*1 149 stаted, For the reasons order the circuit court setting Cook aside the Commission’s County October order affirmed in reversed and remanded part, part, to the ratemaking Commission conduct further proceed- our ings consistent with opinion. in part, and reversed
Affirmed and remanded. part, JJ., SIMON, GOLDENHERSH and took no in the part consideration decision of case.
(No. 61665.— PENKAVA, ELAINE Appellee, FRANCIS KAS BOHM, Adm’r of the Estate of Dr. Georgе Rezek, Deceased, et al. (Sandra Hon, Appellant). 29, 1987.
Opinion June filed *2 GOLDENHERSH, J., part. took no MILLER, J., dissenting. CLARK, C.J., and D. (Bradford Gloor, Chicago Schade & Cassiday, Roth and Jacobs, Bernice for counsel), appellant. Hammer,
Scott D. Beranek, Best & Fraterrigo, Chicago, for appellee. Veldenz,
Michael C. Kominiarek and P. Russell French, Kominiarek, Kezelis & Rogers, Chicago, Francis Kasbohn.
JUSTICE WARD delivered the opinion court: The plaintiff, Elaine Penkava filed a com (Penkava), plaint in the circuit court of Cook County defendants, Kasbоhm, Francis administrator of Rezek, the estate of Dr. George de (Dr. ceased Rezek’s estate); Northwest (North Hospital west); and Sandra Hon (Hon), registered em nurse ployed by Northwest. The trial court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint on the that her ground claims were barred the stat *3 ute of limitations for medical malpractice (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, 83, 22.1, ch. par. 1985, 110, now Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. par. 212). On the plаintiff’s appeal, the appellate 13— court affirmed the dismissal of the claims North against west and Dr. estate, Rezek’s but reversed and remanded as to the claim against Hon. Ill. (131 534.) Un App. der our (103 Rule 315 Ill. 2d R. 315), we granted Hon’s petition for leave to appeal but denied the for petition leave filed appeal by Penkava. dismiss,
When a motion to considering all facts prop in erly will be taken as plеaded complaint true for pur of poses Electric, on the passing motion. Anderson Inc. v. Ledbetter 146,148. Erection 115 Corp. (1986), Ill. 2d 10,
On 1983, the filed a four-count February plaintiff counts I complaint: Hon, and II named Northwest and registered nurse sued as an and of agent employee Northwest; III counts and were Dr. Rezek’s IV estate. Counts I III were drawn on the theory of res II and under the doctrine counts IV
negligence; ipsa lоquitur. These that on allegations counts set out Rezek, 22, 1975, Dr. George at Northwest May Hospital, Hon, a total with the assistance of Sandra performed as a result on the and that plaintiff, hysterectomy failure to exercise due care in performing their negligent one one metalic foreign objects, the two surgery, in The to remain her body. plain- were plastic, permitted October did until objects tiff not discover presence the mass, 1982, when a caused the large presence her abdomen. foreign objects, developed stated, As the plaintiff’s trial court dismissed as court affirmed dismissal complaint. appellate The It Northwest and Dr. Rezek’s estate. reversed nurse, within the Hon, that as a she was not holding for medical malprac benefit of the statute of limitations tice, which the was restricted аctions court said 1981, ch. Rev. Stat. hospitals (Ill. against physicians statute of limitations 22.1). Section 21.1 par. provided part: against any damages or death injury
“No action or under laws physician, hospital duly dentist licensed *** brought arising patient this State out of care shall the claimant years than 2 after the date on which more knew, through diligence of reasonable should or use *** death injury of the existence of the ***, have known brought more than but in no shall such action be event or omission on occurred act years after date which the cause in such action have been alleged or occurrence Stat. (Ill. or death ***.” Rev. injury such 22.1.) par. having the legislature’s court stated appellate *4 evi- nurses registered section 21.1 to include
amended “encom- be denced that nurses were registered ” under term ‘hospital’ within the passed meaning in pаrt provides: That amendment statute. damages against any “No action for or death injury dentist, physician, registered (Em ***.” hospital nurse added.) 110, phasis par. Ill. Rev. ch. 13—212. Stat. Hon contends erred in inter- that the court appellate their section 21.1 because preting considering hospitals, nature, can medical service and treatment provide through nurses and other Also, personnel. ap- a different рly statute of limitations to a em- hospital ployee providing patient care than the statute applied itself an would be an construction of illogical section 21.1 the cause of because action involved has arisen from the same act or acts of alleged negligence.
