*1 thе Fifth year agree two other circuits We with and Ninth During past IIRIRA with similar issues to Circuits that the 1996 amend presented have been gave Attorney court. In all three ments General substan the one before the granting of re- tial discretion in cancellation seeking alien cancellation cases the voluntarily departed previously removal his reasonable conclusion that moval had voluntary in departure of forced removal. under the threat circumstances interrupted of this case the alien’s сontinu Ashcroft, In Mireles-Valdez v. in physical presence country ous this (5th Cir.2003), the alien had been within his discretion. voluntary departure at the border granted during proceeding, reasons, than a removal rather For these the decision of the concluded that his and the Fifth Circuit BIA is affirmed. physi-
departure had ended his continuous at presence
cal in the United States. Id. (“The at does not state statute issue provisions are exhaustive.
Attorney General has determined Attorney not. defer to the
they are [W]e The court con- interpretation.”).
General’s
Attorney General’s inter-
cluded that the
NATIONAL
PENNSYLVANIA
MUTU
because volun-
pretation was reasonable
AL CASUALTY INSURANCE COM
offered at the end
tary departure, whether
PANY,
Pennsylvania Corporation,
at the
deportation proceedings
of formal
Plaintiff/Appellant,
border,
clemency granted
is a form of
Contracting,
Inc.,
Cannon
promise
in return for his
not to
the alien
Plaintiff,
Intervenor
at
An alien cannot
return. 349 F.3d
agreement
consent to this
later retract his
v.
voluntary
by arguing
departure
that his
BLUFF,
PINE
CITY OF
presence
the continuous
re-
did
break
Defendant/Appellee,
discretionary relief.
Id.
quired for latеr
Ashcroft,
in
Vasquez-Lopez
The alien
Inc.;
Construction,
David Mitchell
curiam), reh’g denied
(per
rectly interpreted the IIRIRA because the Appellant. on Behalf “physically present” alien had not been country while in and his “ab- Mexiсo Pennsylvania Mutual Casual- National inadvertent, casual, sence was not or oth- Pennsyl- ty Company, Insurance oc- lacking significance” erwise but Plaintiff, Corporation, vania he agreement curred under an which had to leave the United States consented Contracting, Intervenor Cannon (“We at con- and not return. Id. 973-74 Plaintiff/Appellant, Attorney clude that the BIA’s and the reading of the statute is reason- General’s deference.”). Bluff, Defendant/Appellee, worthy of our of Pine able *2 Inc.; Construction, Mitchell David Mitchell; Mitchell; Theresa R.
David Jr.; National Dix, Pine Bluff F.
Karl Company, De-
Bank; Insurance Nobel
fendants. Mutual Casual-
Pennsylvania National Pennsylva- Company, a
ty Insurance Plaintiff/Appellee, Corporation,
nia Contracting, Intervenor
Cannon
Plaintiff/Appellee, Bluff,
City of Pine
Defendant/Appellant, Construction, Inc.; Mitchell
David Mitchell; Mitchell; Theresa R.
David Jr.; Dix, Pine National Bluff F.
Karl Company, De-
Bank; Nobel Insurance
fendants. America, Amicus
Surety Association Appellee. Behalf of
on 02-3646, 02-3600, 02-3735.
No. Appeals, States Court
Eighth Circuit. Sept. 2003.
Submitted: 15, 2004.
Filed: Jan. En Banc Rehearing
Rehearing and Feb.
Denied: *4 argument on be- pi'esented
Counsel who Gary A. appellant half of the was Wilson appearing appel- PA. Also on Philadelphia, P. Patel of Philadel- lant’s brief were Salil E. Brownstein. phia and Bettina argument on be- presented who Counsel M. Donovan appellee half of the was David Rock, AR. of Little BOWMAN, WOLLMAN, Before RILEY, Judges. Circuit WOLLMAN, Judge. Circuit case, City of Pine suretyship In this Bluff, (City), Pennsylvania Arkansas Casualty Insurance Com- National Mutual (Penn National) cross-appeal the dis- pany findings regarding the con- trict court’s surеtyship, equitable subrogation, tours municipal immunity in Arkansas. We City reimburse must conclude it suffered for the losses Penn National general City released funds to after the general notice of the til despite approximately contractor June 2001. On that date, City request contractor’s default and from the returned to Penn National a completed pending inquiry to withhold funds investi- status form indicating that the reverse and remand contract had been gation. We therefore terminated and that the final judgment price Penn “disрut- with directions enter was ed.” The form also contained a National. notation City that the had received some mil- $2.8 I. lion claims from unpaid subcontractors supplying labor and pro- materials on the After severe ice storms littered ject. Pine Bluff with debris December City applied Emergency for Federal By letter dated June (FEMA) Management Agency funds and National requested not re- general
hired
contractor David Mitchell
any
lease
funds allocated to the project
(Mitchell)
up
Construction
tо clean
the aft without Penn National’s written consent.
