This is an appeal by Sydney Hickman, a former employee of the respondent, Peerless Oakland Laundry Company, from a judgment enjoining him from soliciting and diverting the business оf certain former customers of Peerless.
As grounds for reversal, the appellant contends that: (1) In the absence of an express enforceable contract, equity will not enjoin a former employee from competing fairly; (2) there is no evidence that his competition was unfair; (3) the evidence is insufficient to bring the case within the scope of the ‘1 delivery route’’’ cases; and, finally, (4) the respondent is not entitled to equitable relief, as respondent, did not come *558 into court with, “clean hands.” There is no merit in any of these contentions.
The trial court found that since 1930, respondent had been in the laundry and linen supply business in Oaldand which consisted of supplying linen products to various customers at various intervals; that respondent established valued and extensive trade in this business and had acquired a large number of customers, including restaurants, taverns, doctors, dentists and barber shops; that respondent regularly provided these customers with their linen product requirements by the establishment of various routes and delivery of products on scheduled days; that the customers of a linen supply business ordinarily patronize one concern and ordinarily obtain their linen supply requirements from one supplier and that the business relationship is such that it will normally continue until interfered with.
The court further found that in 1952, aрpellant was employed by the respondent as linen route supervisor and linen sales manager; that in the course of his employment, appellant acquired knowledge of the names and addresses of all of the respondent’s customers, as well as their requirements, peculiar likes and dislikes, and the degree of difficulty in meeting their requirements. Appellant also had access to records which indicated the route number, date of service and quantity of supplies required by еach customer. As a part of appellant’s duties consisted of soliciting new customers for the respondent, directing respondent’s drivers and other employees, supervising the delivery and pick-ups, establishing and maintaining various routes and receiving and adjusting the complaints of the customers, appellant develоped friendly contacts with the customers of Peerless. The court found all this information relating to the respondent’s customers was confidential and a trade sеcret.
Appellant left Peerless in October 1957, and in January 1960, established his own linen supply business under the name of Parisian Linen & Industrial Supply. Thereafter, the appellant called on various former customers of Peerless, solicited their patronage and advised them he was in business for himself and would appreciate thеir patronage. The customers solicited by the appellant had long been customers of Peerless, some for over 20 years. The court found that the appellant solicited these customers with intent of obtaining their patronage for himself and with the intent that these customers would cease patronizing Peerless and permanently *559 enjoined the appellant from soliciting, diverting and taking away any customers of Peerless, the knowledge of whom appellant had obtainеd while he was employed by Peerless.
As to the first contention, the rule is that in the absence of an enforceable contract containing covenants to the contrary, equity will not enjoin a former employee from soliciting business from his former employers provided
such competition is fairly and legally conductеd (Continental Car-Na-Var Corp.
v.
Moseley,
The reason the courts will issue injunctions to guard against such activities as are disclosed in this record, is to enforce increasingly high standards оf fairness or commercial morality in trade (Ungar Electric Tools, Inc. v. Sid Ungar Co., Inc., supra). Appellant, citing Mathews Paint Co. v. Seaside Paint Co., supra, argues he was merely selling to former customers whose names and nature of business were readily visible or availablе in any directory.
We think the evidence disclosed the use of confidential information by the appellant. While the mere identity of the customers may not be considered confidential
(Fortna
v.
Martin,
Appellant himself admitted the confidential nature of the information obtаined concerning the particular likes and dislikes and needs of the various customers because of his position as the manager of the linen supply servicе. This is the very kind of information which so often spells the difference between success and failure in a business based on service
(Ingrassia
v.
Bailey,
Appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to bring the present case within the scope of the “delivеry route” cases and that the evidence is also insufficient to meet the fine conditions laid down in such eases as
Paraco, Inc.
v.
Owens,
A reading of the transcript reveals that the trial court’s findings of fact as to each of the above requirements are amply supported by evidence which, we believe, renders all of appellant ’s arguments on the facts valueless. Aрpellant also contends that the strict application of the rule of the ‘1 delivery *561 route" eases is no longer the law in this state. We agree, but note that thе trial court here appropriately limited the injunction to customers of whom appellant obtained knowledge while employed by Peerless.
Finally, aрpellant contends that the respondent did not come into court with clean hands because Peerless is a member of a trade association which еxisted for the purpose of eliminating competition in violation of the Cartwright Act (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 16700, 16758). However, the trial court implicitly found against the appellant on this point and apparently appellant also did not request specific findings on that issue (Code Civ. Proc., § 634;
Carnation Co.
v.
Marcevich,
Judgment affirmed.
Shoemaker, J., and Agee, J., concurred.