| Fla. | Jul 1, 1867
Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion of-the Court:
In this ease a bill was filed in the Circuit Court of Columbio county on the 3d day of April, 1867, by James W. Spratt and Daniel Callahan, asking, among other things, that the Chancellor would grant an injunction to restrain the defendants, the P. & G. R. R. Co. and the A. & G. R¡ R. Co., from running locomotives and cars over the branch road from Live Oak Station to the Georgia and Florida boundary line, or any part thereof, or committing waste thereon, or in
■ There is also a prayer for such further or other relief as the nature and circumstances of the case may require.
The material statements in the bill necessary now to b© considered are:
This statement is denied by the answer of the P. & G. B, B. Company,
This allegation is denied in the answer of the P. & G. B'„ B. Co., one of the defendants.
This lien is denied in the answers of the defendants.
To this allegation the defendants reply, denying that they took possession of said road, but that the same was turned over to them by the military, authorities of the United States, after-the close of the late civil war, and that the United States took possession of it as captured and abandoned property.
This is admitted in the answers and the amount of the purchase money, and the funds in which it was paid, is fully .set forth.
This is denied in the answers, and it is averred that the value of said road has been increased more than double since it went into the possession of the A. & G. R. R. Co., by the expenditure of large sums of money in repairs and improvements.
This is not denied by the answer.
This is admitted in the answer of the P. & G. R..R. Co.
' There aré many other statements and allegations in the bill, which at this time and for the purpose of deciding the questions properly raised, it is unnecessary to notice.
The argument at bar took a wide range, embracing questions proper to be considered on a final hearing, and was characterized, both for complainants and defendants, by marked ability and learning. If the case was before us on final hearing, we should feel it our duty to consider and decide all the points raised by the bill and answer and argued at bar. In the present condition of' the case, the record presents an appeal from an interlocutory order of the court below from granting an injunction, and to the propriety of granting an injunction we shall chiefly direct our inquiries, leaving other questions to be settled when they properly arise.
The object and purpose of an injunctionis to preserve and keep things in the same state or condition, and to restrain an act, which if done, would be contrary to equity and goad conscience ; and it is the appropriate relief when the remedy at law is subsequent to the injury, and the effectp cannot be •adequately compensated. Jeremy’s Eq. Juris., 308.
In order tq support a motion for an injunction, the bill should .set forth a ease of probable right, and a probable danger that the right would be defeated without the interposition of the court. I.t is not enough that a complainant shall allege in his bill that the injury will occur to himself or property, but he must show facts to enable the court to judge jf the injury will be of the character stated, before he will be entitled to the interposition of the court. 1 Randolph, 206; 11 Ela. Rep., 167.
Ip th.e ca.sg .of the Attorney General vs. New Jersey Rail
It is objected on the part of the defendants that the injunction in this case is used correctively and as a punishment ; that the relief granted by the chancellor is inconsistent with the special relief prayed for in the bill, and for this and other reasons the injunction should be dissolved.
To this it is replied on behalf the complainants, that if the court shall find that the bill contains no prayer for specific relief, corresponding’ to the relief decreed, yet under the prayer for general relief the court may grant any other relief, though inconsistent to the relief specially asked, provided it be agreeable to the case made by the bill.
Many authorities have been cited for and against the positions assumed, but we shall only refer to a few of the leading ones.
In the case of English vs. Eoxhall, the Supreme Court of the IJ. States held, t( that under a general prayer for relief, only relief consistent with the case made in the bill can be granted. The same court decided the same point in the case of Hobson vs. McArthur, and the citatións from Story’s Eq. are to the same effect. 2 Peter’s Sup. Ct. Rep., 223; 8 Cond. Rep. Sup. Ct., 229; 16 Peter’s Sup. Ct. Rep., 195; Story’s Eq. Pl., §40, 41, 42, 43.
On examination it will be found that these authorities do not decide the question raised in this case; they decide that under the prayer for general relief, such relief may be afforded as is consistent with the case made in the bill, thong]» not specially prayed for; but they do not decide that relief may be granted inconsistent with the relief specially asked.
In the case of Hiern vs. Mill, decided by Lord Chancellor
It is important to ascertain what were the rales of the English Courts of Chancery on this subject, in order rightly to understand the import ’ of this ruling of the Chancellor. Formerly the chancellors prescribed rules governing the practice of that court in all matters, even to the manner in which bills should be framed ; and this was so up to the 15 and 16 Tide., ch. 86, sec. 10, when Parliament passed an act to amend the practice of the Court of Chancery.
