ALLEN LYNN PENN PETITIONER v. STATE OF ARKANSAS RESPONDENT
No. CR-13-312
SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
October 10, 2013
2013 Ark. 409
HON. LEON JOHNSON, JUDGE
PRO SE MOTION FOR RULE ON CLERK OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR BELATED APPEAL AND PRO SE AMENDMENT TO MOTION FOR RULE ON CLERK OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR BELATED APPEAL [PULASKI COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, 60CR-83-441]
PER CURIAM
In 1983, petitioner Allen Lynn Penn was found guilty of capital murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole on charges related to the robbery of a service station and convenience store during which the store clerk was shot and killed. He appealed to this court. Prior to our decision on appeal, petitioner filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis based on a confession to the crime made by an inmate at the Arkansas Department of Correction. We granted the petition and reinvested jurisdiction in the trial court to determine whether a writ was in order. Penn v. State, 282 Ark. 571, 670 S.W.2d 426 (1984). The prisoner refused to testify at the hearing, and the trial court held that petitioner was not entitled to a new trial. Petitioner did not appeal that decision, and we affirmed the judgment of conviction in Penn v. State, 284 Ark. 234, 681 S.W.2d 307 (1984).
On April 27, 2012, petitioner again filed in the trial court a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to
Petitioner then filed a notice of appeal on December 14, 2012. The record on appeal was tendered to this court on March 4, 2013. Our clerk declined to lodge the tendered record because the notice of appeal was not timely filed. Now before us is petitioner‘s motion for rule on clerk or, in the alternative, motion for belated appeal and amendment to the motion in which he asks this court to order the clerk to lodge the record.
We need not consider petitioner‘s motion because it is clear that the habeas petition and motion for reconsideration were wholly without merit. An appeal from an order that denied a petition for postconviction relief, including a petition under Act 1780 of 2001, will not be allowed to proceed where it is clear that an appellant could not prevail. Cooper v. State, 2013 Ark. 180 (per curiam); Fields v. State, 2013 Ark. 154 (per curiam); King v. State, 2013 Ark. 133 (per curiam); Foster v. State, 2013 Ark. 61 (per curiam). The generally applicable standard of review of an order denying postconviction relief dictates that this court does not reverse unless the trial court‘s findings are clearly erroneous. King, 2013 Ark. 133; Cooper v. State, 2012 Ark. 123 (per curiam). A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the appellate court, after reviewing the entire evidence, is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. King, 2013 Ark. 133; Cooper, 2012 Ark. 123.
Act 1780 of 2001, as amended by Act 2250 of 2005 and codified at
One of these requirements is that if the specific evidence was previously subjected to testing, the petitioner must request testing that uses a new method or technology that is substantially more probative than prior testing.
At trial, the investigating officer testified that good and partial prints were lifted from the crime scene and sent to the Arkansas State Crime Laboratory for comparison with the prints of petitioner and other individuals suspected by law enforcement prior to trial. He further testified that none of these lifted prints matched the prints of either petitioner or other
Petitioner also failed to meet the requirement of section
Dismissal of the petition is also proper because it was not timely filed. A petitioner who files a petition more than thirty-six months after the entry of the judgment of conviction must rebut a presumption that his petition is untimely.
Petitioner filed his petition almost twenty-nine years after the judgment of conviction had been entered against him. In his petition for habeas relief, petitioner attempted to rebut the presumption against timeliness by contending that AFIS is a new testing method that is substantially more probative than the fingerprint testing done at the time of his trial. However, as held herein, petitioner failed to demonstrate that utilizing AFIS constitutes a new method of technology that is substantially more probative than prior testing.
Finally, petitioner contended that he is entitled to a hearing on his habeas petition because the files and record in his case fail to conclusively show that no relief is warranted, and
Motion denied.
