Pennsylvania Canal Co. v. Burd

90 Pa. 281 | Pa. | 1879

Mr. Justice Sterrett

delivered the opinion of the court,

In its relation to the defendant in error, the Pennsylvania Canal Company was neither a common carrier nor an insurer, nor liable as such. As owner and operator of a public water highway, formerly owned by the state, it was bound to so maintain and manage the canal that it could be used with reasonable safety and convenience by the public, for whose benefit it was constructed. To this end the duty of the company to the public demanded the exercise of reasonable and ordinary care; and it is by this standard its liability to the plaintiff below must be measured.

It follows from this that the company is not liable for injuries arising from unforeseen and unexpected contingencies, such as great freshets and tempests, or other events which, in the exercise of reasonable and ordinary care, would not be anticipated, or could not be provided against.' An injury resulting from an unknown obstruction, which could not be guarded against, without the exercise of extraordinary or unreasonable care, must be considered an accident for which no one is specially to blame, and for which the company is not liable. It would be unreasonable to require a canal company to sound and drag the whole length of its canal continually, to ascertain what obstructions might lie at the bottom, or to keep guards along the banks, to prevent the commission of injuries by careless or designing persons. But it is bound, annually at least, when the water is out of the canal, to inspect the bed and remove obstructions: Exchange Insurance Co. v. The Delaware Canal Co., 10 Bosworth 180.

As the basis of his claim, the plaintiff below charged that the company was guilty of negligence in permitting a sunken log to lie in the bottom of the canal, on which his boat settled and was destroyed. It may be conceded, that if the company knew, or, by exercising reasonable care and diligence, might have known, that the obstruction existed, and neglected to remove it, a clear case of liability would be presented; but it is claimed that there was no evidence of either knowledge or culpable ignorance on the part of the company, and that the learned judge erred, not only in submitting the question of negligence' to the jury, on wholly insufficient testimony, but in suggesting a state of facts not arising out of the evidence, and thereby gave the jury an unwarrantable license to speculate as to how the log came there, and to infer therefrom that the company knew, or.should have been aware, of its presence, as a dangerous obstruction to navigation.

An examination of the testimony before us fails to disclose any evidence upon which the jury could reasonably and properly conclude there was negligence. In the concluding part of his charge, the learned judge says, There is no evidence that the company had any knowledge of this log being there until the water was *285drawn off, in May 1876, and Burd’s boat was sunk. The case thus stands on very narrow ground, * * * and you must, in order to find for the plaintiff, be satisfied that the persons whose duty it was to inspect the canal in the spring of 1876 did not perform that duty in a careful manner, and overlooked the log if it was then visible in this deep part of the canal. These inspecting parties say it was not visible then, and we have said, if it was not, or i-f there and invisible, the plaintiff cannot recover; and if it floated from Hen-lock creek, waterlogged and unseen after the navigation opened, in the spring of 1876, the company is not liable.” While the question of knowledge on the part of the company is thus practically set at rest, for want of evidence thereof, the jury could not fail to understand that it was still incumbent on them to inquire whether the duty of inspection was carelessly or negligently performed. We discover nothing in the testimony to justify the court in submitting this question to the jury.

While refusal to enter judgment of nonsuit is not assignable for error, it may not be amiss to say that the court would have been justified in entertaining the motion. Viewing the testimony in the most favorable light, it was manifestly insufficient to sustain the allegation of negligence on which his claim is founded; in other words, there was no evidence from which the jury might reasonably and properly conclude there was negligence.

In that part of the charge, covered by the fourth assignment, the learned judge said to the jury, that if plaintiff’s “ boat was sunk in settling on a log, there would be a prima facie case of negligence made out against the company, because a log, unlike a stone, would float along before it would sink, and if a floating log escaped the attention of the company for any considerable time, long enough, say, to become waterlogged and sink, the fact of negligence could hardly be denied.” * * * “In determining this question, should it be found by you that this log floated on the surface of the canal at any point, and was not taken out, but permitted to float until it sank, then it would be negligence in the company, and the plaintiff should recover the value of his boat.”

If there had been any testimony to prove such a state of facts as is here suggested to the jury, the principles of law applicable to them would perhaps not be disputed, but the vice of this portion of the charge, as well as the answers complained of in the second and third assignments, is that there is no testimony tending to prove where the log came from, or that it “ floated on the surface of the canal at any point, and was not taken out,-but permitted to sink,” &c. The suggestion of these as possible or probable facts, was wholly unwarranted by the testimony, and could only tend to lead the jury into a field of vague speculation, resulting in a verdict unsupported by the evidence.

Judgment reversed.