The length of a bill, with its charging part, and its pretences, was found to be inconvenient and unnecessary, and this act was passed in order to render the practice simple and easy in the preparation of bills and answers. “ This statutory direction, says Mr. Daniel, does not alter the rules in force previously. That rule was, that when the prayer did not extend to embrace all the relief to which the plaintiff might at the hearing show a right, the defect in the relief might be supplied under the general prayer, provided that such relief waa consistent with that specifically prayed, as well as with the case made by the bill, for the court would not suffer a defendant to be taken by surprise, and permit a plaintiff to neglect and pass over the prayer he had made, and take another decree, even though it were according to the case made by his bill.” Daniel’s Ch. PI. and Prac., 383.
From this it will be seen that when Lord Chancellor Erskine said, “that the plaintiff cannot desert specific relief prayed and, under the general prayer, ask specific relief
In the case of Butler et al. vs. Durham, it was held by the Supreme Court of Georgia “ that if there be a prayer for specific relief and also a prayer for general relief, the complainant shall have such other relief, under the general prayer, as is consistent with the case made and the special prayer and no more.” 2 Kelly’s Ga, Rep., 420; R. M. Charlton’s Rep., 280.
In the case of Stone vs. Anderson and Treadwell vs: Brown, it was held by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire “that, under the prayer for general relief, the plaintiff may have such relief as he is entitled to, without regard to any defect in the prayer for special relief, provided it does not conflict with that specially prayed for.” 6 Foster’s Rep., 506; 44 New Hamp. Rep., 551.
The court, under the general prayer’ for relief, will grant such relief only as the case stated in the bill and sustained by the proofs will justify. The frame and straeture of the bill in this case is for an injunction to restrain the defendants from running, using or removing locomotives and cars over the road or any part thereof, or committing waste thereon, or in any way, manner’ or form using the said road, to the detriment in value of the same, by wearing out the same ; and for an account of the indebtedness of the plaintiffs to the defendants, and for a sale of the road to satisfy the same.
There is nothing in this bill looking to the impounding the revenues of the road, and requiring its officers to make monthly returns of its earnings and expenditures to the court. No such decree was either necessary or proper to preserve
The relief granted by the Chancellor is not the special relief asked for by the complainants, and if the decree made in this case is to be sustained, it must be under the general prayer for relief in the close of the bill. As to the relief to be given under a general prayer, we have seen the rule to be, that it must be agreeable to the case made by the bill, and not inconsistent with the relief specifically prayed for. Chalmers vs. Chambers, decided by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, 6 Harris & Johnson’s Rep., 30.
In this case the relief asked is for an injunction to restrain the defendants from running, using or removing locomotives and ears over the road, or any part thereof, or in any manner using the said road, and also for an account and sale of the road, to satisfy the debt and claim of the complainants; and a general prayer for such relief as to the court should seem meet.
The relief granted by the decree of the Chancellor is, “ that the defendants be enjoined from executing or in any wise carrying into effect the agreement entered into between the President of the P. & G. E. E. Co. and the President of the A. & G. E. E. Co., relative to the sale or lease of said branch road, and that the A. & G-. E. E. Co¡ be enjoined from paying over to the P. & G. E. E. Co, any sums of money growing out of the consideration upon which the aforesaid agreement, contract, or attempted sale or lease ivas madej
2d. That the A. & G. E. E. Co. be enjoined, until the further order of the court, from disposing in any manner whatsoever of any of the incomes and earnings of said branch road, except in the payment of the necessary repairs and the necessary expenses of running and operating said road.
4th. “ The same order as the above, against the P. & G. E» E. Co.”
5th. “ That the defendants do appear before tlio Chancellor, at his Chambers at Lake City, on Friday, the 15th day of May, 1867, to show cause, if any they have, why a Eeceiver shall not be ap]3ointed in this case.”
We are now called upon to decide if the relief granted is agreeable to the case made by the bill, and not inconsistent with that specifically asked. The statement of the special prayer for relief and the relief granted answers the question,for it would be difficult to conceive anything in Chancery proceedings more inconsistent than the prayer for specific relief in this case, and the decree rendered.
The complainants ask that the defendants be l'estrained from running their cars and locomotives over the road to its injury and their detriment: The decree responds to this prayer of the complainants by permitting the defendants the free use of the road, but impounds the revenues arising from its use. The relief asked for is refused, but something else, wholly inconsistent, and to the great injury of the defendants, is granted. Was there any obstruction to the court’s granting the particular relief prayed ? If not, the plaintiffs could not abandon that asked and take a different decreé under the general prayer. Allen vs. Coffman, 1 Bibb R., 469; Thompson vs. Smithson, 7 Peters’ Rep., 144; Read vs. Cramer, 1 Green. Ch. Rep., 277.
