128 Pa. 509 | Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Lancaster County | 1889
Opinion,
This case presents a question which is both interesting and
The important facts are not in controversy. The answer concedes and the master finds that the railroad company built a new road with a safe overhead crossing to take the place of the old road; that the new road is, and has been since its construction in use by the public, and that the crossing at grade now proposed would be dangerous. The master was of opinion however, and so reported, that the plaintiff’s right to the relief sought depended upon the answers to be given to two questions. These he stated and answered as follows :
“ 1. Has the Pennsylvania Railroad Company the right, if
This is our question. The legislative provision on which it depends is in these words: “ That if said railroad company shall find it necessary to change the site of any portion of any turnpike or public road, they shall cause the same to be reconstructed forthwith at their own proper expense on the most favorable location, and in as perfect a manner as the original road.” The question then in every case is whether a change of the public road is necessary. This is left by the statute to be determined in the first instance by the railroad company. The circumstances out of which the necessity must arise are not enumerated. Whether a longitudinal occupancy of the road-bed for any distance however small will create a necessity, or whether nearness to the public road, a deep excavation across it, a cutting away of the hillside under it upon a diagonal line to a depth of nine or ninety feet, will justify the removal and reconstruction of the road, is a question to be settled in the exercise of a sound discretion by the railroad company. Unless the power thus committed to the company is abused, or used without due regard to the public interests, it is conclusive
The question in any given case is not what is possible, but what is reasonably practicable. In the case before us, it appears by the findings of the master that the railroad company encountered the following difficulties in determining what to do with the Newport road. To make a crossing at grade would require a through cut eight feet deep at the side of the railroad, to be continued back from the road fully two hundred feet. At a distance of one hundred feet from the railroad this cut would be five feet deep on one side with a bank twelve feet high on the other. The descent along its whole length would be at the rate of seven and a half feet in a hundred. It would cross the tracks on a diagonal line, the tracks being on a three and a half degree curve. Both the curve in the railroad and the cut for the public road would contribute to make the crossing dangerous to the public and inconvenient to the railroad company. To cross by' an overhead bridge would require a structure three hundred and thirty feet long with a grade of fifteen feet in a hundred. An underground crossing would require an excavation under the tracks fifteen feet in depth, with an approach from the south of six hundred and fifty feet, and one from the north of three hundred and seventy-five feet, with an average grade of eight feet in a hundred. The company decided that neither of these was reasonably practicable, but that it was necessary, in view of all the circumstances, to remove the road a short distance and re-construct it on better ground, with better grades and with an overhead crossing.
This was done. If this was an unauthorized exercise of power, the objection should have been made before the new road was laid out by the court and the work of re-construction completed by the railroad. It might be raised in a proper way even now, but until it is raised and disposed of in an orderly
The cases cited by the defendants in error are not in point. Penna. R. Co.’s App., 93 Pa. 150, was a case in which a railroad company sought to justify the appropriation of a street without direct legislative authority therefor. The same is true of the Penna. R. Co.’s App., 115 Pa. 514, and the rule was stated to be that the legislature may authorize a railroad company to lay its tracks in a public street, but that without such authority it has not the right to appropriate the highway in that manner. The precise question now decided is not, so far as we are aware, considered in any of our own cases, nor has the research of counsel brought to our attention any decided ease in which it is ruled.
The decree is reversed, and the preliminary injunction restored at the costs of the appellees.