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Pedersen v. Zielski
822 P.2d 903
Alaska
1991
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*1 trust, of the deed trust note deed paying crediting

without ever Mistic or PEDERSEN, Appellant, Einar R. of her Mistic with value claim. Judge Hunt ruled that Atlas did breach ZIELSKI, M.D.; Emergency Michael explained: the contract. She Inc.; Room, Fairbanks Memorial Hos undisputed It is made a pital; Hospital Lutheran and Home So timely proper claim for her insured America, ciety Inc.; Michael J. Flan under policy. interest Defendant M.D.; nery, M.D.; Kibbey, William claim, never denied the which denial is a Diaz, Tony M.D., Appellees. precedent subrogating condition itself property. interest in the her insured No. S-3694. Therefore, paid mortgagee when it note, $21,000 full value Supreme Court Alaska. paid plaintiffs payment amount Dec. policy. under claim When Atlas note, bought the had it a real value of Rehearing Denied Jan. $21,378.04. the property When sold and paid holder Atlas of the Deed of Note,

Trust it was entitled to receive $21,378.04

only plus value of the note

costs, However, paid etc. it was $42,378.04

accepted the full value fact, thereby, in receiving

note bene-

fit subrogating plaintiffs itself to

claim. Because has not it denied her (and having

claim no basis demonstrated doing so),

for it breached its contract plaintiff.

with Atlas,

Thus was the failure of when Rutzebeck,

accepting payment pay

Mistic credit Mistic the value of her

claim, Judge triggered Hunt believed agree. Although

the breach. We this oc-

curred property after divorce and divi-

sion, timing is irrelevant. rights fixed

Mistic’s as of the time insured Judge loss. Pursuant order, quitclaimed

Gonzalez’s Mistic her in- in the property

terest Halibut Cove to Rut- quitclaim

zebeck. Her deed to Rutzebeck purport convey

did not her interest proceeds,

the insurance nor inter- was this acknowledged

est or divided the decree.

We conclude that the decree no effect obligation pay

on the of Atlas to Mistic her proceeds.

half of the insurance

Summary judgment under issues herein is AFFIRMED. case

review proceedings.

REMANDED further *2 Clark, Flanigan, Michael W. Walther & Pedersen filed suit Flannery, Anchorage, Flanigan, appellant. Kibbey, for and the appellees other on Novem- 8, 1988, claiming ber that his Middleton, Middleton, R. Collin Timme & malpractice. caused medical Specifical- Zielski, McKay, Anchorage, appellees *3 ly, clamping he claimed that his aorta for Room, Emergency M.D. and Inc. forty-four kept minutes blood from flowing Lazar, Wiles, Delaney, Howard A. spinal long, to his cord for causing too Brubaker, Inc., Hayes, Reitman & Anchor- paralysis. alleges: He “Reasonably com- age, appellees for Fairbanks Memorial petent experienced and Vascular/Thoracic Hosp. Hospitals and Lutheran and Homes Surgeons are aware of haz- America, Gibbs, Soc. of Inc. Sanford M. clamping ard and avoid the aortic heart Brown, Moran, Hagans, Gibbs & Anchor- vessels in such to less than circumstance[s] age, Diaz, appellee Tony for M.D. provide minutes or use a shunt to blood Clapp, Leonard, R. Marcus David F. flow around clamped during area Hughes, Thorsness, Gantz, Powell & Brun- operative procedures.” din, Fairbanks, appellees Flannery, for Following operation Pedersen asked Kibbey, M.D. and M.D. Flannery Dr. what had caused paraly- Flannery sis. Dr. him told that “he wasn’t RABINOWITZ, C.J., BURKE, Before sure but that could have been caused [it] MATTHEWS, COMPTON, [Moore, and JJ. spinal swelling cord due to a blow [the] Justice, participating.] spine to the ... or because lack of blood legs.” flow to the Pedersen was transfer- OPINION Hospital red from Fairbanks Memorial MATTHEWS, Justice. Hospital Providence Anchorage in early 1983. December There he asked Dr. Em- malpractice In this medical case the trial ery what had paralysis. caused his granted summary judgment court in favor Emery replied “it that was a combination of the defendants based on the statute of including of factors blood loss from dam- limitations.1 We genuine conclude that is- aged swelling spinal aorta [and] sues of material fact exist as to when the cord.” Flannery Neither Dr. nor Dr. cause of action accrued and whether defen- Emery gave opera- an indication that the M.D., dant Flannery, estopped Michael J. tion had caused paralysis. Pedersen’s relying on the statute of limitations. We therefore reverse. wife, Gloria, also discussed FACTS2 paralysis the cause of Pedersen’s with Dr. Flannery. Flannery She states that Dr. 22,1983,