In this case we can see no obstruction to the granting by the Chancellor the particular relief asked, if it was proper to issue an injunction at all.
The insolvency of the debtor is never a sufficient reason of itself for the exercise of the extraordinary power of the court by way of injunction, and courts have never acted upon the suggestion of insolvency in the debtor unless there was some other equitable ground for its interposition.
The case of Yonge & Bryan vs. McCormick, cited from 6 Fla. Rep., 370, is not in opposition to this recognized principle of equity. In that case the facts were as follows ; The complainants had purchased from the defendant a tract of land, had paid a part of the purchase money and given their notes for the balance. The title to a part of the land was found to- be in the wife of the- defendant and not in himself. The bill was filed to restrain the defendant from collecting the balance of the purchase money for which the- notes had been given, and it sets forth the failure of consideration because of the defect of defendant’s title to the land, and also the insolvency of the defendant. Baltzell, Ch. J., in delivering the opinion of the court, says: “ The. defectiveness of the title to a part of the property, and the inability of defendant, through insolvency, to compensate the deficiency, are the grounds of equity set. forth by complainants, and are sufficient of themselves to entitle them to the injurietion.”
It will be seen, from an examination of this case, that the court do not place their decision on the ground of the insolvency of the vendor, but upon that of a failure of consideration and the insolvency of the vendor combined; and that it would be inequitable to allow the vendor to recover from his debtor a sum of money for property to which he had no title, and which, if paid, he, ex cequo ei bono, ought to refund.
In the present case the answer of one of the defendants (the A. & G. R. R. Co.,) alleges that the value of the road has been greatly enhanced by the expenditure of large sums of money in improvements and repairs, and the court must be presumed to know that railroads, over which passengers .and freights are dally transported, do not usually fall into decay, and .are not liable to that irreparable injury from waste, whieh alone will authorize the granting an injunction to stay it.
In the case of Thebaut & Glazier vs. Canova et als., decided by this court at the last term, it is laid down that courts with great reluctance interfere with the free use and enjoyment of property by its owner, as his taste or his inclination may direct; and it is only in a case where it is clearly made out that this use and enjoyment is prejudicial and injurious to the rights of others, that it will lend its aid to restrain and abridge this free enjoyment. They should ponder long and consider well, when their aid is invoked for this purpose, before they act.
The complainants claim that they have a lien on the road for the work done and the materials furnished'; that it is an equitable lien, and they are therefore entitled to the injunction granted. The existence of a lien will, it is true, authorize their going into a Court of Equity to enforce it, and will give to the court 'jurisdiction, but it does sot follow,
If it was made clearly to appear to the court that the complainants had an unquestioned lien on the road for the payment of their demand, yet before they would entitle themselves to the interposition of the court, by way of an injunction, they must allege and show that the use of the' road by the defendants would in all probability tend to its injury or destruction to an extent that would impair its value as a security for their demand, and peril its ultimate payment, when their lien shall come to be enforced in the courts by decree.
The facts contained in the record do not warrant the court ip coming to the conclusion that such would be the case.
The road is within the jurisdiction of the court and cannot be removed. The answer of the A. & G. R. R. Co., one of the defendants, alleges, .that by the„large sums of money expended and. laid out in repairs and improvements, the value of the road has been doubled, and that it is greatly more than sufficient to respond to the demand of complainants, if it shall be adjudged that they have a lien on it for the payment .of their claim. Whatever lien the complainants may have cannot be lost or impaired by the action of the defendants, unless such action should result in injury to, or destruction of, the property to such a degree as to reduce its value below the amount claimed by the complainants.
No sale or- transfer of the property pending this suit can convey a title that would defeat any lien they may have, and if the defendants were to attempt to impair its value by any act of waste or wanton destruction of the subject matter, to an .extent that would render inadequate the complainants’ security, it would be their right to apply for and
It is urged in argument that there is no equity in the bill, and that the complainants have a plain and adequate remedy at law. In the present condition of the cause, we do not feel called upon to decide the point made by the objection. This is an appeal from an interlocutory order of the chancellor granting the injunction to restrain the defendants from the use of their road. The bill sets up an equitable lien on the part of the complainants, which is denied by the defendants in their answers. From the record we do not clearly see that any such lien exists or is established, yet as it may be in the power of complainants to establish the existence of a lien on their part, the bill will not be dismissed.
For the reasons herein set forth, we think the injunction in this case was improvidently granted, and that it must be dissolved at the cost of complainants and the case remanded to the Circuit Court of Suwannee Circuit for further proceedings, not inconsistent with this opinion.
