163 Ga. 784 | Ga. | 1927
Lead Opinion
Mrs. Jane Bardwell Peeler brought a suit to recover damages of the Central of Georgia Railway Company. She was the daughter of T. A. Bardwell. On March 26, 1925, T.. A. Bardwell was killed on a crossing by a train of cars operated by that railway, known as the “Southland,” a through train from the middle west to Florida. He left no widow, and but one surviving child, the plaintiff. She sued for the valúe of his life. The defendant presented a special demurrer calling for information as to whether the daughter was dependent for support upon her father. The plaintiff amended her petition by alleging that since her marriage “she and her husband have resided at her father’s home, and she has continued to be a member of his family. After the death of her mother, . . petitioner took charge of the housekeeping, and has continued since that time [ten years] to keep the house for her said father. During all this time her father paid the household expenses, and- was always regarded as the head of the household. Petitioner’s husband made some contribution to the support of the family, but the major portion of the expenses were borne, during the entire period and until the time of his death, by petitioner’s father.” The court dismissed the action, on the
The defendant also demurred upon the ground that the act of August 18, 1924 (Ga. L. 1924, p. 60), amending section 4424 of the Code of 1910 by inserting “minor or sui juris,” after the clause giving to a child or children the right of recovery for the homicide of the father, is unconstitutional, especially because it contains matter different from that expressed in the title. This demurrer was overruled, the court holding the act to be constitutional; and by cross-bill of exceptions the defendant challenges this ruling. There were a number of special grounds of demurrer, upon which the court declined to rule, and which are therefore not before us at this time for adjudication.
As a general rule, the constitutionality of a statute will not be passed upon if it is unnecessary to rule upon this point in order to decide a particular case. However, there is another rule of equal force and cogencjr, which requires that if the controlling, or at least the feature which most vitally affects, the question in a case is presented by a cross-bill of exceptions, the cross-bill should be first considered; and in view of the general importance of the question, we shall first determine whether the lower court erred in adjudging that the act of 1924 is not subject to the attacks directed against it upon the ground that it is unconstitutional. The general demurrer upon the ground that the act of the General Assembly approved August 18, 1924, amending sections 4424 and 4425, is unconstitutional, was substantially as follows: (a) Said act is null and void in so far as it seeks to give a right to a child sui juris to recover for the homicide of her father, because the act is in violation of art. 3, sec. 7, par. 17, of the constitution (Civil Code, § 6445), which provides that “No law, or section of the Code, shall be amended or repealed by mere reference to its title, or to the number of the section of the Code, but the amending or repealing act shall distinctly describe the law to be amended or repealed, as well as the alteration to be made.” (b) Said act is unconstitutional in so far as it seeks to give a right of recovery to a child sui juris, because said act is in violation of art. 3, sec. 7, par. 8, of the constitution, as found in section 6437 of the Code of 1910, as follows: “No law or ordinance shall pass which refers
The first ground of demurrer is based upon art. 3, sec. 7, par. 17, of the constitution, and it will be observed that this paragraph makes no reference whatever to the title of the act proposed to be passed, nor any requirement whatsoever as to what it shall contain. The language of the constitution is, “No law, or section of the Code, shall be amended or repealed by mere reference to its title, or to the number of the section of the Code, but the amending or repealing act [and not the title of the act] shall distinctly describe the law to be amended or repealed, as well as the alteration to be made.” A reading of the body of the act convinces us that the statute is not subject to the infirmity of which complaint is made. The first section declares, that, “from and after the passage of this act, section 4424 of the Code of Georgia of 1910, relating to recovery for homicide, be and the same is hereby amended by inserting after the words ‘ child or children/ in the second line thereof, the words c minor or sui juris/ and by adding to said section the following words: ‘In cases where there is no person entitled to sue under the foregoing provisions of this section, the administrator of the deceased person may sue for and recover for the benefit of the next of kin, if dependent upon the deceased, or to whose support the deceased contributed, in which event the amount of the recovery shall be determined by the extent of the dependency or the pecuniary loss sustained by the next of kin.’” Then the act proceeds to fully and “distinctly describe” section 4424, the law to be amended, by quoting it word for word as it will read when
It is insisted that, in violation of art. 3, sec. 7, par. 8, of the constitution, the act of 1924 now under consideration refers to more than one subject-matter, and also contains matter different, from what is expressed in the title. It is true that the title of the act is expressly “An act to amend section 4424 and 4425 of the Code of Georgia of 1910, relating to recovery for homicide, by providing for recovery by the administrator of the deceased for the benefit of the next of kin, if dependent upon the deceased,” and no express reference to the subject of recovery by a child sui juris is contained in the caption; but, in addition to the portion of the title just quoted, the title concludes with the words “and for other
The words “for other purposes” have frequently been held by this court as sufficient to comply with the requirement of art. 3, sec. 7, par. 8, of the constitution, provided the other purposes, no matter how many they may be, are incidental and germane to the general scheme or purpose of the act. Despite the warning of the Yazoo Fraud, in view of these decisions we have frequently held that the words “for other purposes” in a title are sufficient to apprise the General Assembly that they may anticipate and. expect to find in an act the title of which contains these words any legislation upon the same subject as that especially referred to in the caption. In the present case the General Assembly were told that they were going to amend the law “relating to recovery for homicide,” not only by providing for recovery for the benefit of the next of kin, but “for other purposes.” Thus they were informed that there were going to be other amendments than provision for the next of kin in the provisions of sections 4424 and 4425. The wrords “for other purposes” under these circumstances supplied,