On November Einar Peder- injured sen explained a two-car collision near ... that the aorta was severed garden hose, Fairbanks. Pedersen’s aorta was severed like a and he had that in the accident. brought aorta, He was to Fair reattach the and he had Hospital banks Memorial where immediate work fast to in min- accomplish this utes, surgery performed by corrective damage spinal Drs. or to the cord could Flannery Michael J. Kibbey. William occur. I took this to mean that he ac- The severed ends of complished aorta were operative procedures clamped forty-four for a total of twenty say minutes minutes. He did not actu- stop order during the flow of ally accomplish blood took him 44 minutes to operation, reattachment. procedure. After the Peder- despite He also said that legs permanently paralyzed. efforts, sen’s spinal damage could oc- provides reviewing judgments grant- AS 09.10.070 in relevant In based on orders ing summary judgment, person may bring we take that view of the ‘‘[n]o an action ... non-moving facts which is most favorable to the ... unless commenced Hoblit, party. Carter v. 1085 n. 1 years." within two (Alaska 1988). This statement of facts is made perspective. from that Ford, Flanigan blood, suit bruising During

cur, lack because pro- of medical records to cord, he said had obtained a set duce for Ford and for review Pedersen’s said the He also occurred. point, total, experts. At this Flan- biomechanical might permanent not be igan that. medical records tell as to reviewed only time would nothing in he saw them which states that discussed the She states that she malpractice medical claim suggested a with Pedersen him. Flannery that Dr. occurred to us it never wrong. one of Pedersen’s anything summer Kibbey done had Flanigan Ford called experts in the case Quite contrary since Dr. malpractice may have tell him that medical impression us left both with had *4 life, during operation performed the occurred Einar’s and had accom- he had saved Kibbey. by Drs. and At about procedures just plished operative time, similar Flanigan the same received a planned he had them. counsel, report Ford’s who had ob- from Hospital Memorial Fairbanks The expert from an tained similar information story. different records tell somewhat Thereafter, on he had retained. November discharge summary Flannery’s states: 1988, 8, filed. this suit was problem post[-]oper- biggest “The was that DISCUSSION spinal patient had an anterior atively the secondary to of A. repair Statute Limitations syndrome cord aorta.” The records transected thoracic is parties agree The that this action also that Pedersen’s aorta was show requires governed by AS 09.10.070 which approximately forty-four min- clamped for brought years an action to be within two Although utes. the records were available “after the cause of action had accrued.” discharged time he was to Pedersen Ordinarily, personal injury AS 09.10.010. Hospital on from Memorial De- Fairbanks plaintiff in when the action “accrues” 1983, 5, did not obtain or review cember However, Alaska, along jured. most them then. jurisdictions, adopted other American discovery rule under which the statute attorney, an Bob Beco- Pedersen retained begin to run until the claimant does not novich, on or about December discovers, reasonably should dis have defending purpose him initially for covered, es the existence of the elements he had been on the traffic ticket which Safety cause of action. sential to his Mine as a result of the accident. Even- issued Stiles, 288, 756 291 Appliances Co. v. P.2d tually to look Beconovich was instructed 1988). (Alaska injury. into for Pedersen’s potential claims so, process doing Beconovich as- discovery gained general The first rule attorney, Paul Bar- sociated with another currency malpractice in cases medical against rett. claims the other Potential strongly most where its need was felt driver, against the manufacturer of and injury did manifest when the medical vehicle, Company, Ford Motor Pedersen’s of limitations itself until after statute investigated were found to be Dobbs, Keeton, run. D. R. Keeton had W. in spring unsupportable. Sometime Owen, D. Keeton on the & Prosser and referred his current (5th 1984). Pedersen was at 166-67 ed. Law Torts § counsel, Flanigan. Flanigan Michael was spread malpractice The rule cases soon against in claim e.g., interested brought against professionals, other Company. experts Bookman, He Ford Motor retained Inc. 657 Greater Area 1982) investigate (Alaska (attorney had obtain malpractice), and 828 general. E.g., his medical records from Fairbanks Memo- then tort in cases Int’l, experts. Helicopter Hospital rial review these Hanebuth v. Bell (Alaska 1984) (“[I]t in is the obtained June P.2d medical records were problems plaintiff faced A few later suit was filed nature of 1985. months cause, its discovering injury Ford. defendant, rule, Application occupation discovery how- ever, dependent are governs applicability discovery facts that often rule.”) States, unclear. aWhen first learned (quoting Stoleson v. United injury (7th Cir.1980)). or its cause is a which may fact F.2d dispute. sometimes be When Although the need for the first should injury have learned of an or its plain rule most clear cases where frequently Welch, cause is debatable. See tiff’s undiscovered and 805 P.2d at 982.4 years within two after it undiscoverable minds differ Reasonable as to caused, applies it also to cases where whether Pedersen