402 Pa. 620 | Pa. | 1961
Opinion by
H. Stanley Loose, trading as Baederwood Grille, operated a restaurant in Jenkintown, Montgomery County, where, in August, 1957, he employed in his kitchen unit eleven persons consisting of a chef, cooks, sandwich-salad men and dishwashers. As a result of a six to five vote of these employees at a representation election, the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board on August 15, 1957 (the dates are important as will later appear), certified the Chefs, Cooks, Pastry Cooks and Assistants Union, Local 111, affiliated with the Hotel and Restaurant Employes and Bartenders International Union, A.F.L.-C.I.O., as the collective bargaining agent of the employees in the employer’s kitchen unit. Negotiations between the Union and Loose were entered upon with a view to arriving at a collective bargaining agreement, but without success.
On July 30, 1958, the Union filed with the Labor Relations Board a charge against Loose of unfair labor practices and, as a consequence, the Board two days later issued a complaint thereon against him. On October 27, 1959, the Board, by a two to one de
Loose petitioned the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County for a review of the Board’s order; the Board, in turn, petitioned the court for enforcement of the order. On June 16, 1960, the court entered an order setting aside the Labor Board’s order and denying the Board’s petition for its enforcement. The matter is now befoi’e us on the Board’s appeal.
Certification of a collective bargaining representative by the Labor Board “shall be binding for a period of one year, or for a longer period if the contract so provides, even though the unit may have changed its labor organization membership.” Section 7(c) of the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act, as amended, 43 PS §211.7(c). The effect of this provision is to create for a period of one year a duty upon the employer to bargain in good faith with the certified representative of his employees. At the expiration of a yearly period, however, in the absence of a contract providing otherwise, the employer’s duty to bargain with the certified representative ceases, and he may then question the representative’s status and its right to speak for a majority of his employees. The findings of fact of the Labor Board, if supported by the evidence, are conclusive on appeal. Section 9(a) of the
The basic question then, in this case, is whether employer Loose’s insistence upon a contract of so short a term was consistent with bargaining in good faith as required of him by the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act. While there appear to be no Pennsylvania decisions in point, we recognized in Shafer Petition, 347 Pa. 130, 132-435, 31 A. 2d 537 (1943), that the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act was obviously patterned after the National Labor Relations Act and that federal decisions involving provisions of the latter act may be looked to for guidance in interpreting similar provisions in the Pennsylvania statute. Clauses (1) and (5) of Section 8(a) of the National Labor Relations Act
The crucial issue in this case, therefore, is whether or not employer Loose’s refusal to sign a contract extending beyond the Union’s one-year certification period was made in good faith, pursuant to a well founded doubt that the Union any longer represented a majority of his employees. On this point, the Board, in its two to one decision, found adversely to Loose which would be conclusive of this factual issue on appeal if the finding is supported by the evidence. The fact is, however, that the evidence does not support such a finding. When Loose was called as on cross-examination at the hearing before the Board he testified as follows: “Q. Now, do I understand that your position in June and July of 1958 was that you wanted a contract to run until August 15, 1958? A. I was willing to go along with the agreement to the termination date of the certification. Q. You did not want to sign a contract beyond August 15, 1958? A. That’s right. I didn’t feel I was in a position to obligate my employes. My employes have changed since the certification of the Union as the collective bargaining agent, and my new employes.’ position was
Order affirmed.
Act of July 5, 1935, c. 372, 49 Stat. 449, as amended, 29 U.S.C.A., §158(a) (1) and (5).