92 S.E.2d 171 | S.C. | 1956
Lead Opinion
This appeal is from an order of the Court of Common Pleas for Richland County affirming the action of the Public Service Commission in denying appellant’s petition to enjoin the respondent Carolina Power & Light Company from extending its electric power line from the City of Florence to serve a television station of the respondent Jefferson Standard Broadcasting Company. Pending the appeal, Aiken Electric Cooperative, Lynches River Electric Cooperative, Palmetto Electric Cooperative, Berkeley Electric Cooperative, Broad River Electric Cooperative, Edisto Electric Cooperative, Mid-Carolina Electric Cooperative and Santee Electric Cooperative were granted permission to file a brief amici curiae; and such brief has been filed and fully considered.
On December 28, 1953, Jefferson Standard Broadcasting Company (hereinafter referred to as the broadcasting com
On April 14, 1954, appellant brought the present action to review and set aside the orders of the Commission before mentioned. The case came on for trial before the Honorable J. Henry Johnson, Presiding Judge, at the November, 1954, term, and by his order of November 24, 1954, from which this appeal is taken, he found that all pertinent facts found by the Commission were amply supported by the evidence before it and that the questioned orders of' the Commission were free from error of law.
It appears undisputed that while appellant had two single-phrase 7.2 kv lines within a mile of the site of the broadcasting station, the service required could not be afforded there
In the light of this testimony, the Commission found as matters of fact-, among others, the following:
1.’ That when the broadcasting company selected the site' for its station there were no electric lines in place from which electricity of the quantity and character necessary to operate the broadcasting station could be supplied.
2. That at no time up to and including the date of the hearing was any electrical utility other than the power company supplying service similar to that to be supplied by the power company- over the line which it had constructed pursuant to its contract with the broadcasting'company.
3. That the public interest would be better served .if the broadcasting station were supplied by the power cbmpany,' rather than by appellant, because: (a) the former had many more generating sources and substations then-in place and in use than appellant then had or would have after-constructing the lines and substations which its testimony‘indicated were contemplated, and the power company was thus in position to insure a higher degree of continuity of service; and (b) the power company, unlike appellant, was subject .to the regulatory powers vested in the Commission with- respect to rates and quality and continuity of service. . .
Appellant’s Exception No. 1, charging error on the part of the trial judge in refusing its motion for a jury trial, has been abandoned. The remaining exceptions charge error:
1. In holding that the power company was not required to obtain a certificate of convenience and necessity before extending its service to the broadcasting station;
2. In holding that appellant was not already in the territory and capable of rendering the service required by the broadcasting company; and
3. In not holding that the Commission’s orders were arbitrary, capricious, and without support in the evidence.
Pertinent to the issues before the Commission and the lower court, and here, are the following provisions of the 1952 Code:
Section 24-61: “When ordered by the Commission after due hearing any electrical utility may be required to establish, construct, maintain and operate any reasonable extension of its existing facilities. If any such extension, however, will interfere with the service or system of any other electrical utility the Commission may on complaint and after hearing either order the discontinuance of such extension or prescribe such terms and conditions with respect thereto as may be just and reasonable.”
Section 24-63: “No electrical utility * * * shall hereafter begin the construction or operation of any electrical utility plant or system or of any extension thereof, except those ordered by the Commission under the provisions of § 24-61, without first obtaining from the Commission a certificate that public convenience and necessity require or will require such construction or operation. But * * * this section shall not be construed to require any such electrical utility to secure a certificate * * * (b j for an extension within or to ter*163 ritory already served by it, necessary in the ordinary course of its business, or (c) for an extension into territory contiguous to that already occupied by it and not receiving similar service from another electrical utility.”
Section 24-67: “Whenever an electrical utility * * * is engaged or is about to engage in construction or operation without having secured a certificate of public convenience and necessity as required by the provisions of this chapter, any interested person, corporation or municipality may file a complaint with the Commission. The Commission may, with or without notice, make its order requiring the electrical utility complained of to cease and desist from such construction or operation until the Commission makes and files its decision on such complaint or until the further order of the Commission. The Commission may after hearing make such order and prescribe such terms and conditions in harmony with this chapter as are just and reasonable.”
In our consideration of the issues here presented the governing principle, well settled by many decisions of this court, is that orders of the Public Service Commission issued under the powers and authority vested in it have the force and effect of law; that the Commission’s findings of fact are presumptively correct and its orders presumptively reasonable and valid; that this court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the Commission upon a question as to which there is room for a difference of intelligent opinion; and that, therefore, an order of the Commission such as is here involved will not be set aside except upon a convincing showing that it is without evidence to support it or that it embodies arbitrary or capricious action as a matter of law. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Public Service Commission, 226 S. C. 136, 84 S. E. (2d) 132.
In its order of February 23, 1954, the Commission found as a matter of fact that the extension of the power company’s line from its Florence substation to the site of the broadcasting station was into territory not receiving similar service from another electrical utility, and held therefore, because
Appellant earnestly contends; however; that these factual findings, are not. supported by the evidence, and that-the power, company .was required under the statute to obtain a certificate of convenience and necessity because the territory in which the broadcasting station site is located: (a) was not “contiguous” to the territory “occupied”. by .the power company, being four .and a half miles from the company’s • nearest line; and (b) was. receiving “similar service” from appellant. But the issue here suggested becomes- academic in the. light of the Commission’.s order of February 23, 1954, denying the relief sought by appellant, and requiring the power company- to perform its contract with- the broadcasting company; for that order was, in effect, one -“after due hearing”, requiring the power company to extend its facilities to supply the broadcasting company, as prescribed by Section 24-6.1, and such extension was therefore excepted, by the express provisions of Section 24-63, from the requirement that a certificate, pf convenience and necessity be first obtained.... • t
Appellant next contends that the-lower court erred in holding .that it was not already- in the territory and capable of rendering the service required by the
It is true, of course, as was pointed out in Bookhart v. Central Electric Power Cooperative, 219 S. C. 414, 65 S. E. (2d) 781, that cooperatives are not immune from the police power and may be subjected to regulatory legislation; but this fact, of which the Commission was undoubtedly aware, affords no substantial basis for holding
In support of its contention that the Commission’s orders were arbitrary and capricious, appellant urges that public policy requires that private utilities be not allowed to duplicate the power lines of the cooperatives or to invade territory already served, as here, by the latter. But the premise upon which this argument is founded, namely: that appellant was already supplying, within the area in question, electric service similar to that required by .the broadcasting company, is contrary to the fact as found by the Commission and amply supported by the evidence. The record before us does not warrant the conclusion that the orders of the Commission, affirmed by the learned circuit judge, were arbitrary, capricious, or without evidentiary support.
All exceptions have been fully considered and are overruled, and the judgment of the lower court is accordingly affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting) .
I cannot agree with the legal proposition that Rural Electric Cooperatives are without remedy to prevent encroachment by other electric utilities, into territory served by the Cooperatives. On no other basis, in my opinion, under the facts of this case, can the decision of the Public Service Commission and the lower court be sustained. I respectfully dissent.