The plaintiff’s position is that the court cor appellate therefore, rectly interpretеd 21.1; section her com plaint Nurse against Hon should not have been dismissed because it was filed within the of the stat timely period ute of limitations for personal (Ill. Rev. Stat. injury when the rule to the dis par. 15) relating covery negligence (Moore Jackson Park applied Hospital 95 Ill. 223, 232). event, In plaintiff argues, equitable considerations her require that action dismissed, Nurse Hon not because result would be that her сlaim for medical malpractice would have been barred even before she discovered her and its cause. injury
Before addressing these contentions the plaintiff Hon, we consider a motion filed Dr. es Rezek’s tate to dismiss the portion the plaintiff’s brief which she has entitled There the ar “cross-appeal.” plaintiff gues that court appellate erred North holding west and the estate of Dr. Rezek. contends plaintiff that she has the right file in this man cross-appeal ner under our Rule 318(a) Ill. 2d R. The rule (87 318(a)). provides: method, all appeals, by
“In whatever from the Appel- Court, late the Supreme any appellee, Court respond- *5 154
ent, relief warranted co-party or seek and obtain may filed a having separate record on without by appeal or or appeal cross-appeal for leave to notice petition 318(a).) Ill. R. separate (87 2d appeal.” as has denied that, already estate this court argues The from the appeal appel- for leave to petition the plaintiffs of her claims court’s affirmance of the dismissal late our Northwest, she cannot under the estate and that court has pre- raise the same issues 318(a) Rule mo- Hоn has filed a similar to review. declined viously cross-appeal. tion to dismiss the purported Rule she was 318(a) The claim that under plaintiff’s She file cannot sustained. to a be cross-appeal eligible or co-party” not an “appellee, respondent was simply not and was to the estate of Dr. Rezek Northwest of Rule 318(a). act under qualified provisions the estate nor Northwest but here was nеither appellant rather was Hon. is, of construction statutory
The first purpose course, effect to the intention give to ascertain v. (Maloney in the statute. enacting the legislature “ Bower ‘is 473, 2d This intention (1986), 479.) 113 Ill. used but language not also be gathered from and the purposes the reasons for the enactment from ” ex (People in original.) attained.’ thereby (Emphasis v. Ring (1968), rel. Cason An 305, Ill. 2d 310.) 41 be consid may apprоpriately amendment statute intent. the legislative what was determining ered v. Rink (People Too, “where 540.) 97 Ill. 2d (1983), in great statute would result a literal enforcement are bound to courts or absurd injustice consequences, intended that such were presume consequences as which, is reasonable a construction adopt ex People sume, legislature.” contemplated by was Hupe v. No. 231 Schoоl District Community High rel. 448. Ill. 2d (1954),
This court has note taken legislature mid-1970’s was confronted a medical in malpractice with surance from an accelerated rise in problem resulting charged companies number insurance premiums and the withdrawal of other from the medical companies (Anderson Wagner insurance market. 79 Ill. In 317.) response, legislature 21.1, enacted section limited the time which within which an action mеdical malpractice could be brought *6 against a or in “physician hospital.” legislature’s tendment was to ensure the continued availability medical malpractice to insurance affected and in persons stitutions, and thus ensure the continuation their pro health-care viding services. 79 Ill. 2d 317.
The plaintiff contends that in legislature, section 21.1, intended the reach of the statute would extend physicians nursеs, not hospitals; registered being named aas of health-care separately profession providers, were not to be its within In coverage. support of this position, plaintiff relies upon amendment of section 21.1 specifically designating registered nurses as a or class protected group of health-care providers and upon this court’s decision in Anderson v. Wagner 79 Ill. 2d 295.