ermath. The contract
required
the The letter stated that Penn National was
percent
ten
any progress
withhold
investigating unpaid subcontractor claims
payments
retainage,1
to Mitchell as
and and
potential subrogation
asserted
*5
agreed
pass
Mitchell
to
on payment
to to
letter,
funds. Despite the
working
project
subcontractors
on the
however,
City
the Pine Bluff
ap-
Council
days
any progress payment
within ten
of
proved a settlеment and release with
City. Acting
surety,
from the
as
Penn Na
later,
Mitchell a
days
paying
few
Mitchell
performance
tional underwrote a combined
and
approximately
Mitchell’s creditors
$2
payment
and
bond for the
project
the million.3 Although the record
does
penal sum of
million.2
indicate whether
this amount
$3.5
included
City
FEMA monies the
prior
received
to
As the
progressed,
work
Mitchell and
letter,
Penn National’s
City
June 15
City
began arguing
pricing
over
later received FEMA payments totaling
hauling
Mitchell’s
allegedly
dеbris
ineli-
approximately
million. Dist. Ct. Or-
$1.8
gible for FEMA reimbursement. On
24,
of Sept.
der
2002 at 4.
26, 2001,
March
City
terminated its
contract with Mitchell and arranged for
Penn National brought
against
suit
City
others,
employees
complete
to
City
originally
the work—
seeking a de-
timet.4,
actions
quia
claratory
Penn National did not discover un-
judgment
and a bill
Retainage
percentage
1.
suppliers
paid
"[a]
of what a land-
laborers and material
will be
if
contractor,
pays a
general
owner
withheld until the
Fidelity
contractor defaults. Int'l
Co.,
2;
satisfаctorily completed
construction has been
Ins.
Fed.
41
Cl. at 708 n.
R.J. Bob
(7th
Contractor,
Dictionary
....”
Excavating
Blades Law
1317
Jones
Inc. v. Firemen’s
1999).
Ed.
Ins.
486
(1996).
conjunction, performance
2. Often issued in
$997,435.90
payment
Mitchell,
usually
City
required
bonds are
3. The
released
to
See,
$512,191.81
Bank,
public
projects.
e.g.,
works
40 U.S.C.
to Pine Bluff National
3131(b) (West
Mitchell,
2003);
§
«money
which
Ark.Code Ann.
had loaned
to
cf.
$465,752.03
(Michie 1996).
§
Chancery
performance
22-9-401
A
to the
Court of Jeffer-
owner,
County
protects
satisfy
judg-
son
obligee, ensuring
bond
one of Mitchell’s
or
project
mеnt
completion
general
creditors.
if the
contractor
Structures, Inc.,
defaults.
In re Modular
(3d Cir.1994);
fears,"
F.3d
Fidelity
n. 1
Literally meaning
Int’l
quia
"because he
Ins. Co. v. United
legal
41 Fed. Cl.
per-
timet is
doctrine
"[a]
that allows a
(1998).
payment
n.
A
bond ensures that
son to seek
relief from a future
(8th Cir.2003),
inter- F.3d
and Arkansas
subcontractors also
unpaid
Various
sepa-
governs
inquiry.
or instituted
that
litigation
in the
substantive
law
vened
National on the
against Penn
Tompkins,
rate suit
Erie R.R. Co. v.
304 U.S.
then inves-
(1938);
Penn National
payment
bond.
951
47,
Bd.,
43,
partially
tlement
involves a
conditional
84 S.W.3d
censing
Ark.App.
