The People of the State of Colorado, Appellee, In the Interest of Je.C. and Ja.C., Children, and Concerning T.W. and L.C., Appellants.
Court of Appeals No. 25CA1997
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
May 7, 2026
25CA1997 Peo in Interest of JC 05-07-2026
Opinion by JUDGE ASHBY*; Román, C.J., and Bernard*, J., concur
Arapahoe County District Court No. 23JV289, Honorable Shay Whitaker, Judge. NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e).
Sheena Knight, Counsel for Youth, Brighton, Colorado, for Je.C. and Ja.C.
The Morgan Law Office, Kristofr P. Morgan, Colorado Springs, Colorado for Appellant T.W.
Patrick R. Henson, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Chelsea A. Carr, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado for Appellant L.C.
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division A
I. Background
¶ 2 In April 2023, the Arapahoe County Department of Human Services (the Department) received a referral that father had dementia, believed that mother and the children were strangers holding him against his will, and physically harmed the children when they tried to stop him from leaving the home. As a result, the Department provided ongoing support to the family. During a meeting with the caseworker in August 2023, the children reported concerns about mother’s substance use, anger, and physical aggression. After receiving a report that mother had threatened the children’s lives, the Department filed a petition in dependency or neglect and sought temporary custody of the children. The juvenile court granted temporary custody to the Department, who placed the children with maternal grandmother. But three weeks later, based on concerns about grandmother’s substance use, the Department transferred the children to foster care where they remained.
¶ 3 The juvenile court then adjudicated the children dependent and neglected and adopted treatment plans for mother and father. In December 2024, the Department moved to terminate both parents’ parental rights. Following a multi-day hearing spanning several months, the juvenile court granted the motion and terminated mother’s and father’s legal relationships with the children.
II. Termination Criteria and Standard of Review
¶ 4 The juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the children were adjudicated dependent or neglected; (2) the parent has not complied with an appropriate, court-approved treatment plan or the plan has not been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s conduct or condition is unlikely to change within a reasonable time.
¶ 5 Whether the juvenile court properly terminated parental rights is a mixed question of fact and law. People in Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15; see also People in Interest of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 8 (applying the same standard of review to whether a department of human services satisfied its obligation to make
III. Reasonable Efforts
¶ 6 Father contends that the juvenile court erred by finding that the Department made reasonable efforts to reunify him with the children when the Department failed to make reasonable accommodations for his disability. We disagree.
A. Applicable Law
¶ 7 Before a court may terminate parental rights under
¶ 8 Appropriate services provided in accordance with
¶ 9 Additionally, the
¶ 10 Whether a parent is a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA is a case-by-case determination. Id. at ¶ 21. Before a department can be required to provide reasonable accommodations under the ADA, it must know that the individual has a qualifying disability, either because that disability is obvious
¶ 11 A parent is ultimately responsible for utilizing the services provided by a department to obtain the assistance needed to comply with their treatment plan. People in Interest of J.C.R., 259 P.3d 1279, 1285 (Colo. App. 2011). In determining whether a department made reasonable efforts, a juvenile court should consider the totality of the circumstances and account for all services and resources provided to a parent, measuring them holistically rather than in isolation with respect to specific treatment plan objectives. See People in Interest of My.K.M. v. V.K.L., 2022 CO 35, ¶¶ 33, 35.
B. Additional Background
¶ 12 In October 2023, father filed a notice asserting that the ADA applied based on his diagnoses of vascular dementia and multiple myeloma cancer. At that time, father did not request any specific
¶ 13 In March 2024, the Department moved the juvenile court for a finding that no appropriate treatment plan could be devised for father, asserting that “[d]ue to [father’s] diagnosis and inability to care for himself and the minor children, [the Department did] not believe that an appropriate treatment plan [could] be [de]vised to address [his] unfitness as a parent.” In response, father’s counsel moved for a finding that the Department failed to make reasonable efforts to develop a treatment plan and explore reasonable accommodations for his disability.
¶ 14 The court set a contested hearing to resolve the motions. Father’s witness, qualified as an expert in treatment planning and accommodations for individuals with disabilities, testified that, even though father would not be able to become a custodial parent because of his medical conditions, he could participate in services at his nursing home, attend family time, and maintain an ongoing relationship with the caseworker through continued monthly
C. Analysis
¶ 15 The juvenile court concluded that, understanding father’s condition, status, and treatment plan terms, the Department made reasonable efforts.
¶ 16 The record reflects that the Department (1) provided supervised family time for father at his nursing home and scheduled phone contact for the children and father; (2) spoke to two of father’s medical social workers and their director;
¶ 17 Nevertheless, father asserts that the Department failed to make reasonable efforts and reasonably accommodate his disability because the caseworker did not provide mechanisms to enhance his relationship with the children, engage in more frequent contact with him, or proactively reach out to his providers. But, as detailed above, the record reflects that the caseworker maintained contact with father and his team and made resources available to the children to maintain a relationship with father and process his illness. Moreover, nothing in the record suggests that, had the caseworker communicated with father more frequently or provided the children with additional dementia-specific resources, it would have made a difference in the outcome of the case — particularly considering father’s diagnosis and its undisputed impact on his
¶ 18 Thus, based on the totality of the circumstances, we discern no error in the juvenile court’s conclusion that the Department made reasonable efforts.
