87 N.J.L. 239 | N.J. | 1915
The opinion of the court was delivered by
The questions in this case arise under the supplement of 1911 to the Railroad Tax act of 1888. Pamph. L. 1911, p. 580. This statute provides, in substance, that when real estate subject to taxation as property used for railroad or canal purposes has been omitted from the usual assessment by the failure of the company using the «ame to make return of it for taxation, the state board of assessors, upon proper complaint of such omission, may proceed to cause the property to be assessed under the procedure of the original act for the omitted years, not exceeding five years prior to the complaint. The owner is to receive credit for any payment made to local assessors of a tax imposed on the property locally for the years in question; the excess collected by the state board is made applicable, after payment of. expenses of collection, to specified local sinking fund purposes.
Complaint being made to the state board of assessors that property of the respondent, constituting part of the Pennsyl
The property assessed was plainly within the purview' of the act. The fact that it was taxed locally and that the local taxes were paid, does not affect this question; for the “omission” intended and expressed in the act is an omission from taxation under the Railroad Tax act of 1888. If anything were needed to make this more plain the provision in section 5 giving credit- for taxes paid locally, supplies it. There is no doubt, moreover, that the omission was due to a failure of the company to return it to the state board. It is claimed that the company’s tax agent mentioned the matter informally to the board and was told as informally that it need not be returned. But this did not occur until late in 1908, when the company was already in default for three of the four years in question; and more fundamentally, the duty of the company was made plain by section 17 of the Railroad Tax act (Comp. Stat. 5272, pl. 461), and it could not be excused from that duty by any such informal declaration as that relied on.
The valuations fixed by the board are attacked as not supported by the evidence; but we find evidence to justify them, and it is not- our practice to weigh the evidence in an appeal of this character.
We are thus brought to the principal questions involved, which relate to the retrospective effect of the act of 1911, and its constitutional status if construed as retrospective.
That it was intended to apply to omitted assessments for past- years cannot be questioned. Its express language is “whenever real estate,” &c., "has been or shall be omitted from assessment.” Thus both the future and the past are specifically provided for.
The real question is whether the act of 1911 is obnoxious to any of the constitutional objections urged against it.
First it is claimed, and the Supreme Court held, that it violates paragraph 12 of section VII. of article IV. of the state constitution, that property shall be assessed for taxes under general laws, and by uniform rules, according to its true value. The proposition is, that by the act of 1911 a separate class of property is erected for taxation, whose characteristics are that first, it is devoted to railroad use, and second, that it was omitted from taxation; and as we understand the argument, the proper class created by a uniform rule would be property omitted, generally, without reference to railroad or any other use. We are pointed to the fact that in the General Tax act and in the Railroad Tax act are provisions relating to omitted property that are, as claimed, substantially identical in effect; and especially in that the time limit during which omitted assessments may be retrieved, as the Supreme Court said, “in each case is practically a year, varying because of the difference in the method of taxation.” We think that the argument is its own answer, for conceding, as it must be conceded, that classification by use is constitutional, and justifies different rates, different methods of assessment by different bodies, and differences in
This question we deem conclusively settled for this court adversely to the claim of the company, by the- United States Supreme Court in the case of Florida Central R. R. Co. v. Reynolds, 183 U. S. 471.
It follows that the judgment of the Supreme Court should be reversed, and the taxes brought up affirmed.
For affirmance—None.
For reversal—The Chancellor, Chief Justice, Garrison, Trenci-iard, Parker, Bergen, Minturn, Kalisch, Black, Bogert, Vredenburgh, White, Terhune, Williams, JJ, 14.