137 Misc. 62 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1930
These are applications concerning certiorari orders directed to reviewing the action of the board of taxes and assessments in assessing for taxation for the year 1929 buildings owned by the relators, the construction of which was begun after October 1, 1927. They were not ready for occupancy on October 1, 1928, but were occupied or partly occupied December 15, 1928. Relators attack the action of the board on the ground that the latter’s con-r traction and application of section 889-a of the Greater New York Charter would render that provision unfair and unconstitutional as being (1) retroactive in operation, (2) impairing the obligation of a contract, (3) a taking of property without due process of law. This section of the charter was added by Laws of 1913, chapter 324, which became a law on April eighteenth of that year, to take effect immediately. It reads: “ § 889-a. A building in course of construction, commenced since the preceding first day of October and not ready for occupancy, shall not be assessed.” It was amended by chapter 688 of the Laws of 1928, passed as an “ emergency ” measure on March twenty-seventh of that year, adding to the Section quoted the words: “ Except that this section shall not be construed to prevent the assessment of such a building where it is ready for occupancy or a part thereof is' occupied prior to the fifteenth day of December.” Section 2 of the amendment reads: “This act shall take effect September first, nineteen hundred and twenty-eight.”
Relators argue in the first place that by general rules of construction statutes should be interpreted as prospective rather than retroactive, provided there is any doubt as to their interpretation. I see no doubt in the instant case, and while I do not understand — and it is not satisfactorily explained — why the amendment was made to take effect September 1, 1928, rather than immediately as of the date of passage, I find in that provision no more than a reaffirmance of intention that the act was to be applied during the then current year. It is the law and practice to assess realty (for example) for the year 1929 as of the taxing date October 1, 1928. The provision, therefore, imposing a greater tax upon relators’ property than would have been allowable under the statute as unamended became effective before the taxing date. The effect of the amendment is no more retroactive than would be any provision increasing a tax upon property during any current year. The gravamen of relator’s complaint is really that the tax is a violation of what may be regarded as a contract between relators and the State.
In the applications before me we have a statute that was passed long before any shortage of dwellings, or of other buildings, was imminent, and of course, in the absence of any declared policy of the State in regard thereto. It is couched in language inappropriate to interpretation as either a promise or an offer, and was apparently intended- to bestow a bare “ gratuity.” {Tucker v. Ferguson, supra.) I find no analogy between the facts in any of the cases cited by relators and those in the present case, or between the principles which govern them. The same is true of
In 347 West Thirty-sixth Street Corporation the motion of relators to sustain the certiorari order is denied, and the cross-motion of.respondent to dismiss the same is granted. In the three other applications the motions of relators for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to rule 112 of the Rules- of Civil Practice are denied. Order signed.