79
(2002).
as-
prohibit
payment.
thought
rule does not
The district court
the
58
action,
of
Sexton
multiple
of
causes
payment presented
sertion
conditional
a “boot-
Firm,
Ark.
Milligan, 329
P.A. v.
Lato
strapping” problem and concluded that
(1997),
nor does it
fully
Penn National had not
Can-
satisfied
remedies,
cоnsistent
pursuit of
preclude
claim,
disagree.
non’s
but we
the
adjudication,
long
final
so
as
even to
Cardozo,
noted
As
Justice
satisfaction.
receives but one
plaintiff
because,
necessary
full satisfaction is
“[i]f
Co.,
Chevrolet
Kapp v. Bob Sullivan
different,
holding
surety
were
the
(1960).
Ark.
protection
would reduce the
of the bond to
Here,
City’s contention that Penn Na-
in
the extent of its dividend
the assets of
declaratory remedy only tional elected
American
the debtor.”
Sur.
296 U.S.
Penn National also re-
misplacеd because
at
9. Full satisfaction also
S.Ct.
sought
equitable subrogation
quested
prevents competition
rights
between the
of
Seeking
funds.
recovery
specified
of
original
and the
creditor to the
pursu-
to funds and
priority
declaration
original creditor’s detriment:
“[U]ntil
reflects
ing judgment
equal
in an
amount
satisfied,
wholly
ought
creditor be
there
remedies. To
no assertion of inconsistent
can
no
be
interference with his
wrong
City paid
establish
might,
or his securities
even
bare
which
liable, the court must
party and should be
him in
possibility, prejudice Or embarrass
that Penn National was enti-
first conclude
any way
the collection of the residue of
payment.
to priority
tled
Matthews, 141 Ark.
his claim.” Barton v.
contours of
next consider the
We
(1919) (internal
S.W.
suretyship. Eq
equitable subrogation
omitted);
quotation
Restatement
cf.
surety’s
of a
subrogation
uitable
is one
(Third)
Guaranty § 27
Suretyship
reducing
mechanisms for
loss.
principal
cmt. b.
Prairie State Bank v. United
case,
In
this
debris-removal
227, 231,
32 Ct.Cl.
S.Ct.
164 U.S.
and associated bond created two relevant
(1896)
(recognizing
sure
41 L.Ed.
obligations:
specified
removal of
debris
“elementary.”).
ty’s subrogation rights as
payment
for labor and materials. The
law,
the doctrine
Arising by operation
*7
former
City unilaterally removed the
obli-
surety
acquire
the
to
and assert
permits
charged with
gation, so Penn National was
rights
parties
of those
whom the sure
the
payment
under
its
satisfying the latter
Foods,
Chicago
Inc. v.
ty pays. Welch
has occurred.
bond—an event which
467,
Co.,
515, 17
Ark.
Title Ins.
341
S.W.3d
nothing to Rent-
Mitchell and the
owe
(2000).
470
of the
al and Cannon
virtue
subcontrac-
equitable
A
to
sub
prerеquisite
Penn National. De-
tors’ settlement with
surety’s
the
full satisfaction of
rogation is
in this
spite Cannon’s derivative interest
any underlying
obligation.
debt or
Amer
does,
lawsuit,
any re-
possess
Cannon
Westing
New York v.
ican Sur. Co. of
maining
against
claim for “residue”
Mitch-
Co.,
133, 137,
Mfg.
296 U.S.
house Elec.
