20 N.C. 249 | N.C. | 1839
The two first objections taken by the defendants on the trial have not been pressed upon the .Court in the argument here; but as they appear upon the record they must be noticed, and may with propriety be considered together. The covenant declared upon does not in terms express with whom it is made. It is a “guaranty” under the seals of the defendants “ that Woodburn will pay to Bencini all such sums of money as shall come to his hands as the agent of Peck, Wellford &. Co.,” and it was transmitted by mail on the day it bears date by Woodburn to Bencini, with an indorsation in Woodburn’s hand-writing that it should be shown to Price, one of the firm of Peck, Wellford & Co. It was objected by the defendants that upon the covenant itself it appeared to have been made with Bencini, and that the in-dorsation being the act of Woodburn alone could not be received in evidence to alter the effect of the covenant. It is not to be questioned but that the action upon this contract must be brought by the party with whom it was made, because in him is vested the legal interest in the contract. But the instrument does not in express terms declare with whom the engagement is entered into; and therefore per se must be wholly inoperative, unless we can fairly collect from the scope of the engagement therein set forth to whom the de
The next question presented to us respects the admission in evidence of the way-bills which were offered by the plaintiffs to shew the amount that had been received' for them by Woodburn, while acting as their agent. These way-bills had been made out by him and transmitted at the times they bear date to the plaintiffs or their other agents, setting forth the names of the passengers going with the way-bills and the sums by them paid for their passage money respectively. The reception of this evidence was opposed upon the ground that it amounted to no more than the declarations of Woodburn, and could not bind the present defendants. We are of opinion that the evidence was competent and proper. It is a well established rule that where a person who has peculiar means
It appears from the case stated, that upon the cross-examination of the witness Bencini, he was asked by the counsel for the defendants, whether he had not heard from Well-ford, one of the plaintiffs, that he'had sold his interest iti the mail contracts to one Crusenberry, and that the witness answered that he bad heard Wellford say that he had sold his interest to Crusenberry upon conditions in the summer of IS36, and that those conditions not having been complied with, he had sold that interest to Price, another of the plaintiffs: thereupon the counsel for 'the defendants insisted that
We also forbear from considering whether there was any laches on the part of the plaintiffs in not calling Woodburn more frequently to account, or in not notifying the defendants earlier of his failure to pay over the.moneys by him ed — and also whether the instructions given by the Judge in relation to the alleged laches, and the legal consequences thereof, if shewn, were correct or incorrect. It does not pear that any evidence was offered, shewing, or tending to shew that an injury had been sustained by reason of such alleged laches. Were it admitted that the defendants could set up mere delay or want of diligence in the plaintiffs as a defence at law against an express unconditional covenant — and had such laches been ever so clearly established — it could
The result is, that the defendants have not established any sufficient error upon which to reverse the judgment rendered below, and it must therefore be affirmed with costs.
. Per Curiam. Judgment Affirmed.