Case Information
*0 FILED IN 15th COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 7/2/2025 4:37:31 PM CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE Clerk *1 ACCEPTED 15-25-00111-CV FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 7/2/2025 4:37 PM CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE CLERK
July 2, 2025
Hon. Christopher A. Prine
Clerk, Texas Fifteenth Court of Appeals
P.O. Box 12852
Austin, Texas 78711
Re: Court of Appeals No. 15-25-00111-CV, Pecos Housing Finance Corporation, Pleasanton Housing Finance Corporation, Maverick Housing Finance Corporation, and La Villa Housing Finance Corporation v. City of Arlington Court of Appeals No. 15-25-00112-CV, Pecos Housing Finance Corporation, a Texas Nonprofit Corporation and Cara Turn, Maribel Alvarez, and Irene Dominguez, in Their Official Capacities as Board Members of Pecos Housing Finance Corporation v. City of Haltom City, Texas
Dear Ms. Prine:
Appellants provide the following response to this Court’s June 25 letter requesting information pertaining to its jurisdiction over these appeals. [1]
A. Background
Appellant Pecos Housing Finance Corporation (“Pecos”) is a housing finance corporation (“HFC”) established to coordinate and facilitate affordable housing for
Texas residents, pursuant to the Housing Finance Corporation Act, T L OC . T § 394.001 et seq . (“the Act”). Pecos serves a “public purpose” and “performs an
essential governmental function on behalf of and for the benefit of … this State.” Id. at
§ 394.002(c)(1)-(3). To fulfill this purpose, HFCs like Pecos enter into public-private
real estate partnerships to facilitate the development of low-income housing within the
*2 “local government,” and as a result, HFC-owned properties and the income derived
therefrom are tax-exempt. Id. at § 394.903(a); § 394.905. [2]
The orders challenged in these appeals resulted from efforts by three municipalities – Fort Worth, Arlington, and Haltom City – to prevent Pecos and other so-called
“traveling HFCs” from operating within these cities, which they describe as “a
widespread problem across the state” that has led to “the loss of millions of dollars in
real property value from the local tax base.” [3] According to Appellees, the Act limits
Pecos and other HFCs to operating only within the boundaries of the local
governments that approve the incorporation of the HFC; and to the extent the Act
permits an HFC to operate outside these boundaries, it is unconstitutional. Appellants
assert that HFCs may operate outside the boundaries of their sponsoring governments
under the unambiguous language of the Act. The trial court temporarily enjoined Pecos
from purchasing or approving the purchase of real property within these cities’
boundaries, or requesting, approving, or obtaining tax exemptions for any real property
located within these cities’ boundaries. These orders are before this Court, along with
the trial court’s denials of Appellants’ pleas to the jurisdiction.
Notably, these are just two of at least fourteen similar lawsuits pending across the state, implicating the jurisdiction of no fewer than five regional intermediate courts of
appeal. See , e.g. , City of Euless v. Cameron County Housing Finance Corp., Mark A. Yates, Ga
vino Sotelo, Eduardo Campirano, Louie Tijerina, and Cyndi Wyche, in their Official Capacities as
Board Members of the Cameron County Housing Finance Corp., and Tarrant Appraisal District ,
Cause No. 348-365230-25 , pending in the 236 th Judicial District of Tarrant County;
Harris County Municipal Utility Dist. No. 390 v. Pleasonton Housing Finance Corp. and Roland
Altinger, in his Official Capacity as Chief Appraiser of the Harris Central Appraisal District ,
Cause No. 2025-33133 , pending in the 165 th Judicial District of Harris County; City of
San Marcos and Hays County, Texas v. Pecos Housing Finance Corp. and Pleasonton Housing
Finance Corp. , Cause No. 25-1185-DCB , pending in the 207 th Judicial District of Hays
County; Williamson County, Siena Municipal Utility Dist. No. 1 and Siena Municipal Utility
Dist. No. 2 v. Cameron County Housing Finance Corp. , Cause No. 25-0488-C425 , pending
in the 425 th Judicial District of Williamson County; City of Missouri City v. Pleasonton
*3 Housing Finance Corp. and Board Members of the Pleasanton Housing Finance Corp in their Official
Capacities , Cause No. 25-DCV-328899 , pending in the 240 th Judicial District of Fort
Bend County; City of Missouri City, Texas v. Maverick County Housing Finance Corp. ad the
Borad Members of the Maverick County Housing Finance Corp. in their Official Capacities , Cause
No. 25-DCV-325392 , pending in the 268 th Judicial District of Fort Bend County; City
of Lewisville v. Cameron County Housing Finance Corp., Pecos Housing Finance Corp., and Don
Spencer, in his Official Capacity as Chief Appraiser of the Denton County Tax Appraisal Dist. ,
Cause No. 25-4665-367 , pending in the 367 th Judicial District of Denton County,
Texas; Town of Little Elm v. Pleasonton HFC, Pecos HFC, Don Spencer in is Official Capacity
as Chief Appraiser of Denton County Appraisal District , Cause No. 25-5634-367 , pending in
the 367 th Judicial District of Denton County; City of Carrollton v. Pecos Housing Finance
Corp., Shane Docherty, in his Official Capacity as Chief Appraiser of the Dallas Central Appraisal
Dist. , Cause No. DC-25-07935 , pending in the 101 st Judicial District of Dallas County;
City of Rowlett and Garland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Pleasonton Housing Finance Corp. , Cause No.
