the levy and extension of taxes," approved May 9, 1901, as subsequently amended; (Laws of 1921, p. 763;) that if the tax had been reduced as required by that act it would have been extended at the rate of 45.1 cents on each $100 assessed valuation, and that the portion of the tax produced by the extension of a rate in excess of 45.1 cents is void.
The district in question was organized under "An act to create sanitary districts in certain localities and to drain and protect the same from overflow for sanitary purposes," approved May 17, 1907. (Laws of 1907, p. 289.) Section 17 of that act confers upon the boards of trustees of such districts the power to levy taxes for corporate purposes. Section 2 of "An act concerning the levy and extension of taxes," approved May 9, 1901, as originally enacted, (Laws of 1901, p. 272,) provided, among other things, that "the rate per cent of the tax levy of every county, city, town, township, school district, park district, sanitary district, road district, and other public authorities (except the State), shall be ascertained and determined (and reduced when necessary as above provided), in the manner hereinbefore specified, and shall then be extended by the county clerk upon the assessed value of the property subject thereto." While this section was amended in 1905, 1909, 1915, 1917, 1919, 1921 and 1923, (Laws of 1905, p. 365; Laws of 1909, p. 323; Laws of 1915, p. 572; Laws of 1917, pp. 662, 668; Laws of 1919, p. 772; Laws of 1921, p. 763; Laws of 1923, p. 484;) no change was made in the quoted portion except that in 1909 the word "village" was interpolated after the word "city," and by the amendment of 1915 the words "school district" were stricken out. So far, therefore, as sanitary district tax rates are concerned, they have been included in the act, by its express terms, from the time of its passage. (People v. Chicago and Alton Railroad Co.
It is a maxim in the construction of statutes that where two acts are seemingly repugnant, they should be so construed, if possible, that the later one may not operate as a repeal of the former by implication, and in all such cases if a construction can reasonably be given by which both acts can stand it will be adopted. (City of Rockford v. Schultz,
The judgment of the county court is affirmed so far as the sanitary district tax is concerned, but with reference to the street and bridge, police pension fund and public benefit taxes of the city of East St. Louis the judgment is reversed.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
