*61 Davis, J.,

(after stating the facts). That the limitations restricting the liabilities of telegraph companies in the transmission of nnrepeated messages are reasonable and proper, and that such limitations are binding upon the sender of a message who elects to take the risk of sending it unrepeated, rather than pay the small additional cost to secure accuracy, we regard as settled by the case of Lassiter v. Telegraph Co., 89 N. C., 336, and the authorities there cited; but, as was said in that case: “ The exemption is not extended to acts or ■omissions involving gross negligence, but are confined to such as are incident to the service, and may occur where there is but slight attaching culpability in its officers and ■employés.”

Negligence and gross negligence are relative terms. An act, under certain circumstances, might be simply negligent; the same act, under other circumstances, might be grossly negligent.

Undoubtedly, a carrier would be charged with greater ■care in handling valuable glassware than iron ware, or in transporting a package of gold than one of brass. So, what might be slight negligence in a telegraph operator in transmitting a message of small apparent importance, might be gross negligence in transmitting one of apparently great importance.

Conceding that the defendant company had a right to limit its liability, and that the plaintiff was charged with notice of the printed matter contained in the telegram sent, but that such limitation did not extend to acts of gross negligence, was there evidence of such negligence in this case? It was the dutjr of the defendant to employ competent operators ; there was evidence tending to show that the operator at Richmond was not competent. The witness Dodge, said: “ I did not consider the operator at Richmond a competent man.” Dodge had been manager of the defendant’s office at Charlotte, and testifies as to the method of transmit *62 ting messages. He testifies that the message sent contained fourteen words, and that he sent it exactly as written. He says: “ I telegraphed that I was sending fourteen words. I put fourteen words on the wires. It would be the duty of the receiving operator to answer, ‘ O. K,’ if he received the number of words. If the message received did not contain that number of words * * * it was his duty to telegraph me that it was short. In this case, I put the telegram on the wires correctly. He telegraphed me, ‘ 0. K,’ which means that he received the words correctly. I should say the wires were all right that day, and in good working order. * * * * I have been operating for thirty-seven years, and I think I can give an opinion as to the competency of the operator at Richmond. My opinion was that he was not a fair operator for that office.” The message delivered to the operator at Charlotte contained a proposition to Sed-den & Co., to sell them stock at “ forty-three;” the message-delivered read “ forty,” leaving out the word “ three.” The witness Dodge says: “ It is possible, but hardly probable, that the word ‘three.’ could have been lost; but by the exercise of ordinary care, the mistake could have been avoided.”

This case is clearly distinguishable from Lassiter v. Telegraph Co., supra. In that case, the mere fact of the mistake was the only evidence of negligence. The number of words sent was the number of words received. There was no evidence as to how the mistake occurred, and no evidence of carelessness or incompetency on the part of the agents of the company. Nor was there anything to indicate that the message was of special importance.

Could the mistake here have been avoided by the exercise of ordinary care? Or was it the result of gross negligence?'

The only issues which his Honor allowed to be submitted were:

1st. Was the word “ three ” omitted by the gross negligence of the defendant or its servants?

*63 2d. What are the plaintiff’s damages, if any?

The Court instructed the jury that there was no sufficient-evidence to go to them on which they could find that there-was gross negligence, and they must respond to the first-issue — No.

We think there was evidence of gross negligence, and that the Court erred in not submitting it to the jury.

The plaintiff is entitled to a new trial. Let this be certified.

Error. Reversed.