47 Pa. Commw. 428 | Pa. Commw. Ct. | 1979
Opinion by
The principal question before us is whether the Pennsylvania Department of Education (PDE) is mandated to reduce instructional subsidies to schools which provide less than 180 days of instruction. It comes to us through the consolidation of the appeals of the Pittsburgh School District (Pittsburgh) and the Centennial School District (Centennial) from orders by the Secretary of Education directing a reduction of their subsidies and two actions addressed to this Court’s original jurisdiction by the Pennsbury School District (Pennsbury) and Centennial, requesting that the PDE be ordered to reimburse the district for the amount by which the subsidy was reduced...
The question first arose in 1976 when Pittsburgh received a subsidy from PDE which had been reduced as a result of Pittsburgh’s failure to provide 180 days of instruction because of a teachers’ strike. Pitts
Similarly, Centennial protested the PDE’s reduction of its 1977 subsidy and was granted an administrative proceeding before the same hearing examiner who heard Pittsburgh’s appeal. Again, the Secretary considered the district’s appeal and dismissed it. From the Secretary’s order, Centennial appealed to this Court. Centennial also filed a petition for review pursuant to this Court’s original jurisdiction.
Pursuing a different course in challenging a reduction in its 1978 subsidy, Pennsbury chose to file a petition for review in the nature of mandamus, or in the alternative, an appeal from the subsidy computation. Subsequently, an administrative proceeding similar to those arranged for Pittsburgh and Centennial was granted to Pennsbury, and the mandamus action was stayed pending completion of the administrative proceeding. As in the other cases, the Secretary upheld PDE’s subsidy reduction. Consequently the district appealed the Secretary’s determination to this Court, and also contained the pursuit of its action in mandamus.
During the course of Pennsbury’s appeal, Elizabeth M. Wilson, a resident taxpayer and the mother of a Pennsbury student, filed a petition to intervene which was dismissed by the Secretary. Mrs. Wilson appealed from this order.
In dismissing the districts’ appeals, the Secretary determined that Section 2502 of the Public School Code of 1949
Turning to the words of the statute, we note that Sections 2501 et seq. of the Code are replete with references to “actual instruction expense,” “reimbursement,” and “reimbursement cost.” Despite these unambiguous terms, the PDE contends that we should read the words “days of instruction” into the statute in order to promote the legislative intent to provide Commonwealth children with 180 days of instruction, as expressed in Section 1501 of the Code. Although we recognize that through Section 1501 of the Code, the Legislature intends that 180 days of instruction be provided by school districts, we find no indication that it intended that the subsidy provision should be used as a vehicle to promote that objective. To the contrary, the words of the statute clearly refer to reimbursement for instruction. Pittsburgh and Centennial have provided instruction to the children in their district and have incurred certain expenses as a result. They have consequently asked to be reimbursed for these expenses, and the clear words of the statute indicate that they should have been so reimbursed. “When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” Section 1921(b) of the Statutory Construction Act of 1972 (Statutory Construction Act), 1 Pa. C.S. §1921 (b). We cannot allow the PDE to pursue what it believes to be the spirit of the Code through a reduction in subsidies based on a misinterpretation of a clear legislative mandate.
PDE has further deviated from the Legislative mandate of the Code by interpreting the term “average” to mean “per 180 days” in some instances, and “average” in others. On the one hand, in computing the aid ratio as provided for in Section 2501(14) of the Code, 24 P.S. §25-2501(14), PDE interprets “average” to mean mathematical average as the term is understood in ordinary usage, and computes the average daily membership by adding the number of student members in the school district during each day of instruction (sum) and dividing by the number of days of instruction. On the other hand, in its computation of each school district’s subsidy, PDE interprets average to mean “per 180 days” and computes average daily membership by dividing the sum by 180, rather than by the actual number of days of instruction, when less than 180 days of instruction are provided. As a result, within the same formula, average daily membership is given two different values. Clearly, the Code provides for the computation of the average
A further study of the Code discloses a clear legislative statement of intent that forfeiture of reimbursement is to take place in given instances or that authority is afforded to PDE to reduce or withhold subsidy funds in others. In Section 2518 of the Code, 24 P.S. §25-2518, the Legislature specifically provided for forfeiture of reimbursement for employing certain teachers, and in Section 2519 of the Code, 24 P.S. §25-2519, it provided for the withholding of subsidies to school
Finally with regard to the legislative intent, we note that the stated objective of Section 2502(g) of the Code is “to provide to each child educated in the schools of Pennsylvania, a minimum educational input that is within two hundred dollars ($200) of the median actual instruction expense per WADM. . . .” Apparently the Legislature is more concerned with the dollar value of the education provided to each child than with the number of days used to provide an education of that value. Consequently, we cannot allow PDE to substitute its objectives for those of the Legislature and must accordingly reverse the Secretary’s order upholding the PDE’s subsidy reductions. We cannot, however, grant the relief requested by Pittsburgh and Centennial (full payment of their subsidies) since an appeal from an order merely determines the validity and content of the order. Commonwealth v. Borough of Reynoldsville, 39 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 318, 395 A.2d 333 (1978). Although we have found that the Secretary’s orders are “not in accordance with law,” 2 Pa. C.S. §704, we shall not award damages to the districts, but will order for the future recomputa
Having determined that PDE’s reduction of subsidies is improper, we must next decide whether the action in mandamus by Pennsbury will lie to force PDE to pay full subsidies for prior subsidy years. Mandamus will lie to compel public officials to perform their duties in accordance with the law when those duties are ministerial in character and not discretionary. PDE has the ministerial duty of making proper subsidy computations in accordance with the directives of the Code. Since its method of computing subsidies results in a failure to pay the amount required by the formula, it is a proper subject for an action in mandamus. Rose Tree Media School District v. Department of Public Instruction, 431 Pa. 233, 244 A.2d 754 (1968). However, in deciding whether to grant the relief requested, we feel compelled to consider the fact that PDE has already distributed the funds available to it for the subsidies in question. In essence, no money is available to pay the requested relief. As the Supreme Court stated in Commonwealth ex rel. McLaughlin v. Erie County, 375 Pa. 344, 350, 100 A.2d 601, 604 (1953):
[M]andamus will not issue, as a rule, where it is apparent that the writ will be futile or ineffectual by reason of the inability of the respondent to comply therewith. Although want of funds . . . may not always prevent such, issuance, the court in its discretion may refuse the remedy if it is satisfied that the respondent has not the necessary money or the means of procuring it to comply with the mandate.
See also Commonwealth ex rel. Alessandroni v. Borough of Confluence, 427 Pa. 540, 234 A.2d 852 (1967); Board of Commissioners of Potter County v. Turner, 33 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 639, 382 A.2d 1248 (1978).
Oekeb
Now, November 28, 1979, it is hereby ordered as follows:
1. To No. 284 C.D. 1979, the order of the Secretary of Education is affirmed.
2. To No. 206 C.D. 1979 and No. 494 C.D. 1979, the order of the Secretary of Education is reversed. All future final subsidy payments shall be calculated and paid consistent with this Opinion.
3. To No. 708 C.D. 1978, the Department of Education shall calculate instructional subsidies incident to all future final subsidy payments consistent with this opinion. All other reliefs sought are denied.
4. To No. 285 C.D. 1979 and No. 1631 C.D. 1978, the petitions not having been pursued are dismissed.
Act of March 10, 1949, P.L. 30, as amended.
Section 2502(g) of the Code, 24 P.S. §25-2502(g).