Mrs. Jeter recovered a judgment for $7,500.00 against appellant for personal injuries she claimed resulted to her from the negligence of appellant.
On this appeal appellant contends (1) the proof fails to show it was guilty of any negligence and that, therefore, its motion for a peremptory instruction on liability should have been sustained; (2) that the trial court committed reversible error in granting to plaintiff the hereinafter quoted instruction; and (3) that the amount of the verdict is excessive.
On the question of negligence Mrs. Jeter was permitted to invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, but she also contends that she sufficiently established negligence by other evidence aside from such doctrine. Appellant takes issue on both propositions. This makes it necessary to set out, in substance, the testimony disclosing the facts and circumstances surrounding the accident.
About 3:30 o’clock in the afternoon of February 12, 1952, Mrs. Jeter, in her husband’s automobile, accompanied by her little girl, was driving south on U. S. Highway 61 in the southern part of the City of Natchez, Mississippi. At the same time a large trailer-truck belonging to appellant was being driven north on the same Highway by its servant Joe A. Rosalee. Just as the two vehicles were passing the right, outside rear dual wheel became detached from the trailer, ran across the road to the west, collided with the front of the car being driven Mrs. Jeter, causing, as she claims, an injury to
Was this a proper case for application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur? 65 C. J. S., pg. 987, Sec. 220(2) sets out this definition of that doctrine: “The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which is recognized in almost all jurisdictions, is that, where the thing which causes an injury is shown to be under the management of defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have its management or control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by defendant, that the accident arose from want of care.”
The last definition of the doctrine used by this Court is found quoted from
In addition, on the question of negligence vel non, the testimony is in conflict as to when, as to distance traveled, this wheel, in the exercise of due care, should have been inspected for loose nuts or other defects, and the manner of making such inspection, and the proof of plaintiff, which the jury had the right to accept, was to the effect that neither as to the time nor manner did defendant examine and inspect this wheel as custom and ordinary care required.
This instruction was granted plaintiff:
“The Court instructs the jury for the plaintiff that though the burden rests upon the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of evidence that the defendant was guilty of negligence, which was the sole and proximate causeof the damages, if any, which plaintiff sustained, and this burden never shifts to the defendant, yet if you believe from a preponderance of the evidence in this case that the trailer was under the management and control of the defendant at the time and place of the accident herein complained of, and further believe from a preponderance of the evidence that said accident was such as does not in the ordinary course of things, happen, if the person in management and control uses reasonable care and caution, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation, that the accident was the result of want of care on the part of the defendant.”
Appellant says this instruction placed upon it the duty of showing the specific cause of the accident, else the fact of the accident would be evidence of its negligence, whereas the rule is that, even though the cause cannot be explained, as is often the case, yet if defendant can show he has used reasonable diligence to prevent the happening, there is no liability. The instruction might have been drawn more clearly and specifically but we do not think it mislead the jury. The test of liability, of course, is not whether defendant can explain the specific cause producing the conditions which brought about the injury, but whether defendant has been guilty of negligence which was the proximate cause of the injury. That requisite and paramount idea stands out and runs throughout the instruction. But if the form of the instruction be doubtful, we still do not think this reversible error for the reason that the instructions granted to defendant kept constantly before the jurors, as a prerequisite to their right to impose liability on defendant, their duty to find, from a preponderance of the testimony, that the defendant was guilty of negligence which proximately produced .the injury. For instance, one instruction granted defendant charged the jurors that before they could return a verdict against defendant they would have to find “that the defendant was guilty of some act of negligence which contributed to the injury of
Appellant says the verdict of $7,500.00 was so excessive as that we should either require a remittitur here or reverse the case for another jury to assess the damages. We are impressed by the contention and it has given us much concern. Mrs. Jeter testified she has severe pains in the lower part of her back; that she never had these before the accident; that she has difficulty doing her housework; she has a husband and two girls, six and eight years of age; that she is twenty-six years of age; that theretofore she had assisted in operating her husband’s store at Doloroso, in Wilkinson County, Mississippi; that the injury has greatly interfered with her home and store work; that she gets tired very easily; cannot remain long upon her feet; that the pains interfere with her sleep; that she can only lift objects of small weight; that the day after the accident on February 12th she went to Dr. Whittington, who examined and prescribed for her; that from the time of the accident to the time of the trial July 15, 1952, some five months, she had been wearing a supporting brace — a leather or rubber belt to support her and hold the vertebrae in place. Mrs. Jeter was a justice of the peace but there is no claim that her injuries appreciably interfere with the discharge of her judicial duties.
Dr. Homer Whittington testified that he was the family doctor for the Jeters; that Mrs. Jeter came to see him on February 14th; that she was complaining of a pain in her back; that he examined her and found ‘ ‘ She was pretty well bruised up all over, that is her legs and knees were bruised, also right shoulder, complained of pain in the lower part of her spine, found she had a sprain of the vertebra at the sacroiliac joint.” That injury, he said, was very painful; that he had been her family doctor for a number of years and she had never
Dealing with the amount of verdicts is one of the most troublesome questions with which the courts have to struggle. There is no exact yardstick, or measurement, by which to test the question. Each case must depend upon its own facts. The test is not what amount the members of the court would have awarded had they been upon the jury, or what they, as an appellate court, think should have been awarded, but whether the verdict is so excessive as to indicate that the jury was animated by passion, prejudice, or corruption. Penney Co. v. Evans, supra. We think the verdict was large, but considering all the circumstances, including the age of the plain
Affirmed.
