*1 PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD CO. v. O’ROURKE. Argued January 12,
No. 60. December 1952. Decided 1953. John Vance argued Hewitt the cause and filed a brief for petitioner.
Richard argued C. Machcinski the cause for respondent. himWith on the brief was Herbert Zelenko.
Mr. opinion delivered the of the Court. Justice Reed This certiorari requires us to determine which federal industrial accident statute —the Federal Employers’ Li- ability Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ applies of this circumstances Act— case. The petitioning railroad had employed O’Rourke in its Harismus Cove Jersey Yard at City since as a “freight brakeman.” He worked part of a five-man crew making up trains. Their duties included work on pas- freight that moved floats petitioner’s The accident water. Yard and to the from cars senger Having January 28, night during *2 occurred began the crew floats, from three cars removed already required O’Rourke box cars. carrying to unload one that hand-brakes, so the and release on each up to climb Dur- engine. the by off the float pulled cars could the the and sustained from one he fell ing process, the under brought It was for this suit. the basis which is C. 45 S. 65, U. Act, 35 Stat. Liability Employers’ Federal main- brake mechanism faulty seq.,1 51 et alleging § 27 Stat. Acts, Safety Appliance of the tained violation factor. seq., et as the’causative § S. C. 531, U. on to dismiss motion the railroad’s granted District Court and Harbor Workers’ Longshoremen’s ground that 1 45 S. C. U. §51: engaging by in commerce railroad while “Every carrier common any Territories, of or between or any of the several States between and of Columbia Territories, the District or between and the States District of Columbia Territories, or between the any or of the States nations, foreign any nation or any and or Territories or of the States suffering injury he is any person while damages to shall be liable commerce, or, of the death by in case employed such carrier in such for the benefit personal representative, employee, to his or her of such employee; of such surviving or husband and children of the widow and, none, of employee’s parents; if then and, none, of such if then injury or employee, for such dependent kin such the next of any negligence of the resulting part from the death in whole or in any carrier, officers, agents, employees or of such or reason cars, engines, appli- insufficiency, negligence, defect or due to its in its wharves, ances, machinery, track, roadbed, works, boats, or other equipment.
“Any any carrier, part as such of a of whose duties foreign commerce; employee shall be the furtherance of interstate or shall, any way directly closely substantially, or affect such and chapter, shall, purposes commerce as above set forth for the of this being employed by be considered as in such commerce such carrier chapter.” shall be considered as entitled the benefits of this seq., 901 et S. C. 1424, U. Act, Stat. but the Court 506, F. Supp. exclusively,2 applied Liability Act ground Appeals reversed injured while “railroad covered respond- It decided navigable waters.” work on . . . employment “not ent was F. Compensation Act.” meaning within the 811, be- certiorari, 344 U. S. granted 615. We 2d of this an earlier decision with alleged conflict cause Y., R. H. & H. N. Nogueira Court, the Harbor Workers’ a federal statute The need for obvious after Southern became scope type Pacific it Jensen, wherein 205, decided S. Co. *3 Liability Employers’ Federal the held that neither was to a applied statute compensation state nor the a of the com- loading vessel railroading operations. to its no relation had pany which because inapplicable held act was the state Specifically, admiralty federal within the exclusively fell the matter jurisdiction: in which the deceased work of a stevedore
“The nature; employ- in its his is maritime engaging he injuries which contract; a maritime ment was and maritime; rights and the were likewise received were in connection therewith parties liabilities of the admiralty jurisdiction.” clearly matters within 217. S., at U. 2 33 S. C. U. §905: liability employer prescribed section 904 of this
“The of an liability of such place of all other title shall be exclusive and in wife, representative, or employer employee, legal his husband anyone kin, otherwise entitled to parents, dependents, next of admiralty on damages law or in recover from such at death, account of such . . . .” a took the form of com- federal statute resulting not were employees who act to assure pensation than recovery, rather prompt a certain seamen in 1920 as was extended liability statute, such employers’ C. Act, 38 Stat. to seamen the Jones attempts bring to summary congressional A of the concepts law into with modern admiralty harmony carry without fault to employer although of an duty accidents, appears of industrial the No- the burden 135-136. failed gueira case, S., at These efforts U. uniformity test of held es- to meet the constitutional admiralty conflicting law in order to obviate sential Washington commerce. requirements Co., They S. 219. failed because Con- Dawson & U. legislation to on maritime accidents gress attempted place sug- laws. After this Court’s under state Con- Washington case, S., gestion U. compensa- and uniform gress adopted