should discovered the injury is known but its cause is un that the probably the cause diligence known and reasonable would not prior of his paralysis years to two Hanebuth, discovery. lead to its he filed suit on November 1988. The wreckage (helicopter crash not dis statement hospital records eight accident). years covered until after that he suffered “anterior The formulation of the rule syndrome secondary repair of transacted typically employ, namely which we that a pa thoracic aorta” is a statement *5 cause of action does not accrue until a ralysis operation. was caused the How “discovers, reasonably plaintiff should ever, ordinary person might equate the not discover, the of existence all the elements syndrome” “anterior paral with action,” State, Dep’t of his cause of ysis or to “secondary” understand mean of Welch, 979, Corrections v. 805 P.2d 982 “resulting from.” Pedersen submitted an (Alaska 1991), is enough broad to cover Eaton, affidavit authored Marshall M.D. reasonably and other undiscovered undis- states, Dr. Eaton in part based coverable elements such as the records, whether hospital that would “there have of cause the was tortious.3 Peder- every been reason for Mr. Mrs. Peder- and sen, case, present argues in the that he did attorney and sen their to have been led to know, know, and had no reason paraparesis believe Mr. Pedersen’s operation either that the the cause of was causing was due to the accident itself Mr. paralysis operation his that the neg- was Pedersen’s aorta be transected.” ligently performed. charge per It is hard to purpose any diligence. sonally statutes of limitations is with lack of He injustice may Flannery to eliminate the promptly inquired which result Drs. litigation Emery from the of stale cause paralysis claims. John as to the Fairbanks, 181, 187 City son v. 583 P.2d was not told that was' the (Alaska 1978). Further, he lawyers Statutes of limitations hired a time cause. capable application ly investigate possible should be without fashion to claims engendering litigation may extensive those caused who have his Thus, litigated. possible lawyers case on the merits is his paralysis. It is theory, negligent failing review statutes limitations should were malp begin to run to look on occurrence of definite medical records for medical However, event. as the record now ractice.5 Supreme chargeable negligence We note that the United States Court 5.Pedersen is on has refused to extend the rule to the attorneys of limita of his statute element of tortiousness. brick, States v. Ku- United purposes. tions "Insofar as ‘constructive notice’ 111, 444 100 S.Ct. U.S. 62 L.Ed.2d 259 ‘diligent investigation’ computa affect (1979) (interpreting the statute of limitations period, tion of the is limitations applicable cases). to Federal Tort Act Claims generally charged lapses attorneys with the Mofid, acting v. in his behalf.” 39 Gutierrez Holding evidentiary hearing an well in ad- Cal.Rptr. 705 P.2d Cal.3d 218 questions goes part vance of fact trial to resolve (1985). charged 891 is so was That way meeting early goals toward resolution Borg-Warner, assumed in v. Palmer of statutes of limitations. We recommend such hearing in this case. was, however, unavailing quiry until more as a stands, unable conclude we are surgery. The years than two after the case. that this matter of law main this case whether Ped- rule, the cause Under was, If it inquiry ersen’s was reasonable. plaintiff has accrues when of action not accrue the statute of limitations should a reasonable alert information sufficient knowledge actual until received he has a the fact that person to or he received new cause point, he should action. At prompt information which would a reason- protect rights inquiry to his or her begin an If his in- inquire able further. have notice of all is “deemed to and he reasonable, quiry the cause of inquiry dis would facts which inquiry action should accrue notice (quot Safety, 756 P.2d at 292 Mine close.” inquiry point unless a reasonable would not Municipality Anchorage, ing Russell statutory productive within the have been 1987)); Welch, (Alaska genuine are of mate- period. These issues If, however, a reasonable P.2d at 982. rial fact must be resolved immediately produc not be would evidentiary hearing. tive, of action nonetheless ac the cause if, period, statutory crues within Estoppel B. reasonably elements be dis essential Borg-Warner, Palmer v. covered. genuine There are also issues of 1990). (Alaska concerning material fact Pedersen’s claim estopped relying asking difference between There of limitations. The elements the statute whether estoppel misrepresentation, of an are a ac knowledge, plain- produced and whether a upon: tually and relied unpro- *6 particular tiff’s —which generally Putting estoppel Establishment of re reasonable. ductive—was place quires party seeking to to it to question in the abstract assert tends party made some inquiry, an in reali- show “that other focus on ideal whereas statement, misrepresentation, or possible false ty there have been several inquiry, fraudulently, acted and that he reason courses of some reasonable productive ably representa acts or and some of relied such which would be to reliance did not productive. Where the tions ... and due such which would not be timely.” Although actually attempts inquiry, an institute suit “there plaintiff view, an inaction in our is to ask wheth- can be circumstances where fairer repre