*1 1913. N. 0.] V.
PENNY
B. F. PENNY RAILROAD v. ATLANTIC COAST LINE COMPANY. March,
(Filed 1913.) — — — Negligence Opinion Duty 1. Issues Instructions —Former of Judge Appeal and Error. Trial — case, appeal, In this on a former held was this Court only negligence that which be inferred the evi- from could Upon appeal dence was of defendant’s conductor. substantially in evidence set out the record the same as on trial, judge presiding issue, former submitted jury, negligence, which was not answered as to on the part master, employees, baggage of another of defendant’s concerning formerly which it was decided was no evidence. there By language charge judge alleged confused negligence baggage under the master first issue with Held, of the conductor: submission the second issue and confusing principles relating negli- first under the issue of law gence part baggage error, on the of the master was reversible judge the trial should have followed decision on the appeal. Judgments Injury Allowable —Discretion —Personal —Interest Jury. judgment personal injury Interest from negligently allowable, the time it is in the caused is even jury. judg- discretion of the Interest runs from the time the ment rendered such cases. J., I-Ioke, J., concurring; Clark, dissenting. C.
Appeal J., Garter, September Term, from at New Hanover.
Civil action. These were issues submitted to the jury: 1. Was the defendant guilty negligence respect conduct of conductor, Garmon, which was a proximate alleged as plaintiff’s injury, the complaint? Answer: Yes.
2. Was the defendant guilty negligence respect conduct Van the.baggage master, a proximate cause of the alleged as plaintiff’s injury, the com- ? plaint Answer:. the plaintiff, Did his own negligence, contribute
own injury, alleged in the answer? Answer: No. THE COURT. IN SUPREME R.R. *2 recover ? An- to any, is entitled damage, plaintiff What interest from date dollars, per
swer : cent Six thousand of his injury. the defendant judgment rendered, appealed.
From the A. J. Marshall plaintiff. M. Bryan, Bellamy, E. K. Rountree, & Davis Elliott, and Dams B. George George defendant. term, This case was before us a former J. at
Bbown, the C., the facts are stated of fully opinion N. the restate The evidence set It to them. unnecessary Court. the same as on record the substantially out in the present trial. former issues from saw fit to different the usual
His Honor submit from those cases and different sub- injury issues personal former mitted the trial. issue, the the conduct relating
The submission of second to- Yan calculated to mis- Amringe, although unanswered, of .was matter which the and draw their attention the lead jury not to bear on the liability of Court held of opinion this defendant. C., N. Court opinion (153 specifi- 298), evidence negligence upon held that there no of was
cally there of Yan evi- baggage that no master; part Amringe dence knew of or had reason to believe that Yan that LaMotte for an unlawful We pistol borrowed held purpose. Amringe lending “the of Yan to LaMotte pistol that act was not the cause of proximate plaintiff, injury bullet fired from We stray Calloway’s was caused by pistol.” is, legal further “There direct causal parlance, said: no connection the act Yan Amringe loaning between the pis- accidental injury plaintiff tol and the unforeseen Callo- (cid:127) way.” 'then,
We there is now, held and we hold that some evidence negligence offefed conduc- plaintiff upon part which should tor, Camion, be submitted to the and there- jury, - was fore the motion to nonsuit properly denied. O.] v. R. But there no evidence employee defend- ant train was negligence guilty and could prevented do The case plaintiff failed to it. made to turn on the conduct properly of Garmon.
Nevertheless, .and our former notwithstanding opinion, charge Honor saw fit to find as follows: “If jury the jury from greater weight, its evidence, employees the. them, defendant, or either could the exercise
highest degree practical foresight, care and human after discovered shooting about to take at sta- place tion, have prevented from even being injured, the defendant’s though did employees on the diffi- bring culty, and the shall further find that the failure exer- *3 cise such and foresight care was the cause proximate plaintiff’s injury, then the should answer the first issue jury ” ‘Yes.’
The first issue confines negligence upon properly plaintiff’s Garmon; cause depends of action to the conduct of yet his Honor, in his by inserting charge the words “or either of them” plainly permitted the consider on jury to pass Amringe conduct Yan employee on every under train, contradiction, that issue. This was only in not opinion Court, at variance with the (the but issue submitted and formulated This was judge.
error. - Honor charged that,
His further “The eon- plaintiff further that LaMotte was tends in the con- and the wrong, plaintiff tends Amringe that Yan had no reasonable ground to believe that LaMotte inwas the right; and the contends that Yan Amringe did not act reasonable in prudence handing the pistol enraged to an man knowing without there whether occasion for him to have a pistol.”