valid, exclusive and harbor longshoremen tion now in effect for act Benson, pre- S. 22. Seamen workers. Crowell Jone§ Nogueira v. Act. ferred to take the risks of the Y., and the H. H. at 136. This act supra, N. & R. injuries for means for indemnification Jones Act beyond who were the consti- for all maritime A cen- legislation. quarter tutional reach state Congress change tury experience has caused *4 plan. The “Jensen line of demarcation between state accepted. Davis jurisdiction” federal has been v. De- Labor, 249, Jersey S. 256. New could partment U. of granting compensation enacted statutes for not have navigable on water. Therefore re- respondent’s injury coverage portion comes within the of that of spondent those outside (a) includes the reach of state § compensation laws. Employers’ Liability Act, 51,
The Federal S. C. § gives right recovery note a of due to supra, defects be- equipment, among other in, negligence of cause carrier determine case, however, in this not, need “boats.” We regarded be that should a “boat” float is the car whether See extension. a railroad’s of part in substance It is clear Jensen, at supra, v.Co. Southern Pacific railroad of the an boat is extension or not the that whether later Harbor The is immaterial. Liability Act under the injuries 905 covered such (a) byAct §§ Workers’ coverage exclusive. and made its water navigable 130-131. supra, H. Y., H. & R. Nogueira v. N. applies Harbor Workers’ or not the Whether Liability Act, by virtue Employers’ of the exclusion 903 which depends on S. C. § of U. provisions “coverage”: its defines this payable be under shall
“(a) Compensation or death of an em- respect disability chapter from disability if the or death results only but ployee, navigable waters of occurring upon an dock) and if any dry (including States the United work- disability through or death recovery for the may validly compensation proceedings men’s . . .” by State law. compensation with the liability Section 904 fixes for this (4): “employer,” who in turn defined 902§ ‘employer’ employer any “The term means employ- in maritime whose are waters ment, part, navigable whole or (including any dry dock).” States United provisions The these in a Court considered similar set- ting case, supra. That case involved a while loading freight into cars portion we the section which have omitted contains certain applicability. apply Respondent other conditions to None here. eighteen member of not a the crew and vessel was more than tons. *5 The Harbor Workers’ float. on a moored car
located out: pointed As was apply. held to was manifestly (a)] is definition “The broad( [§903 it company, a railroad to embrace enough em- in maritime employed who ‘are has navigable part, in whole or ployment, . . . From the stand- States.’ waters of the United makes obviously it employment, point in the freight placed whether no difference or whether the vessel vessel, of a hold or on the deck in navigable A float steamship. is a car float or any maritime law like other subject to the waters is 132 and 134. S., vessel.” below, support of the result contends, respondent But language and that distinguishable this that the eases are that No- emphasizes his He not determine claim. does pictured This is loading the cars. gueira popular conception far more similar operation anas he insists was job own, than his which longshoreman’s of a “railroading.” that the on the nature however, emphasis clear, We are mark. The statute duties here misses the respondent’s waters navigable terms, own to accidents applies, by its in mari- employees engaged any has when Nogueira opinion portions The time service. category, this company within bring this quoted maritime, held to be are there operations since its car float occurred are. Whether the they obviously as float, on the loading freight into cars moving Nogueira respondent or to one like case, day, the same was a unanimous decision. On case three Baizley Span, was decided with Works v. Iron Span be compensation to was reversed An award of state dissents. ship lying completed repair of a painter in the cause as a him. not cover navigable waters, statute could a state *6 Both no difference. make from a float could loaded cars Y., H. Nogueira v. N. maritime. See are employments (4) is directed Co., § 134. Besides supra, & H. R. employment, speaks of when it at the cov doing. The exclusive employee is at the work the of an em to an 905 extends 903, of erage §§ in the injured, when he is by 904, § made liable ployer, navigable water. The Court employment, on of his course in holding in error that the statute think, is Appeals, we navigable employee, injury both as to requires, for employment ground as a cov and maritime water worker’s injured Act. An erage by Compensation injury at the time of determines activity particular in of his em he was the course course whether (2), within and whether he was a mem ployment exceptions within the ber of the crew the vessel (a)(1). the em (3) explains and 903 This §§ v. job on the factor of the individual’s Parker phasis Inc., Sales, 244, 245-246, Boat 314 U. S. and South Motor Bassett, Chicago v. 251.5 Co. U. S. Appeals thought
The Court of
this Court’s No
gueira opinion
open,
opin
left
as did the Second Circuit’s
Nogueira,
“that
ion
mere locus
the accident
necessarily
right.”
determines the
32 F. 2d
at 182.