or silence combined with acts or inquiry er was reasonable. Where his however, give rise an attempt, appropriate sentations can to there no there no calling application question in the ab- situation put choice but to doctrine,” gener estoppel plaintiff ... a stract.6 he ally estoppel cannot evoke unless case, present In Pedersen diligence attempting to exercised due following paralyzed a knew that became uncover the concealed facts. accident which resulted serious automobile Anchorage, Municipality v. Russell knowledge major surgery. (Alaska 1987) (quoting Gro person of a a enough to alert (Alas Ness, 421 P.2d 632 n. 23 seth v. triggered potential cause of action and thus 1966)). ka inquiry. duty begin a to an Pedersen did right equitable talking physi In order to to inquiry by establish initiate law, paralysis, estoppel under Alaska concerning cians the cause of his produce of fraudulent con- subsequently hiring counsel. This in- must evidence immediately productive. Safety We found that the there 6. Mine and Palmer are cases where by plaintiffs inquiry law was no reasonable the the plaintiff a matter of held that was reasonable and learning years after within two did accrue until the the cause of action Inc. or death. In Greater Area productive. at 831. Id. inquire, did was not duct which it relied treatment and health. A physician there- forebearing undertakes, when from suit. only fore patient to treat a physically, respond but also to fully to a Co., Ins., Inc., Sweeney v. Gudenau & Inc. patient’s inquiry treatment, i.e., about his 736 P.2d An af- patient to tell the everything that a reason- misrepresentation always firmative is not person able would want to know about the necessary to estoppel. establish As we treatment. Hoblit, See Carter v. observed, settled rule is that “[t]he (Alaska 1988) (“Fraud can be by person the mere failure to disclose a established silence or non-disclosure concerning fact a cause of action which fiduciary when a relationship exists be- arises him does not suffice to toll parties.... tween the The fiduciary has a the statute unless the defendant owed a duty fully disclose information which duty Russell, of disclosure.” 743 P.2d at might person’s affect the rights other action.”); influence his Greater Area Inc. Pedersen claims that Dr. Bookman, (Alaska misrepresented paral the true cause of his 1982) (“The duty of a fiduciary embraces ysis. support this, To points obligation to render a full and fair Flannery’s response Dr. that “he wasn’t disclosure to the beneficiary of all facts paralysis] sure but could have [Pedersen’s which materially affect rights and inter- spinal been caused cord [Pedersen’s] ests.”). Thus, when Pedersen asked Dr. swelling spine due to a blow to the Flannery what had caused his paralysis, it because of lack of blood flow to the enough say was not he wasn’t sure but legs.” This Flannery’s contrasts with Dr. it could have spine been a blow to the report in Pedersen’s medical records which loss of blood. A reasonable in Ped- syndrome states sec “[a]nterior position ersen’s would want to know that ondary repair of transected thoracic was a cause.7 aorta.” Dr. Flannery therefore had duty view, In Flannery’s our state disclose to Pedersen the fact ment to Pedersen is on the borderline of length of time his cross-clamped aorta was normally what one would consider a mis was a paralysis. cause of his His failure to representation. case, it omits im *7 make a full disclosure satisfies the first portant information. In the context of a requirement in equitable estoppel physician-patient relationship, Flannery analysis.8 duty had a to disclose the fact that operative procedures were a cause of appellees Ped- The claim that Dr. paralysis. ersen’s physician-patient The re subsequently misrepresentation cured his lationship is by making one of trust. Because the a full disclosure of the cause of patient physician’s expertise, lacks the the Pedersen’s paralysis in the medical records. patient rely physician must on the point goes for vir In our view this to the reason- tually patient’s all information about the ableness of Pedersen’s reliance on Dr. claim, Contrary appellees duty to what the this does not toll the statute of limitations. How- 7. require ever, mention, of disclosure does not consider, doctors to admit Reyes does not a Rather, liability. question, if asked a direct physician's duty of disclosure. There are nu- patient any doctor must inform the relevant jurisdic- merous cases in California and in other person information which a reasonable would duty recognize tions which in a statute of case, want to know about his treatment. In this See, e.g., limitations context. Emmett v. Eastern operative procedures the fact that them- 931, Dispensary Casualty Hosp., & F.2d 396 935 paralysis selves caused Pedersen's does not es- (D.C.Cir.1967); 426, Bleiberg, Brown v. 32 Cal.3d tablish that of the defendants are liable. It 228, 234, 815, (1982) Cal.Rptr. 186 651 P.2d 821 possible procedures, despite is that their (en banc); Co., Pashley v. Elec. 25 Cal.2d Pacific effects, appropriate most under all the 226, 325, (1944); 153 P.2d 330 Withered v. circumstances. Weimer, 68, (111.1987); 515 N.E.2d 73 Kern v. St. 135, Joseph Hosp., Citing Reyes 102 County Angeles, N.M. v. Los 197 584, 35, (1985); Cal.App.3d Cal.Rptr. (1988), Physicians 243 40-41 139 see also 61 AmJur.2d appellees argue 167, (1981). misrepresentation Surgeons, that a 229 §§

