63 So. 346 | Miss. | 1913
delivered the opinion of the court.
Appellant is the trustee in bankruptcy for the estate of A. H. Borah, a bankrupt. Among the assets of this estate was the insurance policy sued on, covering a stock of goods formerly owned by the bankrupt, and which had been destroyed by fire during the life of the policy. The insurance company having declined to pay for the loss of the goods, this suit was instituted..' At the close of the evidence a peremptory instruction Was given for the defendant, and there was a verdict and judgment accordingly. The ground of this peremptory instruction was the failure of the assured to comply with the iron-safe clause contained in the policy, which clause the reporter will set out in full.
Prior to the month of June, 1911, Borah was conducting a general merchandise business at Silver City, Mississippi. About this time he decided .to open a similar business in the city of Greenwood, and thereupon shipped to Greenwood from his Silver City-store certain goods, wares, and merchandise, with which, together with some other goods purchased from various wholesale merchants, he commenced business on the 26th of June, 1911. The policy sued on was executed on August 8th, and the fire which destroyed the stock of goods-occurred on August 15th. When the goods shipped from Silver City were packed preparatory to shipment a complete inventory thereof was made by Borah, and when they were received
1911. Cr. June 26, by cash acc. C. S.$ 3.00
“ “ S. C. goods to S. C. 129.91
27, “ cash O. S. 4.00
30, “ “ C. S. from 28 — 30 . 5.00
July 3, “ C. S', from 1 — 3 . 4.50
8, “ “ “ “ 4 — 8 . 13.00
30, “ “ “ “ . 105.00
Aug. 9, > “ “ to Aug. 9. 76.00
18, “ Carruthers Jones Shoe Co. 81.70
Borah did not stay in this store himself, but it was managed and the business conducted by a clerk by the name of Lyell, who made all of the sales and sold only for cash. Lyell kept a memorandum book on which he entered, each day, the gross amount of cash sales for the day and whatever goods he took out for his own use. He kept no memorandum of the items composing these cash sales. Borah, at intervals, as shown by the credit side of merchandise account, would post these cash sales in his ledger, transferring thereto, not each item, or rather,
Appellant’s contentions are: (1) That under the terms of the policy Borah was not .required to keep a set of books until he had made an, .inventory of the goods in the store; that he had made no such inventory, and under the policy had thirty days in which to do so, which thirty
In support of his first proposition appellant’s counsel say that the inventory made by Borah of the goods shipped from Silver City to Greenwood was simply an invoice, and not an inventory within the meaning of the policy; and in support thereof we are referred to the case of Insurance Co. v. Bank, 71 Miss. 612, 15 So. 932. In that case the paper claimed to be an inventory was an invoice of the goods sold which had been checked with the goods by the purchaser prior to, or at the time, of his purchase, and before they were put into the store where the business was conducted.
• The paper here in question is not an invoice furnished by a seller to a purchaser, but is a list of the goods, together with their values, which first went into the,store, and therefore a list of all them on hand, made by the assured himself, treated by him as - an inventory, and preserved and introduced on the trial as such. It complies with all of the requirements of, and must be held to be, an inventory. Phoenix Insurance Co. v. Dorsey, 58 So. 778.
It was, of course, not necessary for the assured to have posted his ledger each day, and, if he- desired, he had the right to post only the gross amount 'of the cash sales for the interval between the dates of posting; but if he desired to pursue this plan, he should'have preserved the book containing the items which were posted to the ledger in gross. The preservation of the book kept by Lyell was therefore necessary in order that this clause of the policy might be complied with, conceding, for the purpose of the argument, that the book introduced complied therewith in all other respects. If the keeping of this ledger alone in the manner in which it was kept should be held to constitute a compliance with the iron-safe clause, it would logically follow that the clause could be complied with by a merchandise account containing only two entries — one a debit of the gross amount of merchandise put into the store, and the other a credit of the gross amount taken out of it.
There is no merit in the contention of counsel for appellant that at the time the store .was burned it was actually open for business within the meaning of the policy.’ The physical fact is that it was closed, the doors locked, and Lyell had gone.to another portion of the city, so that it was physically impossible for any business to have been transacted within the store while he was away.
Affirmed.