The holding in Anderson v. Wаgner (1979), 79 Ill. 2d 295, does not There, support plaintiff’s position. court held that section 21.1 was not unconstitutional as special legislation because it simply applied only physi cians and and not to all hospitals health-care providers. Here the is the term question whether is to “hospital” be as interpreted or to a extending applying regis tered nurse employed by hospital when within acting of her scope that the employment. legisla We hold tive intendment was to extend the reach of section 21.1 to registered nurses employed by hospitals. enacted, sec that, scope as agree originally
We or as a registered group did not include nurses tion 21.1 indepen who were class of health-care providers course, does This, the statute. covered within dently term as used in the stat not mean that the “hospital,” not not to cover ute, cannot and should be construed also to when sued as but “hospitals,” only hospitals a hospital cover nurses who are registered employees for conduct agents hospital and who are sued A merely out of care.” patient hospital “arising facilities with a collection of empty building buildings treatment; composed is also physical act on behalf of the nurses, who including persons, court This patients. treatment providing hospital Hospital Memorial Darling Community v. Charleston 326, 332, observed: (1965), 33 Ill. 2d “ undertake ‘The that the does not conception its through undertake to act patient, to treat the does not nurses, simply pro- but undertakes instead doctors longer no responsibility, their own upon cure them to act as their Present-day hospitals, the fact. mannеr reflects demonstrates, fur- do far more than plainly of operation on a regularly employ They nish facilities for treatment. *7 in- nurses and large a staff of salary physicians, basis *** ternes, they charge for medical care patients himself person ***. who avails Certainly, treatment at- expects will “hospital hospital that of facilities” him, employees that its nurses or other to cure tempt resрonsibility.' will on their own act [Citation.]” intended to the legislature It is inconceivable in a dentists and “hospitals” protect only physicians, to sense, liability nurses narrow, exposed unreal leaving That our construction discovered malpractice. for later 21.1 is is clear when section of the correct hospital term is It provides: analyzed. damages for or death injury “No action for *** pa- arising out hоspital dentist physician, of added.) 1981, ***.
tient care Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. (Emphasis 83, par. 22.1.
A obviously can medical care hospital provide If through personnel, nurses. nurses of including a were not to more re- hospital have benefit strictive here, statute limitations we examine there be the would two differ- strange consequence having ent of limitations tort. It periods applicable one clear that under the statute would be liable for hospital not more than four years for the conduct of a negligent nurse employed by it under the doctrine of respondeat superior, after which the would no be lia- longer ble. The hospital’s exposure to would shut liability be down after four years but the nurse’s exposure to liabil- ity would continue. It would be unreasonable conclude that the legislature intended to have suсh a bifurcation application respondeat superior exposure to tort liability.
The amendment of 21.1 section to include registered nurses (Ill. Rev. Stat. can par. 212) 13— readily and simply The benefit of this restric explained. tive statute limitations originally only applied physi cians and hospitals. The statute was amended to apply another health-care dentist, and, later, provider, to the apply registered nurse. It is apparent that the de sign of the latest amendment was to extend the benefit of the restricting statute to all registered nurses in actions arising care, out of it patient is extended to all physicians dentists, and all rather than confining benefit to registered nurses employed by hospitals.
The trial court properly dismissed the complaint against Nurse Hon. It was barred limi statute of tations for mеdical malpractice because was filed more than four after the years (Ill. alleged negligence. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. par. 22.1.) are not We insensitive to the distress of the plaintiff from the claim barring *8 of her in
created, alleges, knowledge she before she had arise from the en situations Unhappy may jury. of explained actment of statutes with We periods repose. action of this charac the rаtionale underlying legislative of to terminate liabil possibility ter: is intended the “[I]t time, a poten of regardless after defined of ity period lack of of his cause of action. knowledge tial plaintiffs *** balancing the The reflect repose periods legislature’s the against of an interest in recovery prob individual’s actions malpractice lems costs in medical perceived in afford having interest available public’s Hospi Mega Holy Cross health care able [citations].” tal 416, 422, 428. 111 Ill. 2d appellate
For reasons given, part of dis- court's the trial court’s order judgment reversing missal of defendant Hon reversed. reversed.
Judgment GOLDENHERSH took no in the con- part JUSTICE or decision of this case. sideration CLARK, dissenting: CHIEF JUSTICE a stat- by interpretation The amends majority opinion face, its stands hardly ute which is on unambiguous Morеover, the plain in need tortuous explication. language, majority which meaning statutory de- is more than the statute’s ignores, sufficient serve insurance reducing clared goal I therefore the court’s decision costs. Since believe that con- statutory in this case violates settled principles struction, I dissent. respectfully of limita
The a statute provides statute question “action for death damages injury tions any *** under laws licensed hospital duly 83, par. 22.1.) Stat. (Ill. this State.” Rev. statute are to be legislature chosen words *9 given their and plain (People Step ordinary meaning. that, 2d It pan (1985), 317.) Ill. seems me an English, action a is an ordinary against hospital action a the which names licensed under hospital, duly laws a State, of this as defendant. Hon a
Sandra is not an An hospital. She is individual. action brought her is not an actiоn against brought against hospital. a fact that she is employed by on the acting behalf should not hospital’s automatically confer her the benefits of a upon statute worded so as to protect hospitals, at least not without evidence that this was in fact what the If legislature intended. such evi- dence is contained in it majority has opinion, escaped me.