910 WITZ, Justice, the second RABINO Chief misrepresentations,

Flannery’s equitable estoppel concurring. in requirement of fact. It is analysis, The court’s characterization the main question which must closely related question in this case whether Pedersen’s concerning application of the be answered possibly was reasonable is misfo- Pedersen's actions discovery rule: whether cused. of his inquiring in as to the cause notes, correctly As the court were reasonable.9 chargeable any negligence the cause Peder- mere fact that attorney of his for statute limitations apparent have been sen’s possible purposes, and that “[i]t reading medical an informed negligent failing in lawyers were to review mean that necessarily does records not mal- his medical records look for medical misrepresenta reliance on the Pedersen’s 1 practice.” Flannery was unreasonable. tions of Dr. in significant I think the course in arisen other fact situations have Similar litigation, (one Flanigan Pedersen-Ford provider of jurisdictions where a medical attorneys) reviewed misrepresentation services made nothing in them medical records saw plaintiff, by a but was which was relied on suggested a malpractice medical Courts medical records. contradicted my view, In the medical claim him. have held that the fact true Flanigan’s posses- records which were appeared in the medical state of affairs notice. In placed sion him other necessarily precluded estoppel. records words, these medical should have records 1050, Nutty Hosp., F.Supp. 571 v. Jewish Flanigan, commencing February led (S.D.Ill.1983); Almengor v. Dade 1054 1986, into conduct 892, (Fla.App.1978); County, 359 So.2d If paralysis.2 the cause of Pedersen’s Joseph’s Hosp., Krueger v. St. N.W.2d reasonable, Flanigan’s inquiry was Ped- 18, (N.D.1981); v. 20-21, 25 Witherell cf. malpractice ersen’s medical cause of action 6, 10-12, Weimer, 52 Ill.Dec. Ill.2d accrued, pur- for statute of limitations (1981) (plaintiff rea 421 N.E.2d 874-76 poses, February of 1986.3 product sonably should have known leg causing prescribed doctors was Justice, COMPTON, dissenting part. nonetheless, problems, prove estoppel), aff'd, the chance A alerted the fact that he or 259, 263-64, Ill.Dec. 118 Ill.2d she has cause of action when (1987). N.E.2d 72-73 discovers, should have she discovered, all REMANDED. the existence of elements REVERSED and Hoblit, (Alas- applicable peri- computation limitations Carter *8 1988), requirement ka we that there is no held od. reasonably in to be a fraud victim act order statutory discovery of a entitled benefit 23, 1984, report 2. reads Dr. Martino's November growing rule. We noted trend of courts "to the part as in follows: negligence in move toward the doctrine that legs surgery his flaccid. Current- [A]fter misrepresentation pos- trusting not will excuse ly, paraplegia on with examination he has deprive per- itive defrauded willful fraud or the sensory at level HI.... consistent Jaeger, remedy." (quoting Id. W. son of his injury, probably or with at TR 10 1515B, (3rd ed. § on Contracts at 487 Williston light preservation posterior In the 11. 1970)). in We in Carter that actions observed function, may very Well be due to ische- this involving statutory discovery rule rea- the ruptured aorta mia suffered as a result of his estop- element of sonable reliance remains an ensuing surgery. the argue pel. that the Pedersen does not Carter added.) (Emphasis holding this should be extended to case. superior necessary, on the court regard plaintiff If remand that a 1.In this the court notes misrep- physician’s charged attorney should determine whether a generally lapses the of an trumps any negligence acting resentation insofar as constructive no- behalf attorney. patient's diligent investigation impact tice the