DC-25-077781 , pending in the 191 st Judicial District of Dallas County; City of Richardson
v. Collin Central Appraisal Dist., Garland Housing Finance Corp., and Cameron County Housing
Finance Corp. , Cause No. 219-03593-2025 , pending in the 219 th Judicial District of
Collin County; Montgomery County Municipal Utility Dist. No. 46 v. Maverick County Housing
Finance Corp. , Cause No. 25-06-09304 , pending in the 284 th Judicial District of
Montgomery County.
B. These appeals are brought by or against the state or a board, commission, department, office, or other agency in the executive branch of the state government.
The Fifteenth Court of Appeals has exclusive intermediate appellate jurisdiction over civil matters brought by or against the state or a board, commission, department,
office, or other agency in the executive branch of the state government … T T § 22.220(d)(1).
The Texas Supreme Court recently addressed the scope of this provision in Baumgardner v. Brazos River Auth. , 2025 WL 1779081 *1 (Tex. June 27, 2025). Finding
the river authority to be a political subdivision [4] rather than a state agency, the Court
determined the appeal did not fall within this Court’s exclusive jurisdiction. Id. at *3-5.
Key to the Court’s holding was the limited geographic reach of the river authority. Id.
at *3, 5. Citing Monsanto Co. v. Cornerstones Mun. Util. Dist. , 865 S.W.2d 937, 940 (Tex.
*4 1993), the Court observed “[a] political subdivision has jurisdiction over a portion of
the State; a department, board or agency of the State exercises its jurisdiction
throughout the State.” Baumgardner , 2025 WL 1779081 *5. Although HFCs are created
by local government, T EX . L OC . G OV ' T C ODE § 394.002(d), at all times relevant to these
appeals there was no limit to the geographic reach of their operations. See also T EX .
G OV ’ T C ODE § 394.002(b)(1) (“the creation of a housing finance corporation is for the
benefit of the people of the state, …”). Moreover, HFCs are empowered to delegate to
the Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs (indisputably a state agency)
the authority to act on its behalf in the financing, refinancing, acquisition, leasing,
ownership, improvement, and disposal of home mortgages or residential developments,
making HFCs more akin to a state agency than a political subdivision. Id. at § 394.032(e).
C. This Court has jurisdiction to consider these appeals “as provided by law.”
This Court also has jurisdiction over any other matter as provided by law. T EX . G OV ’ T C ODE § 22.220(d)(2). As the Texas Supreme Court made clear in In re Dallas
Cnty. , 697 S.W.3d 142, 146 (Tex. 2024) and Kelley v. Homminga , 706 S.W.3d 829, 834
(Tex. 2025), this Court was created to adjudicate matters that implicate, or that the
Legislature has defined as critical to, the State’s interests. The Legislature was clear on
the importance of HFCs to achieving the goal of providing low-income housing to
Texans: “the corporation, as a public instrumentality and nonprofit corporation,
performs an essential government function on behalf of and for the benefit of the general public, the local government, and this state.” T L OC . T §
394.002(c)(3) (emphasis added). There can be no question that Pecos’s alleged “misuse
and abuse” of the Texas Housing Finance Corporation Act is a matter that is critical to
the State’s interests within the common-law holding of Kelley . See Exhs. B-D.
Moreover, as noted supra , similar lawsuits are pending across the state. Those appeals should be heard by the same intermediate court of appeals as a matter of judicial
economy. This, too, was a justification for the establishment of this Court: “[u]nder the
current judicial system, appeals in cases of statewide significance are decided by one of
Texas’s 14 intermediate appellate courts. These courts have varying levels of experience
with the complex legal issues involved in cases of statewide significance, resulting in
inconsistent results for litigants. …” See Senate Research Center, Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 1045, 88th Leg., R.S. (2023) (discussing background of the bill) (emphasis added).
D. These appeals are matters in which a party to the proceeding has challenged the constitutionality of a state statute.
Finally, this Court has jurisdiction over matters in which a party to the proceeding files a petition, motion, or other pleading challenging the constitutionality or validity of
a state statute or rule and the attorney general is a party to the case. T EX . G OV ’ T C ODE
§ 22.220(d)(2).