Concurrence Opinion
delivered the following opinion :
I fully concur in the judgment of the court, and adopt the reasons given for the reversal of the chancellor’s order granting the injunction. I do not, however, concur in the expression op intimation of any opinion on the question of complainants’ lien.
The case presented by the record being an appeal from an interlocutory order, the judgment rendered settles all the questions properly presented for our decision.
It is true that the counsel on both sides elaborately argued the merits of the case before us, asking a decree under the provisions of the statute authorizing this court, in cases of appeal, to make such “ decree as the court below ought rto have given.”
The complainants were not entitled to a decree on their xx parte testimony, filed for the purpose of securing the writ of injunction, which might possibly be explained or rebutted by defendants.
Neither could the bill have been dismissed, unless it failed to set forth any equitable claim. A denial in the answer of all the equities would net be sufficient to sustain such decree.
If, therefore, the condition of the ease was such that it did not become the duty of the chancellor to give a decree, this court would .ceriaiflalj exceed its powers in doing so. Taking this view .of the case, I do not consider it proper to express or intimate any opinion on the equitable lien claimed, which might possibly influence the chancellor in his decision or in .any way embarrass this court, should the question hereafter be properly presented for adjudication.
The following dissenting opinion was delivered by Judge PUTNAM:
I am unable to concur in opinion with the majority of the ‘Court.
The bill shows that appellees entered upon the portion of road belonging to the P. & G. R. R. Co., lying between the Live Oak station and the line dividing the States of Florida and Georgia in the month of April, ,1864, under a contract made between the Pensacola & Georgia It. It. Co. and the Confederate Government, by which the latter was to put the x’oad-bed over that portion of the line in “ fit and proper condition to x’eceive the track,” to place thereon the iron, for which, -as more fully appears by answer of the Pen. & Georgia It. It. Co., the Confederate Government was to have the use during the continuance of the then existing war,
The. answer of the Pen. & Ga. E. E. Co. does not deny any of the material allegations of the bill, except notice, but sets up an alleged violation of the agreement on the part of the Confederate Government, and claims that the improvements were made by appellees for the Confederate Government and not for defendants. There is no pretence that the P. & G. E. E. Co. ever gave any notice to complainants of the breach aforesaid, or at any time notified them that the P. & G. E. E. Co. would not pay for their repairs and improvements.
The A. & G. B. B. Co. set up in their answer the illegality of the contract under which the repairs and improvements were made, and alleges that it is a purchase for valuable consideration without notice, and sets out an agreement under which it claims and admits it is a [foreign, corporation. The bill alleges that the A. & G. B. B. Co. had notice both of the repairs and iiftprovements, and of their lien.
In applying certain recognized principles of equity jurisprudence to the case, as thus presented by the record, the first question for consideration is, have appellees made a case which entitles them to an equitable lien for compensation? Second, the propriety, under the showing, of granting the injunction? Mr. Justice Story, in his excellent treatise on equity jurisprudence, sec. 1217, says: “there are Mens recognized in equity, whose existence is not known, or obligation enforced at law, and in respect to which courts of equity exercise a very large and salutary jurisdiction.” Again, in sec. 1236, “ the doctrine of contribution in equity is larger than at law,' and -in many cases repairs and improvements will be held to be, not merely a personal charge, but a lien upon the estate itself.” In section 1237, the same author says: “ Courts of equity: have not confined the doctrine of compensation, or lien, for repairs and improvements, to cases of agreement or joint purchasers, but have extended it to other cases, where the party making the repairs and improvements has acted bona fide and innocently, and there has been a substantial benefit conferx-ed on the owner, so that excequo et bono, he ought to pay for such benefit.”
Yiewing this case in the light. of the doctrine above laid down, the conclusioix is irresistible, that the appellees aré entitled to their equitable liexx for compensation as agaixxst
The answer of this defendant shows that the company had knowledge of the improvements being made, for it alleges a protest made :to the agent of the Confederate Government for an alleged violation of contract, yet the company gave no notice to complainants, nor did it forewarn them against proceeding with their work, but stood by and suffered the improvements to be made upon their property, whereby it is greatly enhanced in value. To permit the company thus to enrich itself at the expense of complainants, would be contrary to every principle of equity and justice.
The contract set up by the P. & Ga. E. E. Co. in their answer with the Confederate authorities under which these repairs and improvements were made by complainants, so far Implicates this defendant as privy thereto, as to attach the equities of complainants and to entitle them to an enforcement of their lien for compensation .out of the property in the hands of the P. &. G. E. E. Co.
