157 F. 656 | 2d Cir. | 1907
This action was brought to recover damages for the death of the plaintiff’s intestate, Carl J. Jacobsen, alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant, his employer. The plaintiff had a verdict for $5,000 damages and the defendant brought this writ of error. The grounds of error which the defendant now urges are in substance: (1) That the court erred in denying defendant’s motion for a direction of the verdict in its favor•because the plaintiff (a) had failed to show any negligence on the part of the defendant; (b) had shown that the plaintiff’s intestate assumed the risk; and (c) had failed to show freedom from contributory negligence on the part of such intestate. (2) That the theory of liability embodied in the charge to the jury was wrong, and required more than a reasonable degree of care from the defendant.
In determining the question raised by the first claim of error— whether the evidence warranted a verdict for the plaintiff — we are not called upon to weigh testimony. We may simply ascertain the facts most favorable to the plaintiff, which, from the evidence, the jury were justified in finding as the basis of their verdict. When these facts are ascertained, we then apply legal principles to determine whether a verdict thereon could be rendered for the plaintiff. In this case there was evidence from which the jury could have found these facts: (1) On and prior to April 9, 3903, the plaintiff’s intestate, Carl J. Jacobsen, was employed by the defendant- as a laborer
Upon these facts, could the jury have found the defendant guilty
Upon these facts, did Jacobsen assume the risk? Employés assume the ordinary risks attendant upon their employment. They are bound to know the dangers incident to the work in which they are engaged. But they do not assume unusual risks of which they have no knowledge. It does not appear that Jacobsen knew that a hole had been cut in the platform above him through which objects might fall or that workmen under the platform were using these wooden blocks. The jury could well have found that he did not assume the risk because lie had no knowledge of the danger.
Upon these facts, was Jacobsen guilty of contributory negligence? This is the most serious question in the case. There was a large open space in which Jacobsen could have worked in perfect safety. There was no reason, other than convenience, why he should have selected this place under the traveler. Yet that place was convenient. No. particular danger was apparent. The front end of the traveler was the place from which the objects had always fallen. We cannot say as a matter of law that there was contributory 'negligence. The question was properly submitted to the jury.
The defendant’s second claim of error is in the charge of the court. The court charged, in substance, that it was an important question in the case whether the defendant, if ordinarily prudent, should not have anticipated that the blocks used to jack up the traveler might, fall in the progress of the work, and have taken some steps, by an interrupting structure or otherwise, to prevent them from falling itpon persons below — whether the defendant’s obligation to furnish Jacobsen a safe place in which to work was fulfilled in the absence of such precautions. The charge was correct. As we have seen, changing the trucks upon the traveler created a new condition — an increased danger. Such changed condition imposed upon the master the duty of taking additional precautions for the safety of the servant. There was some evidence that intercepting structures are used under similar conditions. The question whether the defendant fulfilled the obligation imposed upon it was a proper one for the jury, and was properly submitted to them.
The other questions noticed upon the briefs do not require separate examination. The defendant being liable at common law, it is unnecessary to consider the New York employer’s liability act.
There is no error in the judgment; and it is affirmed, with costs.