City and there is no risk of
ell or the
(1935);
Paul
when 24, 2002, at Sept. 15. We think this equitable material suppliers, laborers and well, and, statement defines the issue ab subrogation pеrmits proceed controlling authority, sent state our obli retainage remaining contract against gation predict is to how the Arkansas Su Equilease reimbursement. funds preme Court would rule on the issue. See Co., v. Fid. & Corp. United States Guar. Lines, Smith v. Chemical Leaman Tank (1978); (8th Cir.2002). Inc., 285 F.3d Pearlman v. Reliance Ins. 371 U.S. urges Penn National apply us to (1962) 132, 139, 232, 9 83 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d support series federal decisions which (“[T]he subroga same rules as to proposition obligee may that a bond ... surety completes tion exist whether a surety’s not increase thе risk or otherwise whether, though not called surety’s subrogation rights. undermine the contract, upon complete pays it States, e.g., Corp. Nat’l Sur. materialmen.”). surety’s laborers and (Fed.Cir.1997); 1544-46 right typically superior monies is to these Transamerica Premier Ins. Co. v. United general to' the contractor’s (1994) 32 Fed. Cl. 313-14 assignees bankruptcy or estate in becahse (Transamerica); Home Indem. Co. surety’s rights vest “full satisfac upon *8 States, United 180 Ct.Cl. 376 F.2d tion for default and relate back to the time (1967). Although 892-93 no Arkansas suretyship the bond or contrаct of was facts, precise Corp., entered into.” 565 decision covers these we be Equilease (citation omitted); Supreme at 126 Restate lieve that the Arkansas Court (Third) Guaranty Suretyship ment of and would steer a course consistent with feder- claim, 5, supra, surety 6. As indicated in the settle- initial in which case the footnote merely provides placed ment that Cannon will receive half of would have its interest in reim- $669,869.93. any beyond right recovered amount bursement ahead of the subcontractor's anаlysis might payment contrary point Our be if the to situation to the different subcon- —a suretyship generally. negotiated beyond payment bond and tractor received no benefit of
953
principles,
eq-
These
considered with the
Seaboard Sur. Co.
al decisions. See
sup-
uitable
of laborers and material
Bank & Trust
First Nat’l
Cir.1941)
(and
(8th
in ab-
(predicting,
pliers
subrogated
therefore the
sure-
291
authority,
funds,
Dakota
ty)
payment
remaining
that South
to
have
sence of state
regarding sure-
follow federal cases
courts to reсognize
would
led federal
the obli-
ty priority).
gee’s duty as a “stakeholder” to ensure
(contract
application of collateral
proper
that in
In contracts for services
retainages) upon appropriate
funds and
upon
or
in installments
payment
clude
general
of the
default.
notice
contractor’s
progress payments
unearned
completion,
Transamerica,
314;
32 Fed. Cl. at
collateral,
or
retainage
security,
are
and
Int’l Fid. Ins.
Co.
cre
ensuring discharge
obligatiоns
of the
(1992);
Home
Cl.Ct.
Indem.
contract.
underlying
the
Restate
ated
Indeed,
Corp.,
Marine Ins. Co. v. Rather, good-faith law. our decision is a (2001) 351, 180, 343 Ark. just endeavor to reach the result Arkansas (“The subrogation] doctrine is [equitable courts would have reached if faced with flexible and extends as deeply rooted and equities. the same justice. far to do The doctrine as needed doing complete its basis the has as
perfect justice parties between the without subrogation
regard Equitable to form.... a and is given application
is liberal broad in enough every to include instance which America, UNITED STATES of acting voluntarily, paid one not has person, Appellee, primarily a for which another debt was party liable and which that other should (citations omitted); Land paid.”) have Fed. Eugene LEATHERS, Appellant. Farming
Bank Louis v. Richland St. No. 03-1181. Co., 954, 180 Ark. S.W.2d (1929) (“[A]s subrogation the doctrine of Appeals, Court of United States equity courts of for the was evolved Eighth Circuit. injustice, prevention of it is administered Sept. Submitted: 2003. legal right, principle not as a but the is justice applied to subserve the ends of Filed: 2004. Jan. particular in the case before equity do En Banc Rehearing Rehearing Therefore no rule can be laid court. Denied: March 2004. application, down for its universal it applicable depends whether particular and circum-
upon the facts arises.”);
stances of each case as it see Foods, Chicago Inc. Title
also Welch
Ins. See, e.g., appear Transamerica Premier Ins. Co. v. them.... If it is made States, (1994); officials, 32 Fed. Cl. 313-14 Government's after due notice of the giving equitable right Newark Ins. Co. v. United 144 Ct.Cl. facts rise to an in the (1959) F.Supp. ("Surely plaintiff surety company, plaintiff's a and of the stakeholder, out, caught right, paid in the middle between assertion of such a without claimants, cannot, effect, competing doing, money ques- two valid reason for so plaintiff, decide the merits of their claims the mere tion to someone other than the physical delivering plaintiff judgment.”). act of the stake to one of be will entitled to