A considerable portion his Honor’s elaborate remarks to the jury alleged relates to the negligence of Yan thus injected he into the case an element of negligence which we had held was to it. foreign This was injurious to highly defendant and was calculated to mislead the jury. SUPREME COURT. IN THE
526 V. R. R. PENNY decisions to follow the judge -is the trial duty It trying, he made in court, when especially appellate he or not. approves whether them saw could, they jury His Honor instructed accident, fit, damages from the date of allow interest on find on 1898. ¥e unable to September, are which occurred such sustaining of decided cases text-books any authority ruling. injuries it been damages for personal
In reference to in not allow jury may held that uniformly repeatedly de committed respect terest. It is different to torts v. Hamper reasons. and for very good struction of property, ante, R., 451, R. and cases cited. Am. and Ene. states the rule be that Eng. torts awarded actions for recoverable are large because in such eases person, ascertainable
measure with the and are not discretionary 1032, standard. p. with reference to a Vol. pecuniary Maine, York, New Ten Pennsylvania, cases from citing many Utah, Georgia, Wash nessee, and other courts. Texas, appellate Harmon, v. S., McMustry R. R. Co. v. 147 U. ington 571; R., R. Sharpe, Louisville R. Ky., 462; Ky., effect is 22 Oyc., To the same p. principle precedents
The universal
deduced from all the
does not
does not be
a debt and
personal
create
ascertained,
it
error
come
one until
judicially
*4
for
tell
interest on
may
the court to
allow
single
case
We
dissenting
awarded.
do
find
sus
to
The
additional
following
cases
proposition.
fully
Hampden,
v.
Sergeant
Chap
tain it:
38
Ratteree v.
Me., 581;
man,
574,
397,
4
R.
Ga.,
E., 684;
Young,
Ga.,
79
S.
R. v.
81
Wallace,
14
E.,
A.,
v.
R.
548
15
912;
7 S.
L.
(Tenn.),
Texas, etc.,
Carr,
W.,
R. Co. v.
43
W.;
332;
S.
S.
91 Tex.,
C., 21
C.,
Costello v. D.
E. T. and. H. K. Ida.
Boston
508;
D.
v.
R.,
Maine
401
A.,
Gypsum
and
74
Jacobson v.
(Vt., 1909) ;
Boston,
Co.,
E.,
130 N.
Cochran v.
W.,
(Ia., 1911);
97 N.
Mass., 171;
Ill. Cent. R. R. v.
Read.
case on the that interest subject, may is said not be consid- ered in the amount for in- determining' personal and the reason the rule jury, for and stated clearly forcibly as follows:
“The rule in substance
in these
adopted
that,
cases is
while
interest is not
as matter
right,
allowed
time for which
been
out
kept
of the
use
or
property
damage occasioned
wrong of
defendant
by
be con-
may
sidered and
amount not
rate
exceeding
legal
of interest
may be
therefor in
included
the verdict
order
necessary in
give adequate
compensation. This
principle
applicable
cases
where there has been definite
injury
specific prop-
Shaw,
The
erty.
reason is
stated
Justice
in
by Chief
Boston,
Parks
“The extent and magnitude of the are not infrequently unappreciated and incapable of reasonable ascertainment on it is day degree received. Its permanence de- often ceptive first, at the commonly determination condi- requisite tions recovery materially assisted per- spective of time. The most aid helpful learning nature actual degree of be events injury may occurring after the event of. complained There is no fixed standard which the compensation to awarded can be measured. Its general rules have stated been many times. The sum of fixed money upon must be such as fairly compensates the injured person for the loss time, physical the mental pain, suffering, both that undergone in the past to occur in the likely future, reasonably and also money expended expended and in assuaging pain restoration health. Elements that *5 COURT. IN THE SUPREME be considered. to come must which are
are and also those past computation. mathematical capable them are not Most and conscience the sound only judgment can settled They pecu- are assessed, are which they the tribunal by determined, are to be within The its province. liarly that inter- the trial. It is moreover, day apparent as of in- in an place akin to' interest no est or considerations use for the is compensation this sort. Interest quiry wrongdoer which money which is due. But money expense, the future or loss suffering, law required by pay until injured judgment one whom he has not due of time of definite become a made It is not a debt and does not up. a or entered. finding until verdict has been obligation finally elements, gross together making up It is of divers composed not have on the being of which into sum, sprung many may traceable committed, although when the day tort directly chargeable If interest were on that properly to it as cause. allowed discount should be accrued, which already Such of computing which relates to the future. a method impracticable. of dam- damages would The amount wholly well ages sort, recoverable in actions of this as those under employers’ certain branches of the act and under liability penal death, to definite causing statutes for. is limited amounts. be allowed in instances maximum Plainly, no can injury.” Dam.
See, also, Sedgwick seq., et (8th Ed.), sec. cited. cases
In a able elaborate the rule very opinion referring to damage cases, Ten- personal injury Supreme Court of says: nessee - “As this sum in includes gross compensation all recover for requisite suffering, date of pain, disability to judgment beyond, it is intended to be and prospectively full recovery, measure of be supplemented by cannot new element for the detention of this sum from date injury. measure of damages being thus fixed, expected it is in determining courts juries and will make gross the sum fair just compensation *6 0.]
