27 Pa. Super. 341 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1905
Opinion by
The question raised in this appeal was practically settled by the decisions in Howard Street, 142 Pa. 601, and Hare v. Rice, 142 Pa. 608; which were followed by Melon Street, 182 Pa. 897, and Morris v. Philadelphia, 199 Pa. 357. It was there held that while there was no constitutional obligation to pay damages resulting from vacating a street, it was within the power of the legislature to impose such burden on the commonwealth or its agents by statute, and that this had been effectually done by the 6th section of the Act of April 21, 1858, P. L. 385. By that act damages arising from the vacation of streets in the city of Philadelphia were grafted onto the general system of road damages, and the proceedings appropriate in cases of opening or widening streets were made applicable in vacation cases. As shown in Howard Street, supra, the legislature has put the vacation of streets on the same footing as to the damages thereby resulting to property owners, as the taking for opening or widening; and the assessment of damages and benefits, though condensed into one proceeding, is in effect the same as asssesments for benefits to be collected and of damages to be paid by the city. Under these decisions the statute imposes on the city liability in the first instance for damages resulting from vacating in like manner, as in the cases of opening or widening streets, and the mode of assessing damages and benefits is made the same. That the city should be so liable is a necessary conclusion if it be conceded that assessments for benefits may be made at all, for such assessments are only sustainable as a kind of local taxation upon those specially benefited. The power to impose such taxation implies liability on the part of the taxing power. The duty imposed upon road juries under the act “ to assess damages for the opening, widening, or vacating roads or streets ” puts the damages arising in
The question now under consideration was not presented in Upsal Street, 22 Pa. Superior Ct. 150, and the portion of the opinion in that case cited by the appellant’s counsel was not necessary to the determination of the point there decided. It cannot be considered an adjudication of this court on the question we are now determining.
The assignments are overruled and the decree of the court of quarter sessions is affirmed.