113 Ga. 592 | Ga. | 1901
The general tax act of 1898 contained the following visions: “ The presidents of all manufacturing or other incorporated companies, or their agents, other than railroad, insurance, telegraph, telephone, express, sleeping and palace car companies, shall be required to return all their property whatever of their respective companies at its true market value to the tax-receiver of the county where the same is located, or where the principal business of such company is located; provided, that if the real estate and machinery and other personal property used in connection with the operation thereof is located in a county different from that of the principal office, then such real estate and machinery, and other personal property connected therewith, shall be returned in the county where located, and the money, notes, accounts, and other property subject to taxation shall be returned in the county where the principal place of business of each such companies is located.” Acts 1898, p. 29 (8). The body of the act distinctly provides that the president of a manufacturing company, when he comes to return the property of his company for taxation, may, at his option, return all of the property of his company at the place where it is located, or, if he sees proper to do so, he may return the same where the principal
In construing “ saving clauses ” and “ provisos ” where they are inconsistent with the body or purview of the act, some of the courts have drawn a distinction; but by far the larger number of authorities treat both alike. Among the- latter is Chancellor Kent, who says: “But it may be remarked upon this case [naming a case holding the contrary view] that a proviso repugnant to the purview of the statute renders it equally nugatory and void as a repugnant saving clause; and it is difficult to see why the act should be destroyed by the one, and not by the other, or why the proviso and the saving clause, when inconsistent with the body of the act, should not both of them be equally rejected.” ■ 1 Kent’s Com.. *463. See also Sedg. Con. Stat.. & Con. L. 47,, 48;- D.warr. Stat. 118. ' We agree with these, authorities that there is, no good.reason why" am in
It is true that as a general rule judicial interference with the col-" lection of State taxes is forbidden, and that this rule is subject to few, if any, exceptions; many so-called exceptions being only apparent. Decker v. McGowan, 59 Ga. 807. As was said by Judge Bleckley in the case just cited: “For an officer to exact money under the name of a tax, when there is no law to warrant the exaction, is not an attempt to collect taxes, but an attempt to collect, something else; and the rule which excludes interference in the collection of taxes does not apply. The difference is that which exists between the absence of authority, and the mistaken or wrongful execution of an authority which has been duly conferred. If the officer is armed with a valid law, and confines himself within its limitations as to the rate and the objects of taxation, he is free from being impeded by the courts, whatever errors or abuses may happen. But if he thinks he has a law, or pretends to have, when in truth he has none, or if he disregards express limitations and restrictions, he is so far a mere wrong-doer, and can not take shelter under official cover. Upon principle, I should say that cases admitting of interference might be distinguished from those not admitting of it by this simple test: Conceding all the elements of fact to be as the officer decides them to be, or as favorable to him as possible, would his action be legal or illegal ? If legal, no interference ; if illegal, interference to the extent necessary for the citizen’s protection.” See also Perkins v. State, 101 Ga. 294. There was, at the time that the tax-collector of Morgan county attempted to collect the sum claimed to be due in that county as a tax from
Judgment affirmed.