LAURA PEMBERTON, Plаintiff-Appellee, - vs - MICHAEL WOODFORD, Defendant-Appellant.
CASE NO. CA2012-01-001
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO BROWN COUNTY
1/28/2013
[Cite as Pemberton v. Woodford, 2013-Ohio-214.]
RINGLAND, J.
CIVIL APPEAL FROM BROWN COUNTY MUNICIPAL COURT Case No. CVG1100669
Michael Woodford, The Citadel, 114 East Eighth Street, Suite 101, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202, defendant-appellant, pro se
OPINION
RINGLAND, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Michael Woodford, appeals from the decision of the Brown County Municipal Court granting a writ of restitution to plaintiff-appellee, Laura Pembеrton, in a forcible entry and detainer action.
{¶ 2} On October 25, 2011, Pemberton filed a complaint for eviction against Woodford, alleging that he was in breach of his month to month tenancy on her propеrty and for nonpayment of rent. The property is a 6.01 acre tract of land that she purports to own in
{¶ 3} The case proceeded to a hearing on December 16, 2011. On December 21, 2011, the municipal cоurt granted the eviction and transferred Woodford‘s damages claim and the question of ownership of the Property to the common pleas court.
{¶ 4} Woodford appeals from that decision, raising four assignments of error for our review. For ease of analysis, we will combine Woodford‘s first and fourth assignments of error as the issues therein are intertwined.
{¶ 5} Assignment of Error No. 1:
{¶ 6} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT REQUIRED PROOF OF TRUST BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE WHEN THE ISSUE OF THE EXISTENCE OF A TRUST IS WITHIN THE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF THE COMMON PLEAS COURT AND THE EVICTION COURT‘S RELIANCE ON THE “STRONG PRESUMPTION OF TITLE” ON ACCOUNT OF RECORDED INSTRUMENTS IS MISAPPLIED IN THE CONTEXT OF PARTIES MANIFESTING A CLEAR INTENT TO REPOSE SPECIAL TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN EACH OTHER.
{¶ 7} Assignment of Error No. 4:
{¶ 8} IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT TO PRESUME SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OVER THE AFFECTED LANDS AND MERGE THE ISSUES OF DISMISSAL WITH IMMEDIATE RIGHT TO POSSESSION WHERE THE ALLEGED
{¶ 9} Within Woodford‘s first and fourth assignments of error, he argues that thе municipal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case because title to the property was drawn into question.
{¶ 10} At the December 16, 2011 hearing, a series of documents was introduced into evidence regarding the Property. Pemberton introduced only one document, a deed of the Property dated August 12, 2011 and recorded on August 16, 2011 from Terri Losekamp to Laura Pemberton, individually. Woodford then introduced numerous documents, both recorded and unrecorded, signed and unsigned. The majority of these documents were signed by Laura Pemberton, as “Trustee of the Mita Kuye Oyasin Nature Preserve and Wildlife Sanctuary Land Trust” (the “Trust“). Among the exhibits Woodford introduced was an unrecorded deed, dated October 4, 2000, granting title to Pemberton as Trustee of the Trust. It is substantially on the basis of that unrecorded deed that Woodford сlaims title to the Property is drawn into question.
{¶ 11}
{¶ 12} In Haas v. Gerski, 175 Ohio St. 327 (1963), the Ohio Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether an action to quiet title in the court of common pleas prevents a municipal
[a]n action in forcible entry and detainer is solely a possessory action. It does not determine the title to real property. The gist of the actiоn is the right to present possession. Where, as here, possession is dependent on title, it is the present title which controls. In such an action, the court as an incident to determining the right to possession may determine in whom the present title rests, but it is only to this extent that title is determined and such determination in no way binds the Court of Common Pleas.
Id. (internal citations omitted.)
{¶ 13} In its syllabus, the Haas court more succinctly stated that, “[a] Municipal Court, under Section 1901.18, Revised Code, has jurisdiction to hear and determine a forcible entry and detainer action, where, although title to the realty is drawn in question, there is no question as to present record title.” (Emphasis added.) Id. While axiomatic, Black‘s Law defines “record title” as “title as it appears in the public records after the deed is properly recorded.” Black‘s Law Dictionary (9th Ed.2009). In State ex rel. Carpenter v. Warren Municipal Court, 61 Ohio St.2d 208 (1980), the Ohio Supreme Court reaffirmed and expanded the Haas decision, holding that a municipal court not only may decide such a case, but rather must, lest the purpose of the forcible entry and detainer statute (i.e., immediate possession) be defeated.
{¶ 14} In the case at bar, the only recorded deed of the Property is the 2011 deed to Laura Pemberton individually. The deed Woodford relies on to draw the title of the Property into question was never recorded. Therefore, there is no question as to present record title, which lies with Pemberton. Accordingly, the issue of whether the unrecorded deed to Laura Pemberton as trustee created the Trust or conveyed the Property into the Trust need not be decided by the municipal court or this court.1
{¶ 16} In light of the foregoing, having found that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the forcible entry and detainer action where there was no question as to present record title, Woodford‘s first and fourth assignments of error are overrulеd.
{¶ 17} Assignment of Error No. 2:
{¶ 18} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT REFUSED TO APPLY
{¶ 19} Here, Woodford argues that he possessed “color of title” that precluded his eviction from the premises.
{¶ 20} The statute does not define “color of title,” and Ohio courts have rarely sought to define the phrase. Black‘s Lаw defines color of title as, “[a] written instrument or other evidence that appears to establish title but does not in fact do so.” Black‘s Law Dictionary (9th Ed.2009). The 9th District gave a more detailed definition, stating thаt, “[c]olor of title means something in writing which upon its face, professes to pass title, but which does not do it, either from want of title in the person making it, or the defective mode of conveyance thаt is used, but such writing must not be so plainly and obviously defective as that no man of ordinary capacity would be misled by it.” Tarry v. LaGrange, 9th Dist. No. 90CA0004808, 1990 WL 139879 (Sept. 26, 1990).
{¶ 21} Woodford argues that he possessed color of title as a result of the unrecorded 2000 deed and numerous other instruments signed by Pemberton as Trustee of the Trust. However, there were no written instruments introduced prior to the 2011 deed to Pemberton that name Woodford individually or purport that hе is a trustee of the alleged Trust. Accordingly, under the present set of facts, we cannot find that Woodford acquired color of title in the property.
{¶ 22} In light of the foregoing, having found that Woodford lacked color of title where no written instrument appeared to grant him any interest in the Property, Woodford‘s second assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 23} Assignment of Error No. 3:
{¶ 24} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHERE THE COUNTERCLAIM EXCEEDS THE JURISDICTIONAL LIMITS SET OUT IN
{¶ 25} In his third assignment of error, Woodford argues that because his counterclaim seeks more than $25,000 in damages and exceeds the jurisdiction of the municipal court, the entire case should have been certified to the court of common pleas.
{¶ 26}
{¶ 27} In the case at bar, Woodford sought only monetary damages based on the alleged unjust enrichment of Pemberton. Therefore, the municipal court‘s decision on the eviction action would have no impact on the monetary damages sought in Woodfоrd‘s counterclaim. Accordingly, the municipal court properly severed and transferred only the
{¶ 28} In light of the foregoing, having found that the damages Woodford seeks in his counterclaim would not be affected by the decision of the municipal court, and the municipal court properly transferred thе damages portion of the case, Woodford‘s third assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 29} Judgment affirmed.
S. POWELL, P.J., and HENDRICKSON, J., concur.