The second ground of the defendant’s demurrer, which the court sustained, is based upon the proposition that unless a child who is sui juris is dependent upon its parent in some way, such child is not entitled to recover for the tortious homicide of such parent. We can not concur in the ruling of the lower court. We think it plain that the only intention of the General Assembly, in inserting into section 4424 of the Code the words “minor or sui juris,” was to give an unqualified right of action upon the sole ground of relationship existing between parent and child. We deem the use of these words as an explicit declaration on the part of the General Assembly that a child, by virtue of the relationship, has an interest of value in the life of its father, for which it is entitled to recover if deprived thereof by the tort of another. It
In our opinion, too, it is most reasonable legislation. Aside from any consideration based upon age or dependency, the value of a father’s society, advice, example, and counsel is an element of inestimable value to a child. It is perhaps true, too, that the value of each of these items increases as the child grows older; so that there is no reason why a child sui juris should not be allowed to participate on equal terms with those of his brethren who may be minors, in the value of a father’s companionship, counsel, advice, and assistance of which he as well as they have been wrongly deprived by a tort-feasor. But aside from this, the act of 1924 gives to the children for the homicide of a parent the full value of that parent’s life; and in many instances this would be an element of very substantial value to the children, whether minors or sui juris. Yes, even though all the children were sui juris. In expectancy, at least, every child has a right to an equal share in the property belonging to his parent at the time of his or her death; and as'the recovery is for the full value of the parent’s life, cases will readily suggest themselves where the recovery would be capable of practically accurate calculation and be extremely substantial in a material way. Suppose a father is earning $50,000 a year in his profession or business, in excess of^ the expenses of living, and he has an expectancy of twelve years of life at the time
'Judgment, on main, hill of exceptions, reversed; on cross-hill, affirmed,.
Dissenting Opinion
I can not concur in the conclusion reached by the majority of the court on either of two points decided. Treating them in inverse order, I am of the opinion that the trial court did not err in sustaining the second ground of demurrer to the petition. Considering the act of 1924 on the theory that it is constitutional, the amendment leaves unimpaired the previous rulings of this court to the effect that a child suing for the homicide of the father must allege and show that such child is dependent upon the father for support. As stated in the majority opinion, such had been the construction placed upon Civil Code § 4424. Two efforts had been made to review and overrule the earlier decisions upon this point, and in both instances this court denied the motions. The act of 1924, by inserting the words “minor or sui juris,” after the word “children,” in the second line of the section, merely enabled adult children as well as minors to sue for the homicide of the father, and left unchanged the rule that required allegation and proof of- dependency. I think this is a necessary construction of that part of the section as amended. There are good reasons to believe that the General Assembly so intended it. For illustration, suppose that a father had ten children, nine of whom were adults and self-supporting, and one a minor dependent on the father. In case of a recovery the dependent child, under the ruling of the majority, would receive only one tenth thereof;
I also dissent from the conclusion reached on the constitutional question. I think the act of the General Assembly, in so far as it amended the second line of the' section by inserting the words “minor or sui juris,” is in conflict with article 3, section 7, paragraph 8, of the constitution of Georgia (Civil Code, § 6437), to wit: “No law or ordinance shall pass which refers to more than one subject-matter, or contains matter different from what is expressed in the title thereof.” I concede that a section of the Code may be constitutionally amended where the caption merely refers to the number of the section, provided the act, considered in its entirety, distinctly describés the section to be amended. If thus described, the act does not violate article 3, section 7, paragraph 17, of the constitution (Civil Code, § 6445). What I hold is that the act violates the first above-named section of the constitution. Its caption is as follows: “An act to amend section 4424 and 4425 of the Code of Georgia of 1910, relating to recovery for homicide, by providing for recovery by the administrator of the deceased for the benefit of the next of kin, if dependent upon the deceased, and for other purposes." (Italics mine.) The provision of the caption which I have italicized clearly shows, so far as the caption may indicate, that the intention of the legislature was to amend the Code section only in respect to suits brought by the administrator of the deceased. No member of the General Assembly, reading the caption or hearing it read, would have had the remotest idea that the act contained an amendment of such a radical nature as one whereby an adult child might bring suit for the homicide of the father on an equal basis with a minor dependent child. It is well settled that the words “and for other purposes,” when contained in the caption of an act, constitute sufficient notice that all legislation germane to the subject specifically named may be included in the act. Giving those words the construction stated, it appears to me that they gave notice that other matters germane to the bringing of a suit by the representative of the deceased under that section of the Code might be found in the body of the