Pedro Garcia v. G. CurriePedro Garcia v. G. Currie
William Harris Jones, Pro Se
Before CLEMENT, PRADO, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
William Harris Jones, federal prisoner # 28772-298, who was convicted of attempted coercion and enticement of a minor to engage in sexual activity, moves for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) on appeal. He seeks to appeal from the district court‘s denial of his motion “to reverse ‘void’ federal judgment to correct a ‘manifest injustice,‘” which the district court construed as a petition for a writ of coram nobis.
Jones remains in custody. Accordingly, the district court correctly determined that the writ of coram nobis is not available to him. See United States v. Hatten, 167 F.3d 884, 887 n.6 (5th Cir. 1999).
Because the appeal lacks arguable merit and is therefore frivolous, Jones‘s motion for leave to proceed IFP on appeal is DENIED, and his appeal is DISMISSED as frivolous. See Baugh v. Taylor, 117 F.3d 197, 202 n.24 (5th Cir. 1997); Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 1983); 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.
Pedro Tiempo Garcia, Pro Se
Daniel Christopher Neuhoff, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, Law Enforcement Defense Division, Austin, TX, for Defendants-Appellees
PER CURIAM:*
Pedro Tiempo Garcia, Texas prisoner # 1060889, filed a
Garcia challenges the district court‘s denial of his request for the appointment of counsel. The appointment of counsel in a civil rights action is warranted only in exceptional circumstances. Ulmer v. Chancellor, 691 F.2d 209, 212-13 (5th Cir. 1982). Having reviewed the relevant factors and the record in this case, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Garcia‘s motion. See Cupit v. Jones, 835 F.2d 82, 86 (5th Cir. 1987); Ulmer, 691 F.2d at 213.
The district court dismissed Garcia‘s claims for money damages against the defendants in their official capacities as barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Because Garcia does not challenge this particular ruling in his opening brief, he has abandoned any challenge to the ruling on appeal. See Hughes v. Johnson, 191 F.3d 607, 613 (5th Cir. 1999); Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224-25 (5th Cir. 1993); Brinkmann v. Dallas Cty. Deputy Sheriff Abner, 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987).
Following a contact visitation during which officers observed Garcia orally ingesting small objects passed to him from his visitor, Garcia was placed in dry cell isolation. He argues that the conditions of his confinement there were inhumane because he was clothed only in a paper gown in a cold, bare cell and was not given soap, daily showers, or free access to running water or toilet paper. The summary judgment evidence established that the policy prescribing the conditions of confinement in dry cell isolation, while harsh and restrictive, are reasonably related to the legitimate penological interest of curtailing the influx of illicit drugs into the prison unit. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981); Talib v. Gilley, 138 F.3d 211, 214-15 & n.4 (5th Cir. 1998). Thus, the district court correctly determined that Garcia did not establish an Eighth Amendment violation. See Wilson v. Lynaugh, 878 F.2d 846, 849 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that the Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from conditions of confinement that constitute threats to health but not against those that cause mere discomfort or inconvenience).
Garcia maintains that his due process rights were violated when he was placed into dry cell isolation for 44 hours and then into solitary confinement for 38 days without having been charged with a disciplinary infraction and without having received a hearing. The Due Process Clause “does not protect every change in the conditions of confinement which has a substantial adverse effect upon a prisoner.” Madison v. Parker, 104 F.3d 765, 767 (5th Cir. 1997). A punitive housing reassignment, by itself, does not trigger any due process protections. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 486 (1995). Taking all of Garcia‘s allegations as true, nothing about his placement in either dry cell isolation or solitary confinement
AFFIRMED.
John Richard Berry, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Renata Ann Gowie, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney‘s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Marjorie A. Meyers, Federal Public Defender, Michael Lance Herman, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender‘s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Defendant-Appellant
Before DAVIS, SOUTHWICK, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Nilson Guillerj F-Salazar pled guilty to illegal reentry following deportation in violation of
In reviewing a sentence on appeal, we first ensure that the district court did not commit a significant procedural error, such as treating the Guidelines as mandatory or failing to consider the
F-Salazar argues that the following statement made by the district court at sentencing supports his position: “As to the discretion of proposed amendments