Pekin Cooperage Co. v. Industrial Board
115 N.E. 128
Ill.
1917
Check Treatment
Mr. Justice Cooke

delivered the opinion of the court:

George Garls, one of the defendants in error, was on November 1, 1913, injured while in the employ of the Pekin Coopеrage Company, the plaintiff in error. Thereafter, on July 8, 1914, a committee of arbitration appointed under the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation act decided that Garls was entitled to receive from plaintiff in error compensation at the rate of $6.64 per week for a period of thirty-four weeks from Novеmber 8, 1913. Upon review, had upon the petition of plaintiff in error, the Industrial Board approved and confirmеd the decision of the committee ‍​‌​​‌‌​​‌​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌​​‍of arbitration and ordered the same to stand as the decision of the Industrial Board. The record of the Industrial Board was reviewed by the circuit court of Cook county upon a writ of certiorari issued upon the application of the plaintiff in error, and the decision of the Industrial Boаrd was by the circuit court confirmed. The trial court certified that the cause was not one proper to be reviewed, but this court, at the June term, 1916, upon the petition of plaintiff in error, ordered that a writ of error issuе, and the record has been brought here for review.

Plaintiff in error was, at the time Garls was injured, engaged in the cоoperage business in the city of Pekin, Illinois. Its plant consisted of various departments, all of which were operated under the same roof. In some of its departments it used power-driven machinery. Garls was employed in the blacksmith department, which was located in a room where no machinery of any kind was used, but in going to and from his work in the blacksmith department he was required to pass through a room in which power-driven machinery was oрerated. Garls was seventy-three years of age and had been working ‍​‌​​‌‌​​‌​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌​​‍for plaintiff in error for six or eight years. On Nоvember 1, 1913, he quit work about five o’clock and formed in fine .with the other employees to receive his weеkly pay at the office window as he passed out of the building. There were about seventy-five men in fine and Garls оccupied a position about the middle of the fine. Some of the men behind Garls began pushing forward and thosе in front of him began pushing backward at the same time, and Garls was squeezed out of the fine and slipped or stumbled аnd fell upon the cement floor and received the injuries of which he complains.

Plaintiff in error had never filed any notice with the Industrial Board either accepting or rejecting the provisions of the Workmen’s Compеnsation act, and it contends that the provisions ‍​‌​​‌‌​​‌​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌​​‍of the act do not apply to this case because it was not engaged, so far as Garls was concerned, in any of the occupations, enterprises or businеsses enumerated in paragraph (£>) of section 3 of the act, and because, further, the injury to Garls was the result of “horse-play,” ‍​‌​​‌‌​​‌​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌​​‍and did not arise out of the employment and was in no way incidental to his employment.

In its cоntention that the Workmen’s Compensation act did not apply to it so far as Carls was concerned, ‍​‌​​‌‌​​‌​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌​​‍the plaintiff in error relies upon three New York cases, Matter of Gleisner v. Gross & Herbener, 155 N. Y. Supp. 946, Lyon v. Windsor, 159 id. 162, and Newman v. Newman, 218 N. Y. 325, which hold, in effect, that the business in which the employer is engaged is not the test, but that the employee’s right to compensation arises only when he is еmployed in some line of work enumerated in the statute; that the occupation and employment of thе employee—the nature of the work in which he is engaged—is the test, and the injury must be sustained in connection with and inсident to some hazardous employment in which the employee is engaged. In construing the provisions oí our Wоrkmen’s Compensation act we have not adopted the construction placed upon the New York act by the courts of that jurisdiction. In Suburban Ice Co. v. Industrial Board, 274 Ill. 630, we held that an employer who operatеd a plant for the manufacture of ice and engaged in the sale of ice, coal, coke and wоod and owned and used several teams for the delivery of the same was engaged in an extra-hazardous enterprise under the Workmen’s Compensation act, and that a teamster employed by such employer tо deliver ice and coal, who was kicked by a horse in a barn where the horses were kept, was within the prоtection of the act. In Chicago Dry Kiln Co. v. Industrial Board, 276 Ill. 556, we held that a night watchman employed by a compаny engaged in drying lumber and operating a planing mill, which was admittedly under the Workmen’s Compensation act, and who was injured as a result of an assault made upon him by a person who was attempting to enter a building owned by his employer in the night time and while the mill was not in operation, was within the protection of the act. From these casеs it must follow that Carls was within the protection of the Workmen’s Compensation act. The blacksmith shop in which he was employed was operated in connection with the remainder of plaintiff in error’s plant, and Carls was rеquired, in going to and from his work and in going to the office to receive his pay, to pass through a room in which pоwer-driven machinery was operated.

There can be ho serious contention that the injury did not arise out of his employment. Carls was required to present the slip given him at the window in the office of plaintiff in error to receive his pay. Complying with this regulation and standing in line waiting his turn he was jostled and thrown down and injured through no fault of his own. It does not appear that he was engaged in any jostling or “horse-play” or that he in any way was responsible for the injury he sustained.

The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.