OPINION BY
The Pennsylvania Department of Education (PDE) petitions for review of the Office of Open Records’ (OOR) final determination granting the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette’s (Requester) request for records un-. der the Right-to-Know Law (RTKL).
On August.5, 2014 the Requester filed a RTKL request (Request), seeking “[a]ll of the emails of Acting .Secretary of Education Carolyn Dumaresq as they pertain to the performance of her duties as Acting Secretary since she was appointed on Aug. 25, 2014[
Requester appealed PDE’s denial to OOR on September 24, 2014. OOR issued a Notice of Appeal the next day, which notified Requester and PDE that any in
OOR issued its final determination on October 24, 2014, in which it held: (1) the Request was sufficiently specific; (2) PDE could not seek prepayment of fees because it failed to include an estimate in its initial response; (3) PDE could not bifurcate the proceedings before OOR — i.e., PDE was required to assert any applicable exemptions or privileges at the time of the appeal and could not seek to assert them after losing the specificity challenge; and (4) PDE failed to establish that any exemptions or privileges applied to the requested records. Thus, OOR granted Requester’s appeal and ordered PDE to provide Requester with all responsive records within thirty days.
On appeal
“[T]he objective of the RTKL is to empower citizens by affording them access to information concerning the activities of their government.” Levy v. Senate of Pa.,
When considering a challenge to the specificity of a request under Section 703 of the RTKL, this Court employs a three-part balancing test, examining the extent to which the request sets forth (1) the subject matter of the request; (2) the scope of documents sought; and (3) the timeframe for which records are sought.
The subject matter of the request must identify the “transaction or activity” of the agency for which the record is sought. See Section 102 of the RTKL, 65 P.S. § 67.102 (defining a “record” under the RTKL as “Information, regardless of physical form or characteristics, that documents a transaction or activity of an agency and that is created, received or retained pursuant to law or in connection with a transaction, business or activity of the agency.”) (emphasis added); see also Mollick v. Twp. of Worcester,
The scope of the request must identify “a discrete group of documents, either by type ... or by recipient.” Carey,
The timeframe of the request should identify a finite period of time for which records are sought. See Carey,
Here, the Request seeks “[a]ll of the emails of Acting Secretary of Education Carolyn Dumaresq as they pertain to the performance of her duties as Acting Secretary” for approximately one year. (R.R. 7a.) Applying the three part test, we note that the Request identifies a finite time-frame of 347 days (August 23, 2013 to August 5, 2014), and limits the scope of the request — emails to and from Secretary Dumaresq. What the Request fails to specify, however, is the subject matter of the request — i.e., the transaction or activity of the agency for which Requester seeks information. Requester argues that the subject matter of the Request is specific because it only seeks emails “as they pertain to the performance of her duties as Acting Secretary.” This, however, does not provide a context by which the Request can be narrowed; it is, by virtue of the Secretary’s position, a request for emails about all of the agency’s activity overly nearly a one year period. In other words, it is a fishing expedition. Furthermore, the Request’s year-long timeframe is not short enough to save what is, because of Requester’s failure to identify a subject matter narrower than ‘all agency activity,’ an otherwise overbroad request.
In sum, the Request seeks all emails of Secretary Dumaresq over a one year period, without limiting the subject matter of the Request in any meaningful way and is, therefore, insufficiently specific under Section 703 of the RTKL:
Accordingly, the final determination is reversed.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 14th day of July, 2015, the final determination of the Office of Open Records is hereby REVERSED.
Notes
. Act of February 14, 2008, P.L’. 6, 65 P.S. §§ 67A01-.3104.
. OOR noted that this “was a typographical error as it postdated the Request. [PDE] interpreted the Request to seek records from August 23, 2013 to the date of the Request and the Requester does not contest [PDE’s] interpretation of the Request.” (R.R. 48a.)
. 65 P.S. § 67.902(b) (providing thirty-day extension for agency to respond to RTKL request).
. 65 P.S. § 67.703 (“A written request should identify or describe the records sought with sufficient specificity to enable the agency to ascertain which records are being requested.”).
. On appeal from OOR in a RTKL case, this Court’s standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary. Bowling v. Office of Open Records,
. We note that although it appears this Court has previously applied this three-part test, as in Carey, we have not explicitly laid out the test, stated that it was the test to be used in specificity challenges, or explained how the test should be applied. In the interest of clarity, we do so now.
. “Section 208” refers to Section 208 of the Oil and Gas Act of 1984, Act of December 19, 1984, P.L. 1140, as amended, 58 P.S. § 601.208, repealed by the Act of February 14, 2012, P.L. 87.
. Requester seems to argue that the Request was sufficiently specific, irrespective of any
. Because we have concluded that the Request was insufficiently specific and reverse OOR’s determination on that basis, we need not address any of PDE's remaining arguments.