9H period, of action. It is the may essential to his or her cause essential elements rea person law that sonably settled when be discovered. Palmer v. Borg- alerted, put person inquiry is so the on Warner, 632, (Alaska 1990). 818 638 P.2d person the notice. This means that (other Op. omitted). at 908 citations “deemed to of all facts have notice which It is clear from this statement that the inquiry reasonable disclose.” would Mine identifying court is least separate two Stiles, Safety Appliances 756 P.2d Co. accrual dates. of these Neither is the dis 288, (Alaska 1988) (quoting 292 Vigil v. covery rule date we adopted accrual Spokane 796, County, Wash.App. Bookman, recently and reaffirmed as as in (1986)). P.2d republished the Borg-Warner, Palmer v. It just “inquiry” is not clear what 634 n. 3 See referring throughout opinion. court is to its Welch, also State v. 981-82 discovery adopted court rule this (Alaska 1991). separately One identifiable Bookman, Greater Area Inc. v. plaintiff accrual date is “when has in (Alaska 1982),contemplates sequence formation sufficient to alert a reasonable First, by plaintiff. plain- activities person potential to the fact that he has a discovers, reasonably or tiff should dis- Op. phrase cause of action.” at 908. This cover, the of all elements existence essen- expresses meaning different than that tial his or her cause action. Presum- expressed in “the existence of all elements ably discovery this can result from action,” essential to a cause of Mine Safe number of unrelated or interrelated activi- ty, 756 “the P.2d at existence of all plaintiff may actively ties. The in- solicit action,” cause of elements [the] formation, person may a third volunteer Bookman, phrases P.2d at two plaintiff, pain information to the may I thing. which consider to mean the same examination, lead a new medical date, It is also an earlier accrual since the may itself Any uncover information. plaintiff does not to be aware of as these lead to of the elements much information to alerted to the be fact essential to a action. The cause of exam- “potential” that he or she has a cause of ples are activity endless. Whatever the action as is the case when information ex information, source dis- tends to the “essential elements” of a covers, discover, should action. case the court elements essential to a cause of action. At concludes that was alerted point begins statute of limitations put notice1 when he “knew run. paralyzed following he became a serious As the last following sentence automobile accident which resulted ma demonstrates, quote court contem- jor surgery.” Op. plates a far different course of conduct: The second date is accrual somewhat rule, Under the the cause of understand, more difficult to because of action accrues in when circuity reasoning. If court’s formation alert a sufficient to “reasonable be immedi- to the fact he has a ately productive,” the cause of action ac- point, cause of action. At that crues, begins begin protect i.e. statute of limitations his or her run, “if, rights statutory period, and he within is “deemed have notice *9 may reasonably of all essential elements be dis- inquiry facts which reasonable added). If, however, (Emphasis Op. covered.” would disclose.” a reason inquiry it is the the cause of immediately able would not be Yet accrual of action productive, puts inquiry on the of action the notice in cause none that if, saying theless statutory place. accrues within the the first The court is that inquiry patently The notice to which Chief Justice Ra- is not as “an affirmative the same concurring opinion binowitz templates duty refers in his con investigate potential causes of action” all inquiry "a reasonable into the cause required by Borg-Warner. Palmer v. (Footnote omitted). paralysis”. of Pedersen’s accrued, legally er sufficient reason to toll the stat- the cause of action after statute, running estop during relying the ute or from the [the defendant] accrue, Co., may again i.e. the of action cause on statute.” Gudenau & Inc. again. may running Inc., Insurance, start statute P.2d Sweeney instance, conduct For of discovery agree not rule I do may engag- inquiry, defendant hinder i.e. contemplates separately identifiable these fraud, concealment, conduct; ing in and like applied by The rule accrual dates. may of the incident render nature itself adopted rule in is not the court fruitless, find inquiry failing i.e. wreck- Indeed, rule we is a Bookman. desolate, rugged age of aircraft in ter- an rule, is a in Bookman. It harsh abandoned rain, despite military of the best efforts v. Borg-Warner, in Palmer because ground Yet and civilian air and searchers. “upon held this court inquiry if a dis- reasonable would have death, of the claimant notification closed facts which tend to establish a suffi- duty investi has an affirmative estate filing support cient basis to a cause of gate potential before all causes action action, (Em the statute of limitations will com- expires.” the statute of limitations running is put is mence when the on phasis original). If this indeed the law, duty inquiry under a to investi notice. What constitutes a “rea- was gate potential inquiry” by all causes action sonable should be measured an expired. Applying standard, by the statute the court’s objective simply and not rule, lose, Pedersen should Borg-Wamer particular inquiry made whether however, just Inexplicably, lost. as Palmer person is reasonable. apparent Pedersen does not lose. What is This court concludes that Pedersen was cause of action is to be correct, inquiry on notice. If that is he is presumed nothing more acci from than an to have notice of all facts deemed which injury.2 dent and an disclose, inquiry just reasonable not agree I do not that once also particular inquiry the facts which his dis- notice,

