113 Pa. 635 | Pa. | 1886
delivered the opinion of the Court,
Then another term is added to the contract, by which it is provided that the lessee “shall pay fifteen cents per hour for the steam furnished to his engine ” by the lessor, “and he shall have the right to use the tools in the pattern shop ; but in consideration therefor,” the lessor, “ shall have the use without charge of the power of the engine” of the lessee whenever they shall require it in tlie pattern shop. The plain and obvious meaning of these words is, that for whatever steam may be furnished by the lessor to the lessee’s engine, the lessee shall pay fifteen cents an hour; but the lessor does not agree to furnish any steam, and the lessee does not agree to take any. But if steam is actually furnished to the engine, which means necessarily also if it is used, the lessee agrees that he will pay fifteen cents an hour for it. If the furnishing of steam by the lessor was a necessary incident to his lease of the promises, there would be an implied obligation to furnish it, and the ease would be parallel to Watson v. OTIern, and Koch and Ballist’s Appeal and the kindred cases. But it is too manifest to require discussion, that there is no such implied obligation. This being the case, where the lessee simply agrees to pay for steam furnished without requiring the lessor to furnish any,
We sustain the 1st, 2d and 3d, because the value of the lease, or any part of it, is not the measure of the damages to which the plaintiff is entitled for a breach of a particular covenant contained in it. If such a covenant was broken, the actual damage which resulted from the actual breach, can be and should be shown. To ask what was the value of the lease, lets in the wildest and most speculative conjectures, which the friendly zeal of the party’s witness may choose to indulge in. If there was an injury done, let the witness state what it was, and how it was done; and if he can express the value of that particular injury in figures, let him do so. ■
We think the questions covered by the seventh and eighth assignments should have been allowed, as they bear directly upon the allegation of damages from loss of the use of the tools, and that subject being an open one, presented by the plaintiff, the defendant was as much entitled to give evidence in reply as the plaintiff was, in support of it.
We do not sustain the ninth assignment, as it is only a general statement of the law applicable to any finding of damages, and we see no objection to it. The same is true of the twelfth assignment.
The sixteenth and seventeenth assignments are not sustained.
Judgment reversed, and venire de novo awarded.