Nor can I perceive that the answer of the defendants in any particular entitles them to any modification of these equitable doctrines in their application to this case. The Well settled principle, delido, estops them from making it available for their relief.
The agreement set up Was for repairs and improvements to be placed upon the property of one of the parties, the P-. ’& G. E. E. Co., to be compensated in part by use and enjoyment, the balance upon tbe happening of an event in money, by the owner, the P. & G. E. E. Co.
In the case of Woodward vs. Lively, 36 Pennsylvania State Eeports, 437, cited at bar, it Was held by the court 'that “ although, in one aspect an improvement lease, ñév
Whether the- defence set up by the A. & Gr. R. R. Co. can avail to relieve the property in their hands from the operation of the lien, is a question more properly to be considered on the final hearing of the cause. Without expressing an opinion as to the validity of the contract between the two defendants touching the sale or lease of the road, it is sufficient that the bill, answers and exhibits disclose such a state of facts as eminently to justify the chancellor in the court below in his action in holding the questions presented for further consideration when the case should be submitted upon the proofs.
Having thus disposed of the question of lien, it only remains to inquire whether, agreeably to the case made by the record,, the chancellor in the court below erred in gi’anting the ox-der from which an appeal has brought the case before this COUX’t.
This court, in the case of the city of Apalachicola vs. the Apalachicola Land Co., 9 Florida Reports, authorizes the chancellor*, on a xnotion for an injunction, to go into the consideration of the merits as disclosed in the bill and which are intrinsic and dependent upon its express allegations and chai’ges.
In the spirit of this decision, in a case where the answers of the defendants are filed, it would be the duty of the chancellor*, fox* the same purpose and to the same extent, to consider the merits of tJxe case as presented by the entire record. ?.
1. The bill alleges permanent repairs and improvements upon the property of one of the defendants, with notice, and without objection, by which that defendant has been essentially benefitted, and for which complainants have received no compensation, and asserts an equitable lien.
2. It alleges the pendency of a suit at law for the recovery of the demand; that the P. & G. P. P. Co. is insolvent and has no other property than that by complainants improved, out of which compensation can be had, and that unless their lien is enforced upon that specific property, they are without remedy.
8. It alleges an attempted disposition of the property to the other defendant, the A. ■& G. P. P. Co., a corporation having its existence without the jurisdiction of this court,' with notice of the existence of lien, for the purpose of defeating it.
4. That complainants are professional railroad contractors; that the repairs and improvements are of a character requiring mechanical experience and skill in their construction, and that they have never been legally dispossessed of their work upon said road.
The answer of the P. & G. P. P. Co. does not deny any of the material allegations of the bill, except the existence of the lien, and notice of the performance of the work by complainants, but sets up a breach of contract on the part of the Confederate Government, yet does not bring home to complainants notice of the alleged breach.
The answer of the A. & G. P. P. Co. sets up illegality of the contract, denies notice of the lien, and alleges that they are purchasers without notice and consideration paid, and makes exhibit of the contract under which they claim.
On application for injunction after answer, the court will
Insolvency has been held by this court a sufficient ground for granting an injunction.
Willard on Injunctions says, page 22, that an injunction may be granted where the defendants, against whom there is otherwise a good remedy at law, is insolvent or about to abscond. On page 100, the same author declares, “that it is not error to refuse to dissolve an injunction where the insolvency of a party, on whom the equity of the case largely depends, is charged positively upon knowledge and belief in the bill and positively denied in the answer.”
While the court will abstain from committing itself to points or questions which will arise on the final hearing, it will examine into them sufficiently to enable it to determine whether the injunction should be granted or refused. The court will then balance the facts as alleged by the respective parties to enable it to come to a correct conclusion. In doing this, if complainants have made a case showing a probaable dcmgev, the right may be defeated and an injunction may be granted. Read et al. vs. Dews et al., R. M. Charlton’s Repts., 356.
The present caséis much stronger. As against the P. & G, R. R. Co. there can be no question as to the propriety of the action of the court below in granting the injunction ; and in the .case .of the other defendant, the A. G. R. R. Co., it is equally clear to my mind that the facts justify the action of the .chancellor. I.t is a non-resident corporation, in possession of the property, using it to the detriment of complainants, holding by at least a questionable claim and withdrawing
The order in this case is not inconsistent with the ease made by the record; and it seems carefully to guard the rights of all parties, with little or no hardship or injury to either. Nor do I perceive anything in the frame of the bill inconsistent with the rules of pleading or rendering it liable to the exception urged by appellants. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the injunction granted by the chancellor should not be dissolved.