¶ 19 Mother asserts that the juvenile court erred by finding that she could not become a fit parent within a reasonable time because, in her view, she made substantial progress in her treatment plan objectives. We are not persuaded.
A. Applicable Law
¶ 20 An unfit parent is one whose conduct or condition renders him or her unable to give a child reasonable parental care. People in Interest of D.P., 160 P.3d 351, 353 (Colo. App. 2007). Reasonable parental care requires, at a minimum, that the parent provide nurturing and safe parenting sufficiently adequate to meet the child’s physical, emotional, and mental health needs. People in Interest of A.J., 143 P.3d 1143, 1152 (Colo. App. 2006). A parent’s noncompliance with a treatment plan generally “demonstrates a lack of commitment to meeting the child’s needs and, therefore, may also be considered in determining unfitness.” People in Interest of D.P., 181 P.3d 403, 408 (Colo. App. 2008).
¶ 21 In determining whether a parent’s conduct or condition is likely to change within a reasonable time, “the court may consider whether any change has occurred during the proceeding, the
B. Analysis
¶ 22 Mother’s treatment plan required her to (1) maintain caseworker contact; (2) complete a substance abuse evaluation to determine the most appropriate course of treatment; (3) cooperate with all requested urinalysis (UA) tests; (4) maintain and budget legal income to meet her financial obligations; (5) complete a mental health evaluation and comply with all treatment recommendations; (6) attend family time; and (7) provide a safe, stable, and suitable residence for the children.
¶ 23 The juvenile court found that, although mother had made some progress on her treatment plan, she did not reasonably comply with the plan overall and continued to exhibit the same concerns that originally necessitated the Department’s involvement with the family. Therefore, the court found mother to be unfit. The
¶ 24 The record supports the juvenile court’s findings. The Department asked mother to submit to random, weekly UAs. But mother submitted only a small percentage of her required UAs during the last year of the case. Mother’s therapist expressed concern that mother was not complying with required UA testing and that mother had sent a threatening email to Ja.C.’s guardian ad litem one week before the final day of the termination hearing. The therapist agreed that mother “still ha[d] a lot of work to do” regarding impulse control, coping skills, and anger management.
¶ 25 The caseworker testified that, over the course of the two-year-long case, mother had not maintained stable employment, shown sustained sobriety, or demonstrated the ability to use coping skills or tools to manage her anger. Therefore, the caseworker opined that mother was unlikely to become fit if given more time.
¶ 26 Even so, mother asserts that the juvenile court erred because she made “significant improvements” in managing her mental
V. Less Drastic Alternatives
¶ 27 Both parents contend that the juvenile court erred by finding that there were no less drastic alternatives to termination. We are not persuaded.
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶ 28 The consideration and elimination of less drastic alternatives are implicit in the statutory criteria for termination. A.M., ¶ 40. In considering less drastic alternatives, a juvenile court must give
¶ 29 For a less drastic alternative to be viable, it must do more than adequately meet the child’s needs; it must be in the child’s best interests. A.M., ¶ 27. If a juvenile court considers a less drastic alternative but finds instead that termination is in the children’s best interests, it must reject the alternative and order termination. Id. at ¶ 32.
¶ 30 “We review a juvenile court’s less drastic alternatives findings for clear error.” People in Interest of E.W., 2022 COA 12, ¶ 34. Thus, when a juvenile court considers less drastic alternatives but
B. Analysis
¶ 31 The juvenile court considered less drastic alternatives to termination but found that none of them would meet the children’s physical, emotional, and mental health needs. In so finding, the court considered the foster parents’ preference for adoption, the children’s wishes, mother’s ongoing struggles with substance use and anger management, and any benefit to the children of continuing their relationships with the parents.
¶ 32 The record supports these findings. The caseworker reported that visiting father was difficult for the children, in part, due to his declining short-term memory and lack of consistent engagement with the children during visits. And mother continued to involve the children in inappropriate conversations during family time. The caseworker testified that she and the children’s guardian ad litem discussed the option of an APR with the children several times over the course of the proceedings. But the children consistently expressed feeling unsafe when discussing an APR and potential
¶ 33 Moreover, the caseworker testified that she had discussed various permanency options with the foster parents on multiple occasions, and the foster parents preferred termination and eventual adoption over an APR. See People in Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 920 (Colo. App. 2011); see also People in Interest of P.D., 580 P.2d 836, 838 (Colo. App. 1978) (noting that a court cannot enter an APR to an unwilling party who is not the child’s parent). Contrary to mother’s arguments, the lack of direct testimony from the foster parents and there being no evidence that the foster parents would have had “the children removed from their home if they were not immediately allowed to adopt” do not, on their own, require the court to find that an APR was a viable less drastic alternative. Rather, as detailed above, in assessing whether an APR was viable the court properly considered numerous factors together with the foster parents’ preference for adoption. See Z.M., ¶ 29.
¶ 35 Because the record supports the juvenile court’s finding that there was no less drastic alternative to termination, which was in the children’s best interests, we must accept its determination. See B.H., ¶ 80.
VI. Disposition
¶ 36 The judgment is affirmed.
CHIEF JUDGE ROMÁN and JUDGE BERNARD concur.