put limita- inquiry the statute of closes. long is somehow tolled as as the tions my question, view this if indeed it is reasonable, plaintiff making unpro- case,” question in the “main whether ductive, or her efforts establish his inquiry would have disclosed reasonable A cause of action. facts tend to establish a sufficient which disclose facts tend to estab- filing a support basis to action support filing lish a sufficient basis to permitted within the time statute If an does cause action. The question is not whether facts, limitations. inquiry may disclose such inquiry was However, reasonable. it also have been reasonable. objective must an standard be one be does not application disclose such facts is anoth- achieve uniform statute because “there today’s ly, Borg-Wamer’s application 2. Until stated in comment about cause rule crashes, Borg-Wamer malpractice Palmer v. Widmyer to a medical air taken from v. Southeast claim, Borg-Wamer Inc., could be rationalized an (Alaska 1978), Skyways, exception air crash rule. This published just ap- two months after article Borg-Wamer, could be 636 n. 6 derived from peared attributing most crash the deaths of air ("air neg- normally crashes do not occur absent poor judgment pilots. victims in Alaska to .the ligence, es- weather even in inclement ... quote The article contained a National from the tate should have known Safety Transportation in- Board’s chief accident poten- being date of informed of the crash that Alaska, vestigator who stated: carrier, pilot, tial claims existed light plane The common denominators [in However, manufacturer.”). Peder- or the since experience, are lack of lack Alaska] crashes duty inquire triggered by his knowl- sen’s edge and, training operators, for the commercial following paralyzed seri- that “he became supervision. lack of ma- ous automobile accident which resulted in *10 News, Daily September Anchorage jor at surgery,” Borg-Wamer simply an is not air exception crash to the rule. Ironical- col. 6. limitations, a I concerning result believe best serves facts that cause of action through affected interests. apparently reasonable inquiry. Obviously his focus was not on his medical importantly, More based on the record providers. care Would a person agree us I do not before Pedersen was differently? have acted Inquiry presup- notice. notice poses person that a is alerted to the fact The record before us discloses that Ped- potential that he or she has a cause of ersen seriously injured was in a traumatic Op. action. at 908. As this rule is stated automobile impact collision. The was so Safety Appliances Stiles, in Mine Co. v. severe ruptured, that his aorta was necessi- tating the statute of limitations special use of clothing survival begins “discovers, person to run when the minimize hemorrhaging internal pending reasonably discovered, or should have surgery. Loss of body blood into the cavi- existence of all elements ty essential to his depriving was system cardiovascular cause of action.” This is oxygen restatement necessary and fluid to sustain adopted rule this court in bodily functions. surgery Immediate Bookman, Area required Greater Inc. v. “repair” (sew the aorta it back person If a together), does not and thus save Pedersen’s life. discover all the elements of Although his or her legs responsive his were to stim- action, cause reasonably could not ulus admission to the hospital and elements, have discovered all per- prior such surgery, they were not afterward. son is not alerted to the fact that he or she partially Pedersen is paralyzed. potential have a cause of action. The Pedersen and inquired his wife both statute of begin limitations does not to run physicians paral- about the cause of the person “discovers, until the ysis. They given information that should all discover” elements. Id. complete, was less than arguably and that

