Pennington v. LongabaughPennington v. Longabaugh
In this medical malpractice case, plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court’s order granting summary disposition in defendants’ favor pursuant to MCR 2.116(0(10). We affirm.
On March 28, 2001, at approximately 8:47 a.m., the decedent Mary Pennington underwent a transesoph ageal echocardiogram (TEE) performed by defendant John Longabaugh, M.D. After the procedure, Mary complained of chest and throat discomfort. Dr. Longabaugh ordered a chest x-ray, which was negative. Mary reported that the pain had subsided. Dr. Longabaugh discharged Mary at approximately 11:10 a.m. Following her discharge, however, Mary presented to Bixby Hospital, where, sometime between 2:30 p.m. and 3:30 p.m., she was diagnosed with a perforated esophagus. At approximately 4:00 p.m., Mary was transferred to St. Joseph Mercy Hospital where she underwent surgery to repair the perforation. Several days later, she suffered a stroke and was placed on life-support systems. She later died after being disconnected from life-support machines.
Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that defendants’ failure to properly perform the TEE, failure to obtain informed consent, and failure to properly diagnose and repair the perforation caused Mary’s death. In support of these claims, plaintiff offered the testimony of George Gubernikoff, M.D. In his deposition, Gubernikoff testified generally that Mary’s death was caused by “complications related to her care following her perforated esophagus.” He identified those complications as the stroke and “a prolonged Intensive Care Unit course.” He noted that Mary was at risk for a stroke because of her age and history of diabetes. He further testified that he could not state the medical probability of the cause of the stroke or whether earlier diagnosis of the perforation would have altered her outcome. The trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary disposition, ruling, among other things, that plaintiff had failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact with regard to whether the alleged negligence caused Mary’s death.
On appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in ruling that plaintiff failed to establish a genuine issue of fact regarding causation. We disagree. We review de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition.
Dressel v Ameribank,
In a medical malpractice case, the plaintiff must establish: (1) the standard of care, (2) breach of that standard of care, (3) injury, and (4) proximate causation between the alleged breach and the injury.
Woodard v Custer,
Even if all the alleged breaches are accepted as true, plaintiff has failed to present any expert testimony to establish a genuine issue of fact with regard to whether the alleged breaches caused Mary’s death. Dr. Gubernikoff testified broadly that “the cause of death is the complications related to her care following her perforated esophagus.” He identified the complications as the stroke and “a prolonged Intensive Care Unit course.” However, he also testified that he could not testify about the medical probability regarding (1) what the cause of Mary’s stoke was or (2) that an earlier diagnosis of Mary’s perforated esophagus would have altered her outcome. Thus, Gubernikoff s testimony does not establish a causal link between the alleged negligence and plaintiffs ultimate death. Plaintiff also relies on the death certificate and the affidavit of merit to establish causation. However, this evidence, without supporting expert testimony, is insufficient to establish a genuine issue of fact relating to whether the alleged negligence caused Mary’s death. Therefore, the trial court did not err in granting defendants’ motion for summary disposition.
Because resolution of this issue disposes of the entire case, we need not address plaintiffs remaining issues on appeal.
Affirmed.