*1 MUTUAL PENNSYLVANIA MILLERS 43809. EMPLOYERS’ v. INSURANCE COMPANY аl. et FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY v. COMPANY FIRE INSURANCE EMPLOYERS’ 43810. MUTUAL INSURANCE MILLERS PENNSYLVANIA et al. COMPANY September July 26, 1968 Submitted 1968 Decided Rehearing 14, 1968. denied November *3 Williams, Lane, A. Ed for Penna. Lane & Woodruff, Savell, Millers. Weinberg, Ben L. John Ansley, Jr., K. Weinberg &
Long, Fire. Employers’ for Dunlap, Kovacs. Johnson, for E.
Jean Douglas J. for Jr., Noland, County- Robert Dollar, R. James Federal. Pennsylvаnia Millers contends that Judge. the
Quillian, Douglas evidence showed that Federal had received actual noticе of intent to cancel its so as necessity to obviate the of written required notice (Ga. under Code Ann. L. 1960, pp. 56-2430 §§ 671; p. 653) 289, (Gа. and 1964, p. 335); 56-2430.1 that the evidence also established that Willie Yates when he received such information acting agent wаs Douglas as an of Federal and within scope the of employment. Thus, his it is contended Pennsylvania ruling upon Millers that the appearance former of this case is controlling not here and that judgment instead should have been renderеd in its favor. Code Ann. provides: of “Notices cancellation of policies protecting the interest of the insured any and lienholder shall be delivered or mailed to the last of record as addresses provided herein to the insured and to the lienholders shown in policy and specify when, shall not than days less or such longer period may as be in the or by contract statute, the cancellation shall become effective.” (Emphasis supplied.) According Thompson to the record communicated January with Yates on 28, 1966, and the loss occurred on the night of February morning 2 or the Fеbruary of 3, 1966. There- fore, even if this be equivalent considered as to a written no- tice of provisions cancellаtion under the section, the Code such cancellation would not have been effective until at least February 7, 1966, dаys four after the loss occurred. Since written notice cancellation would been not have effective рrior to the occurrence of the loss, any actual notice could not have accomplished a рrior Pennsylvania cancellation and Mil- policy lers’ was still in effect at the time of the loss. agent Moreover, Doug- shows that Yates as evidence las any Federal was not informed of cancellation of policy that *4 but, explained misapprehension as he acted under a it, as to procured the policy termination date of the he when new insur- ance on property. point assuming the also out that even We Douglas might that Federal have consented to an earlier can- required cellation than days by the statute, 10 there no is Thus, being evidence to that effect. there a showing that no given Douglas notice of cancellation was to Federal within the purview ruling of Code Ann. thе 56-2430, when the case was
659 Fire controlling Employers’ in court is here. previously this 433, App. Pennsylvania Co., Millers Ga. Co. v. &c. 116 Ins. suprа. assigned. error judgment was not the reasons
The for. requires headnote no elaboration. The second overruling frоm an order Employers filed a cross appeal objections amend of to an objections amplificаtion its and the order petition judgment from an declaratory to the for and ment of request for overruling objections plaintiff’s to admission its on the appeal ruling main is affirmed a facts. the and Since the cross be of no benefit to the cross appeal appellant, would appeal cross is dismissed. appeal
Judgment main dismissed. appeal on Cross affirmed. J., J., P. concur. Bell, Hall, and Rehearing. for
On Motion held: court, before it was previously this case was the When request for can- is whether Kovacs’ remaining question “The can- effectively policy of Millers' Pennsylvania cellation the not, If mortgagee, Douglas County Federal. it as to the celed to mort- policy was in force as the Pеnnsylvania Millers’ then of loss to the of the indebtedness proration the extent gagee, and loss) of be in stipulated amоunt the would (up $10,000, to the Pennsylvania Millers, Fire Ins. Co. v. Employers’ order.” 807). (157 found that: The court App. 433, Ga. SE2d engrafted upon an contract of insurance independent “Since mortgagee, of the for the benefit main insurance contract existed in re- unilateral of Kovacs Douglas County Federal, act policy its consent and questing a cancellation оf the without policy notice as various other' without written Pennsylvania Millers' provisions not effect cancellatiоn could Pennsyl- Ins. mortgagee.” Employers’ to Fire v. policy as supra. Co., App. 433, 437, vania Millers &c. 116 Ga. this support positiоn court noted that the Insurance In of the (Ga. pp. 671; L. (Code 1960, 1967, 289, Code Ann. §§ 653) (Ga. p. 335)) requires p. and written 56-2430.1 protects canсellation of a which policy to effect the notice interest of the lienholder. application question of the apparent is thus that
It *5 the cited section adversely Code was determined to the con- prior movant in thе tentions decision of this case.
Rehearing denied. 43740. HARTFORD ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY et al.
COMPANY v. TOLISON. Argued 15, 1968. 3, 1968 June November Decided Brackett, Lyle & H. Arnall, Arnall, Jr., P. Claud F. Brackett, for appellants. Drew, for appellee.
Charles Judge. question The sole for decision is whether, Eberhardt, in a claim for compensation, employer workmen’s or in- surance carrier is entitled to for sums by credit received employee against in settlement of a claim party the third tort- causing feasor the injuries, where the written notice Ann. given by Code is not emрloyer 114-403 or car- § employee rier to the or to tortfeasor. Code Ann. provides: any person upon “Whenever is pay called to compen- sation, expenses medical expenses funeral on account of and/or injury compensable or death under Title, person this and such person persons contends that a or othеr employer than the is lia- pay ble to on damages, injury account such or to the death, injured employee or those entitled to recover for employee’s death, person upon such called to payment may give 'make such