147 A. 144 | Conn. | 1929
The advice to be given upon this reservation depends upon the meaning and effect of Chapter 170 of the Public Acts of 1925, which is quoted in a footnote hereto.* We are to ascertain the intention *551
of the legislature in passing this Act, from the words used, but reading all the parts of the statute together, and having in view the circumstances surrounding the legislature at the time it was passed, and the history and progress of kindred legislation. Old Saybrook v.Public Utilities Commission,
In National Fireproofing Co. v. Huntington (1909)
In Fenton v. Fenton Building Co. (1915)
Therefore laborers and materialmen upon public buildings and works were relegated to recovery from the contractor alone, and exposed to a like difficulty or impossibility of obtaining payment from him which *553 inspired the enactment of mechanic's lien statutes, but were deprived of the means of obtaining security which was available, under those statutes, to those furnishing labor and materials in construction work for private owners.
To obviate similar difficulties and disadvantages in other States, statutes or ordinances had been enacted requiring contractors on public works to secure, by bond or otherwise, the payment of all such claims for labor and material. 18 Rawle C. L. p. 883, § 9; note, 27 L.R.A. (N.S.) 579; 44 Corpus Juris, Municipal Corporations, § 2540, p. 355; 15 Corpus Juris, Counties, § 254, p. 558; 35 Cyc., Schools and School Districts, p. 960. Such a requirement was held to be a proper exercise of legislative power. Columbia Digger Co. v. Rector, 215 F. 618, 632; Wilson v. Whitmore (Webber) 92 Hun, 466, aff.,
In Friedman v. County of Hampden (1909)
A similar application, by reference, of general lien laws, containing a provision such as § 5220 of the General Statutes of Connecticut, would result in the apportionment of liens exceeding in amount the contract price or, as well, the balance remaining unpaid above payments already made, in good faith, before notice of lien.
In other jurisdictions, questions arose as to the manner of obtaining the relief contemplated. In Merchants Traders National Bank v. City of New York,
In Minnesota, where the statute provided that the municipality shall be liable "for any loss sustained by any person furnishing labor and material" under the contract, it was held that, to be entitled to recover, it was necessary for the laborer or materialman to show that the contractor was insolvent and unable to pay.Fargo Cornice Ornament Co. v. Clay County SchoolDistrict,
These considerations, especially the then recent decision in Fenton v. Fenton Building Co., supra, and the Massachusetts statutes and the construction accorded them by the cases cited in the Fenton case, are of *556 significance in construing our statutes on the subject. As we have seen, by expressly requiring security for such claims, only, as would be lienable against a private owner, as in the Massachusetts Act of 1878, the incidents of the general mechanic's lien laws might have been made applicable, as to the classes of persons entitled to benefit, limitation of liability on the part of the owner, and in other respects. Our statutes provide for protection of all claims for labor and materials furnished, without express or implied reference to whether as against a private owner, mechanic's liens might attach therefor. Moreover, the provision for limitation of owner's liability, in some respects resembling, in others inconsistent with, that provided under the mechanic's lien statute (§ 5220), which was inserted in the Act of 1925, affords an additional indication of intended independence from the general lien law.
Again, the limitation of the prescribed security to "bond with sufficient surety," excludes other forms of security, such as the retention clause in the contract which was held to be permissible under the Massachusetts statutes, and the provision for payment to the claimant, by the municipality, and recovery over, by the latter, from the surety on the bond, appears to be calculated to obviate difficulties and uncertainties, in that regard, such as we have mentioned as having arisen elsewhere.
It is clear that the primary purpose of the statute is to protect and benefit those who furnish materials and labor to the contractor on public work, in that they may be assured of payment of their just claims, without defeat or undue delay. It involves an incidental benefit to the municipality, since it contemplates protection to it in the payment of such claims, subject only to the ascertainment of their correctness, *557 and reimbursement therefor, if the prescribed security is exacted. It suggests no intent to benefit the contractor, but, on the contrary, to afford protection against his defaults and his inability or failure to pay just claims for labor and materials furnished him in the execution of his contract. The above-mentioned purpose is accomplished, as to claimants, by construing the statute as entitling them to direct payment from the municipality, and there is no injustice to the latter provided its aggregate liability on account of such claims is limited to the total contract price. Both the municipality and the surety on the contractor's bond may be safeguarded against excess, above the contract price, of the amount of such claims plus prior payments made to the contractor, by provision and enforcement of contract requirements such as that progress payments be conditioned on proof that labor and material claims have been paid, similarly as was provided in the instant contract as to the final payment, or for retention of an amount or percentage sufficient to cover such claims or for reclamation of payments already made, or both. On the other hand, the prime object of the law would be nullified by a construction of the provision contained in the last two sentences of the Act of 1925 as limiting claimants to resort to such balance only as remains above prior payments made to the principal contractor, and, further, no purpose would be served by the requirement of security for payment of labor and material claims, and for recovery of reimbursement from the surety for such. As the defendant concedes in its brief (p. 6): "It is obvious that if the public body uses only the surplus funds for the payment of material and labor bills, it has suffered no loss and needs no reimbursement from the surety." Such a construction is not compelled, or warranted, if these sentences are read together and, *558 as they must be, with the other provisions of the Act, which, as we have seen, does not concern, either expressly or by implied reference to the lien laws, payments made to the contractor, but only claims of the specified class. It is as to "such claims" that the municipality's "liability" is limited by the Act, to a total not exceeding the contract price; payments made to the contractor are not to be included in computing this total.
The criticism that, thereby, claims of this class under public contracts are accorded a more advantageous position than similar claims to which the mechanic's lien laws are applicable is appropriate for consideration by the legislature, but cannot control the construction of the statute as it stands. Compliance with the Act, as we construe it, does not involve a violation of Article XXIV of the Amendments to the Constitution, or of § 58 of the General Statutes.
The defendant concedes that the plaintiff and other claimants similarly situated may assert their rights, under the statute, against the defendant, which in turn may seek reimbursement from the surety on the bond. We have no occasion, on this record, to consider whether claimants under this statute may also have a right of action against the surety, under Baurer v.Devenis,
Our answer to the first question is Yes, provided statement of claim was filed in conformity to the statute, and provided, further, that the total amount of such claims does not exceed $23,500, the contract price. To the second question we answer Yes. As to the third, our construction of the limitation clause is as