179,
differently.
readWe
case
There it was said:
“There was
exclusion of stevedores or of
no
those
sustaining injuries
navigable
loading
waters
a
unloading
vessel unless it was under eighteen
application
tons net. The
act
such cases
explicitly
depend upon
made to
question
navigable
whether the
occurred upon
waters
recovery
therefor could not validly
aby
state
statute.”
S.,
281 U.
at 136.
565; Merritt-Chapman
5 Norton v. Warner
Co.,
& Scott
791,
Corp. Willard,
189 F. 2d
Long
Co. Lowe,
R.
Island
category.
F. 2d
fall within a similar
Analogous
weight
cases lend
to our conclusion. Buren
F.
indistinguish
v. Southern
2d
is
Pacific
Parker,
The result in
well,
totally
able on its facts.6
any
inconsistent with
“duties test.”
the em
Armistead,
ployee there,
janitor
company.
was a
with the motor boat
He had been ordered to ride in one of
during
the boats
trip
keep
test
order to
a lookout for
objects.
hidden
at 246.
S.,
under
the Harbor
Workers’ Act could not have been
paid
connection with
his death if we
applicability
to test its
were
the nature
A
regular
of his
work.
number of lower court cases are
*7
in similar vein. Those we
margin
collect
deal
with various types of construction and
workers,
service
obviously not
engaged
themselves
traditional “mari
if
employment,”
time
one
solely
were to look
particular
type
job they were engaged for.7 Each was
held to fall within the scope of the statute.
Section
(4)
902
requires
pay
if
“any”
he has
engaged.8
so
If, then, the acci-
6
Pennsylvania
Co.,
Gussie v.
Super. 293,
See
R.
1 N. J.
64 A. 2d
244;
J.,
Richardson v.
Central R. Co. N.
App.
233
Div.
253
Byrd
789;
N. Y.
System,
Super. 568,
S.
v. N. Y. Central
6 N. J.
A.
Reading Co.,
Supp. 875,
2d 97. Zientek v.
contrary
93 F.
but as
opinion Desper
Ferry Co.,
to this see our
v. Starved Rock
S.U.
187, 190;
Co.,
Supp. 698,
Pittsburgh
v. Erie
Job
R.
79 F.
Rist
and
v.
&
Co.,
Supp.
Conneaut Dock
104 F.
7Baizley
Span,
(a
Iron Works v.
painter);
281 U. S.
De Bar
Corp. Henderson,
(member
deleben Coal
v.
dent occurs on the Act must longshoreman was there of his furtherance employer’s business, irrespective of whether he himself can be “maritime.” Such labeled are the admitted facts Longshoremen’s this The and Harbor case. Workers’ Compensation applies. Act
Reversed. Minton, with whom Mr. Justice Chief Jus- tice, Black, join, Mr. Justice Justice Clark Mr. dissenting.
There is but one question
here,
is whether
this respondent was
employment”
“maritime
at the time of his injury.
was,
If he
Longshore-
then the
men’s and Harbor
applies
Workers’
and not the Federal Employers’ Liability Act. That was
decided in
York,
New
N. H. & H. R.
Was it maritime employment get to these cars off the car float or was it railroad employment? If this railroad employee had been doing his braking job on land, no one would thought have he was engaged in anything but rail- road employment. it Does become maritime employ- ment because it happened over navigable waters? We think not. place only thing is the that differentiate^ the situations. Place is admittedly enough make what is braking on land other than braking when done over navigable waters. Not only must we look to the place where the happened, accident but of equal impor- tance is the nature of the employment. The nature of the employment is certainly not maritime. It was an ordinary railroad chore, done an ordinary railroad brakeman. If this were not so, the train crews on trains being ferried across navigable streams the United States would be employed maritime service. With the imagination of the Court’s opinion, a train while crew, crossing a bridge with supports its in a navigable stream, would in maritime service.
We would treat this railroad employee as being in law what he inwas real life, a railroad brakeman, interstate commerce and subject to the Federal Employ- ers’ Liability Act, and affirm this judgment.