delivered the opinion of the court.
This is аn original proceeding for declaratory judgment pursuant to Rule 1 of the Rules of the Montana Supreme Court. It is based upon the certification of the Hon. James F. Bаttin, United States District Judge, presiding in a civil cause in United States District .Court for the District of Montana entitled “Jeanette Penrod, plaintiff, v. William S. Hoskinson, M.D., defendant.”
The certification states that such litigation involves a controlling question of Montana law as to which there is a substantial ground for a difference of opinion, viz. whether section 93-2624, R.C.M.1947, as amеnded, or section 93-2605, R.C.M. 1947, is the applicable statute of limitation. Judge Battin has further certified that adjudication of this question by the Montana Supreme Court will materially advance ultimate termination of the federal litigation.
The precise question for determination as certified by Judge Battin:
“Is § 93-2624, R.C.M.1947, as amended, enacted in 1971, or is § 93-2605, R.C.M.1947, the applicable statute of limitation in a medical malpractice action in which the alleged negligent act took place in May of 1969, the plaintiff allegedly having discovеred the negligence in September of 1973, and the.action having been filed on April 23, 1975?”
Judge Battin has certified the following facts giving rise to this issue:
“On May 6, 1969, plaintiff underwent surgery in the Holy Rosаry Hospital in Miles City, Montana, where she underwent a *279 hysterectomy, gall bladder removal, and incidental appendectomy. The doctor who performed the surgery wаs the defendant in this case, WILLIAM S. HOSKINSON, M.D. On September 21, 1973, during a routine physical examination, plaintiff was advised by a physician at the Holy Rosary Hospital that it appeared on X-ray that she had a surgical drain in the area of her spleen.
“On August 15, 1974, plaintiff underwent surgery at Holy Rosary Hospital for removal of the drain.
“Plaintiff filed a Complaint charging the defendant with malpractice on or about the 23rd day of April, 1975.”
Defendant has filed a motion for summary judgment in the federal court action, claiming the action is barred by seсtion 93-2624, R.C.M.1947. Plaintiff has opposed the motion for summary judgment on the ground that section 93-2605(3), R.C.M.1947, in conjunction with the “discovery doctrine” set forth in
Johnson v. St. Patrick's Hosp.,
The question for determination involves a finding оf the statutory law of Montana, upon which there is no guiding opinion, and specifically deals with the retroactive effect of section 93-2624, R.C.M.1947. Judge Battin has certified that thе answer to the question is controlling in the action before him and that adjudication thereof by the Montana Supreme Court will materially advance ultimate termination оf the federal court litigation.
We accepted jurisdiction on March 19, 1976, provided for the filing of briefs, heard oral argument on June 3, 1976 and took the matter under advisement.
Wе observe that at the time of the alleged malpractice on May 6, 1969, the applicable statute of limitation was the general tort statute of limitation codifiеd as section 93-2605, R.C.M.1947, providing in part:
“93-2605. Within three years. Within three years:
*280 “3. An action upon an obligation or liability, not founded upon an instrument in writing, other than a contract, account, or promise.”
In 1966 we held that аn action for malpractice does not accrue until the patient learns of it or in the exercise of reasonable care should have learned of it. Johnson v. St. Patrick’s Hospital, supra.
In 1971 before plaintiff’s action had become barred by section 93-2605, the Montana Legislature enacted a specific statute applicable to medical malpractice actions. This statute has been codified as section 93-2624, R.C.M.1947, and provides in part:
“93-2624. Actions for medical malpractice. Action for injury or death against a physician or surgeon * * * based upon such person’s alleged professional negligence, or for rendering professional services without consent, or for error or .omission in such person’s practice, shall be commenced within three (3) years after the date of injury or three (3) years after the plaintiff discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury whichever occurs last, but in no case may such action be commenced after five (5) years from the date of injury. However, this time limitation shаll be tolled for any period during which such person has failed to disclose any act, error, or omission upon which such action is based and which is known to him, or through the use оf reasonable diligence subsequent to said act, error or omission would have been known to him.”
In 1973 this statute was further amended to enlarge the class of persons subject to the statute, but this amendment is irrelevant to the present case. The general three year tort statute of limitation in section 93-2605 has at all times remained in effect.
Thе gist of plaintiff’s contention is that section 93-2624 should not be given retroactive effect and applied to bar plaintiff’s action because the legislature did not so intеnd. Instead, plaintiff argues, the statute of limitations in effect at the time of the *281 alleged malpractice, section 93-2605, in conjunction with the “discovery doctrine” of Johnson, governs plaintiff’s action and presents no bar.
The рrincipal contention of defendant is that section 93-2624 is the applicable statute of limitation because the language exhibits a legislative intent that it be apрlied to claims arising prior to 1971, the date of its enactment. Defendant argues tha-t so applied, plaintiff’s action is barred because five years had expired bеfore it was filed.
At the outset we note section 12-201, R.C.M.1947, which provides:
“No law contained in any of the codes or other statutes of Montana is retroactive unless expressly so declared.”
This statute creates a presumption against construing a statute retroactively.
Dunham v. Southside National Bank of Missoula,
“ ‘While our Constitution does not forbid the enactment of retrospective laws generally, it is a rule recognized by authorities everywhere that retrospective laws are looked upon with disfavor. It is a maxim said to be as old as the law itself that a new statute ought to be prospective, not retrospective, in its operation. * * * The maxim has its foundation in the presumption that the legislature does not intend to make a new rule for past transactions and every reasonаble doubt will be resolved against a retrospective operation.’
The intent of the legislature to give a statute retroactive effect as required by sectiоn 12-201, must be determined by the statute itself and from no other source.
City of Harlem v. State Highway Comm’n,
We find nothing in section 93-2624 exhibiting a legislative intent that it be applied retroactively. Absent such intent, it is applicаble only prospectively.
*282
The remedy v. right distinction drawn in
Gillette v. Hibbard,
Guiterman v. Wishon,
Defendant cites the Arkansas case of
Steele v. Gann,
Aсcordingly, we hold that section 93-2605, R.C.M.1947, is the applicable statute of limitation in a medical malpractice in which the alleged negligent act took place in May 1969, the plaintiff allegedly having discovered the negligence in September *283 1973, and the action having been filed on April 23, 1975, pursuant to the certificate of facts and issues herein.