Appellee City of Fort Worth has alleged that, to the extent Pecos’s actions are authorized by the Act, the Act violates Article VIII Section 11 of the Texas
Constitution. See Exhibit C at 9. It also seeks a declaratory judgment that Article VIII, Section 11 of the Texas Constitution “limits counties’ ad valorem taxation authority to
‘property within their respective boundaries’ and that Defendants' scheme violates
Constitutional limits on the scope of Texas counties’ taxing authority.” Id. at 9-10.
Appellee Haltom City has similarly alleged that Pecos’s actions (which were authorized
by the Act) “violate the Texas Constitution’s rules against extra-jurisdictional taxation
by seeking to impose a system of taxation on properties located outside the boundaries
of Reeves County where Pecos City is located.” See Exhibit D at 12. Haltom City further
alleges that “[i]f [the Act] could be read to empower Pecos HFC to take properties
outside of Reeves County off the tax rolls of other counties, this would violate the
Texas Constitution’s limits on the scope of Texas counties’ taxing authority.” Id.
On June 30, 2025 this Court notified the Office of the Attorney General of these Constitutional challenges. To the extent this Court determines that it does not have
jurisdiction pursuant to T T § 22.220(d)(1) or (d)(3), Appellants
respectfully request that the Court await the Attorney General’s decision whether to
join this appeal before ruling on its jurisdiction.
Thank you for your attention to this matter.
Respectfully Submitted: / s / Amanda L. Reichek Jeffrey M. Tillotson Texas Bar No. 20039200 jtillotson@tillotsonlaw.com Amanda L. Reichek Texas Bar No. 24041762 areichek@tillotsonlaw.com Kathryn E. Yukevich State Bar No. 24133390 kyukevich@tillotsonlaw.com T ILLOTSON J OHNSON & P ATTON 1201 Main Street, Suite 1300 Dallas, Texas 75202 Telephone: (214) 382-3041 Facsimile: (214) 292-6564 Blake W. Stribling Texas Bar No. 24070691 bstribling@chasnoffstribling.com Daniel J. Lecavalier Texas Bar No. 24129028 dlecavalier@chasnoffstribling.com HASNOFF S TRIBLING , LLP 1020 N.E. Loop 410, Suite 150 San Antonio, Texas 78209 Telephone: (210) 469-4155 ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT PECOS HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION *7 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served by email to counsel herein on July 2, 2025.
/s/ Amanda L. Reichek Amanda L. Reichek *105 Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.
The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system
on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing
certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a
certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.
Envelope ID: 102719906
Filing Code Description: Other Document
Filing Description: Correspondence with Court
Status as of 7/2/2025 4:45 PM CST
Case Contacts
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Jeffrey MTillotson jtillotson@tillotsonlaw.com 7/2/2025 4:37:31 PM SENT
TJP Service tillotsonjohnsonpatton@gmail.com 7/2/2025 4:37:31 PM SENT
Kassi Yukevich kyukevich@tillotsonlaw.com 7/2/2025 4:37:31 PM SENT
Amanda Reichek areichek@tillotsonlaw.com 7/2/2025 4:37:31 PM SENT
Sean Wallace swallace@tillotsonlaw.com 7/2/2025 4:37:31 PM SENT
Devlin Browne dbrowne@tillotsonlaw.com 7/2/2025 4:37:31 PM SENT
Daniel J.Lecavalier dlecavalier@chasnoffstribling.com 7/2/2025 4:37:31 PM SENT
Blake W.Stribling bstribling@chasnoffstribling.com 7/2/2025 4:37:31 PM SENT
[1] Appellants intend to file a motion to consolidate these appeals, along with No. 15-25-00113-CV, pending this Court’s jurisdictional determination.
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[2] On May 28, 2025, Gov. Greg Abbott signed HB 21 into law, amending the Act effective immediately. See Housing Finance Corporations; Authorizing a Fee, 2025 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 208 (H.B. 21) (VERNON’S), attached hereto as Exhibit A. The properties at issue in these appeals were acquired prior to these amendments.
[3] See Plaintiff City of Arlington’s Third Amended Petition and Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief , at 1, 5 (Exhibit B); City of Fort Worth’s Fourth Amended Petition in Intervention and Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief , at 2, 7 (Exhibit C); [Haltom City’s] First Amended Application for Temporary Injunction and Response to Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction , at 1, 7 (Exhibit D).
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[4] Although considered political subdivisions, this Court has exercised jurisdiction over appeals brought by or against municipalities. See , e.g. , City of Austin v. Mario Ponce et al. , Case No. 15-24-00076; City of Rio Vista v. Johnson County Special Utility District , Case No. 15-24-00065-CV.
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