45 N.Y.S. 460 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1897
The judgment in this action directs the reformation of a deed dated July 12, 1886, whereby the late George J. Penfield conveyed to the trustees of the village of New Rochelle certain property which he desired to dedicate to public uses as a highway. From this judgment the village has not appealed. The only appellant is the New Rochelle Coal and Lumber Company, which has succeeded to the interest of James P. Canty, the original defendant in the suit, who claimed to be a bona fide purchaser, for value, of land which would be taken from him if the deed were reformed, without having had any notice of the alleged mistake in the description of the highway in the conveyance. The position of Canty and his successor is that equity cannot interfere to grant relief in such- a case, where the judgment will injuriously affect the bona fide purchaser for a valuable consideration without notice. (Kerr on Fraud & Mistake, 436; Casler v. Sitts, 6 Hun; 659.) They also insist, and, of course, they are entitled to take advantage of this point, if it be a good one, that there was not sufficient evidence of mutual mistake, even, as against the village, to warrant the rendition of the judgment under review.
At the time of the conveyance Mr. Penfield was the owner of a piece of land which lay between the New York, New Haven and
It will be observed that the petition refers to the highway opened by Mr. Penfield as extending a street called Mechanic street, and it seems probable that this expression occasioned the mistake which has given rise to the present litigation. Mechanic street enters Huguenot street from the south on the side opposite Mr. Penfield’s property. It does not enter at right angles, but diagonally. An extension of Mechanic street across Huguenot street, upon lines in the same direction as those of the sides of Mechanic street, would carry the extension across Mr. Penfield’s land, for the most part, far to the east of the lines of the highway which he actually laid out and which were visible at the time of the presentation of the petition to the village trustees. When the deed came to be drawn,
. We think the evidence was ample to justify the conclusion of the learned trial judge, that the' insertion ■ of this description was the result of a mutual mistake on the part of the grantor and the grantees. There can be ño real doubt that what Mr. Penfield intended to convey was a highway fifty feet wide, as already marked out, through the middle of his land. It is equally plain that it was this highway which the trustees of the village intended to accept and desired to' have conveyed to them by means of the deed which they requested should be given. The deed itself does not appear to have been read by any members of the board, except Mr. Banks, the president, who failed to -observe the error in the description. It • is urged in behalf of the- appellant that, in view of the rule which requires clear proof to establish-a mutual mistake in a conveyance; all the trustees should have been called as witnesses, and that the testimony of Mr. Banks alone was not sufficient Inasmuch, however, as it appears that he was the only' trustee who really kneW anything about the matter, and as his testimony tends strongly to •establish the mistake, we think it was quite enough, in the absence of all proof to the contrary. Mor does the fact, if it be a fact, that Mr. Penfield and Mr. Banks read the description in the deed affect the rights of the parties to the conveyance to have it reformed if they mistakenly believed that the description corresponded with the actual boundaries of the land intended to be conveyed. (Bush v. Hicks, 60 N. Y. 298.)
A more serious question is presented in respect to. the right of ■ the plaintiffs to have the deed reformed so as to affect the Mew Rochelle Coal and Lumber Company, which has become the sue
It is true'there is a direct and positive denial by Hr. Canty of the truth of these statements; but the trial judge has found against him on this issue, and we cannot say that the finding is without adequate evidence to support it. - It is argued that there was unreasonable delay in bringing the suit, and that equitable relief should have been denied on that ground. The action appears to have' been commenced, however, very soon after the. mistake was discovered, and no blame can be attached to Hr. Penfield for not discovering it earlier, because nothing had occurred with reference to the highway, or the property. in' the vicinity to indicate that the description in his deed was erroneous. Such conveyances as had been made were all evidently based upon the location of the extension of Hechanic street along the lines Upon which it had actually been opened and just where he supposed the description in his deed would show it to be located. In cases of this kind, courts are liberal in granting relief, even where there has been a considerable lapse of time. (Gillespie v. Moon, 2 Johns. Ch. 585, 602; Andrews v. Gillespie, 41 N. Y. 487, 491.)
The only other point that requires consideration is the fact that after Hr. Canty began to btiild he was enjoined, and that the injunction was subsequently dissolved at Special Term by Hr. Justice Dykmait. The record discloses very little about this in junction suit, but the learned trial judge, in his opinion,, remarks that the application could not have been fully presented to him at the time and that he could not then say that Hr. Canty was wrong. We are unable to see how this refusal to continue a provisional remedy can be regarded as in any respect a conclusive determination as to Mr.. Canty’s rights in the. premises. If the case had proceeded to judgment, a very different question would be presented.
Before the deed from Hr. Penfield to the village was recorded there was placed upon record a subsequent deed from Hr. Penfield • to the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Company of a portion of his property near the railroad line. This conveyance being first in order of record operated to deprive the village of a
The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.
All concurred.
Judgment affirmed, with costs.