Penny v. rendered, and full of amount to when given one in be proper soon, or late after the looks injury; as, given whether soon late, as, to just given and when continuing suffering disability, the It is could it concludes of obvious that past. experienced be suffering pain disability trial, on the then for years of interest added very day before.” Geor the Court of Young, Ga., 397, Supreme
In R. v. Blaclcley, says: in a forcible Justice gia, opinion by Chief damages is un- to discretionary multiply “To add interest mixture the indefinite the certainty; definite; by certainty to subjects parties one of the of elements incongruous If the of the burden and other the benefit both kinds. gives considered, damages is the time of to be realizing discretionary of terms general problem be left as one the it should the rate of unfixed like all the rest of The terms. damages, matter. as has to the interest, established no law, relevancy im- conscience enlightened Sums ascertainable only by in- verdict, bear interest before either do not as partial jurors allowance damages, terest or as or without discretionary jury.” assignments error, It is to discuss other unnecessary trial, as errors complained there must another again. not occur may
New trial. there should a new trial I think J., concurring:
Hoke, the court misdirection of on the first reason of how far to Honor, being His in doubt issue. estoppel trial,
rulings present the Court an were laudable en- facts, the entire developing with a view of end litigation, an deavor, doubt, protracted no to make two of defendant’s on responsibility the question submitted Cannon, reference to the conduct of one issues, having baggage second that of Van Amringe, and the conductor, referring on issue, the first charging jury master. he to consider conduct Garmon, permitted train, on defendant’s which would include employee
' 161 —34 IN THE COURT. SUPREME R R. therefore, and we unable to
tbe of Yan are, conduct the evidence determine what aspect the responsibility on nor been fixed defendant what de- exceptions open are is in record; position, foo, fendant contravention was, in the opinion of the former cause. no doubt, This Honor, inadvertence on the of his it has operated but part degree defendant’s prejudice that, mind, to a constitutes my should be held for reversible too, error. authorities, position favor injuries actions for personal *7 allowed. proper element of to be C. This J\, dissenting: began action 1898, and OlaRK, pending has been fifteen In that time the years. plaintiff four several verdicts; forty-eight recovered jurymen have decided in his unanimously favor and four Superior Court who heard judges, evidence, and who understood the sur- circumstances rounding upon trials, attendant ap- their verdicts. proved There all ought now, in justice, of this litigation. end It is more than doubtful if the objections which have been found Court as several to these had trials been avoided whether juries would not have returned the same exactly verdicts. In some jurisdictions, whether constitutional pro- vision legislative or by enactment, it is now forbidden the appellate, court to more grant than one new trial. This rule will certainly be more conducive to justice than the present as system, illustrated a new trial for the fourth time. After so many favor, verdicts in so against powerful and influential an it opponent, would disregard be well to mere technical charge, iucorrectness in the or other technical errors admission of evidence, since some these can always found, as this case history of in all shows, long trials (cid:127) where a contested. hotly It seems to me justice requires that technicalities should disregarded now be and that interest after four justice, verdicts in his favor after fifteen years of litigation,-the plaintiff should be allowed rest his hard-earned upon victory. 0.]
R. R. v. R. bave tbe of tbe time estimated might Tbe jury interest returned bave added fifteen injury, years tbe It bave been better as tbeir verdict. would lump sum But held for error that tbe ought bad tbis. not to be done minds tbeir workings of their and stated jury showed us tbe directed estimate tbe at tbe its occurrence and time of from that time date to the when bis compensation should be added. should receive should be judgment tbe affirmed. my opinion, COMPANY AND CAROLINA RAILROAD VIRGINIA SOUTHERN AIR LINE RAILROAD COMPANY. v. SEABOARD (Filed April, 1913.) Sidings— Condemnation—Crossing Other Railroads — Railroads — Interpretation of Statutes. n Where railroad right company charter the etc., condemnation, way by road, acquire rights of build its thereof; grounds other railroad intersect switches, making sidings, side-tracks, etc., intersec- build *8 rights privileges all with other railroads to tions authority, State, it conferred railroads of this (5) Revisal, (6), condemn its charter both company right way acquire of another across the road a manufacturing siding plants construct or order to enterprises handling freight. their Butler v. business C., 416, distinguished. Oo., Tobacco 152 N. — Change Crossing Assessing Consideration Same —Mutual — Damages Findings Jury. Questions of Court — — having company power of condemnation across A railroad right company exercise due of another the road should parties regard as little to the convenience of both and with party track use the other of its own interference with the great obtained without increase its cost as can be inconvenience; appearing it in this case the defendant proposed spur siding plaintiff company track or the may reasonably had a where required it, cross that the beyond spur, point the end cross at defendant’s