Discovery by person of all could misleading. be viewed as Medical elements of a cause of action is not the records indicate that the flow of blood was discovery through same as interrupted reasonable in- period longer for a than one of quiry tending physicians to establish a suffi- acceptable said was facts support filing cient basis to complications might arise. The records action. also state that the was “second- ary” “repair,” meaning that it was case, my “main” in this operation. However, caused neither view, person is when a reasonable treating physicians, consulting have discovered the existence of all the physicians hospital directly ever stated elements of his or her cause of action to Pedersen or his wife that the against providers sued, the medical care was the cause of the paralysis, medical thereby triggering “inquiry my notice.” In negligence aside. view that is no means clear. Pedersen looking for someone to whom he person could Even if a understood that liability injuries, attach including surgery paralysis, caused the would a rea- the driver of the person’s automobile with whom he sonable attention directed be collided, the manufacturer of his auto- providers own his medical care to the extent mobile, and even the ambulance crew that require reasonableness would him to transported hospital him to following investigate surgery? Would a reason- the collision. He sued and person settled with the likely able be more to look to those manufacturer of his automobile. apparently culpable, The set- most such as the other approximately $600,000. driver, tlement was for automobile the automobile manufac- turer, That was not a nuisance value settlement. possibly the ambulance crew? It cannot be said that Pedersen person was not Would it be reasonable for a alerted to the fact that he proceed theory culpability had a lay accident, cause of action automobile actors involved in the or that he failed to uncover itself was the reason the had to manufacturer *11 saving surgery? Was it rea- the life have attorney to person’s contin- LOEB, sonable for the Joyce Representative as Personal apparently culpa- most pursue ue to those Bouffioux, of the Estate of Teresa having hospi- ble, reviewed even after Appellant Cross-Appellee, incomplete argu- tal Do the records? given per- misleading answers ably and L & L Invest Leo RASMUSSEN the reasonableness physician son’s affect ments, general partnership, a d/b/a inquiry? Boxhoy, Appellees and Cushman Cross- minds could I conclude that reasonable Appellants. how would differ on S-3450, Nos. S-3464. A

respond in the circumstances described. presented whether Peder- jury Supreme Court of Alaska. person, sen, should have Dec. his all the elements of discovered providers against his care action medical sued years

more than two before he them.

Assuming court’s conclusion that notice put on

Pedersen legs paralyzed,

learning that his immediately following the made accident,

surgery that resulted from the rule applied

under the formulation of the Borg-Wamer, court in duty under

should have been investi-

gate possible injury. all causes include the conduct of his obviously

would providers. Only care one

medical allegedly make

physicians failed to a full

disclosure Pedersen and his wife. It is physician’s

difficult to conclude that

alleged fully failure to disclose matters to had on rea-

them would have effect medical inquiry,

sonable since the records

themselves, Pedersen, always available physician had An

disclosed what the not.

inquiry based on those records would have surgery

led as the cause of the

paralysis. This would physician. Re- focused alleged

liance on failure disclose at point have become unreasonable years suit was

earlier than two care provid-

filed. As to the other medical

ers, legally no sufficient cause has been postpone accrual of the statute

shown

beyond notice date court accept Thus if we the court’s

establishes. framework,

analytical Pedersen should

lose.

Case Details

Case Name: Pedersen v. Zielski
Court Name: Alaska Supreme Court
Date Published: Dec 6, 1991
Citation: 822 P.2d 903
Docket Number: S-3694
Court Abbreviation: Alaska
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