I with agree that section 21.1 was en majority acted in response to medical insurance cri malpractice sis, marked an by accelerated rise in charged premiums by some insurance and companies the withdrawal of other companies from the medical malpractice insurance (Anderson market. v. Wagner 79 Ill. 295, 317.) But this crisis did not all affect health-care providers As this equally. Anderson, court noted in the legislature was in of data possession that, which indicated for the year against “claims con surgeons and physicians stituted 59% of all claims paid count and by 73% of total amount of all claims that were Claims paid. hospitals composed 36% of all claims count and paid by 25% amount. Thus and physicians hospitals together of accounted of 95% total number medical mal practice claims and of 98% the dollar amount оf those
claims 79 Ill. 2d paid.” 295, 317.
Thus, the legislature was to a crisis directly reacting confined to two primarily specific classes health-care providers physicians There was crisis hospitals. no — among hospital the vast employees, majority whom would not carry liability insurance. It is true personal malprac- are defendants hospital employees many suits, are
tice and the institutions for which work they su- respondеat contribution or sued under impleaded perior. targets patient litigation But real surely defendants, are the of institutional “deep pockets” It is not the “shallow pockets” hospital employees. their which have 25% not hospitals, employees, paid all successful claims. And malpractice hospitals, their obtaining which have had employees, difficulty insurance.
Thus, was, obviously, purposе legislation affecting alleviate factual medical crisis em and not a fictitious crisis hospitals, affecting in Ander *10 court this recognized This ployees. implicitly son, the statute noting Assembly that the General “drew and within the classification very encompassed narrowly the to whom the statute those applied only segments the cri health-care most affected providers acutely by 295, 319.) fact, Ill. 2d In the court noted that (79 sis.” statute, like in other the Illinois statutes jurisdictions, group to a limited “provides very only protection *** or facilities arid excludes nurses medical personnel health and a of medical body personnel substantial could litiga care facilities that be involved Since (79 309.) tion.” Ill. 2d personnel, not for, to the worked were hospitals they opposed not the the could crisis, legislature affeсted” “acutely by for to provide have intended statute protection Anderson on interpretation them. is our case the leading determinative, wor surely not it is of section While 21.1. dis the curt majority’s consideration than more thy Ill. 2d 155. missal of it. See 117 at major- the Moreover, I am unable to understand why of section 21.1 which that an interpretation believes ity meaning the its “hospital” plain ordinary word gives unreal “narrоw, in a protect hospitals would (117 156.) sense.” Ill. at would be Hospitals protected broad, in a real sense—after four very years they their insurers safe from any brought would be claims out upon theory, whether arising hospital’s negligence (see Community own Darling Charleston 326, 332), Memorial 33 Ill. 2d or out Hospital the hospital’s torts responsibility the of its employees under the superior. doctrine The fact that respondеat its their employees would remain own responsible torts beyond the would no effect four-year period have on a hospital or its insurers. I note that the has made
Finally, clear majority whether it holds that the statute to all applies employees of hospitals, or only registered nurses employed by If it holds hospitals. statute only regis protects tered nurses employed is difficult to un by hospitals, dеrstand later why legislature amended statute include specifically nurses. Ill. registered (See Rev. Stat. par. nurses, Since unlike 212.) 13— are physicians, usually hospital the addition employees, of the words “registered nurses” would have hardly at all if changed law meant legislature had truly to include nurses registered in the employed by hospitals A statute. original material a statute made change by an act is amendatоry presumed change original (See statute. In re Cohn (1982), 190.) 93 Ill. 2d While the presumption may rebutted evidence that origi *11 nal statute was ambiguous, and the legislature intended subsequent (see amendment a clarification People v. Bratcher Ill. 2d there is no 534), evidence here that word was “hospital” ambiguous, the addition was in phrase “registered nurse” its tended clarify meaning. reasons,
For the I foregoing dissent. respectfully JUSTICE MILLER joins this dissent.