26 Fla. 23 | Fla. | 1890
On the 3d day of January, 1889, the appellee filed his bill in the Circuit Court of Volusia County, against the appellants, and, among other things the bill alleges (substantially):
That at an election held in and for the town of Daytona, July 24, 1889, at which a Mayor, Councilman and Treasurer were to be elected, and that the complainant and one Courtland Buckman, were candidates for the office of Mayor of said town, and the election so held was illegal.
That the complainant has caused a suit to be instituted in the name of the State of Florida, upon complainant’s relation, against the said Buckman, to test the legality of said election, and that the complainant is a tax-payer in
That the town council of the said town have authorized the said Buckman, acting Mayor, to employ counsel at the expense of the corporation, to defend said suit and threatened suits against the Councilmen and Treasurer of said town.
The prayer of the bill is for an injunction restraining said town authorities from expending the funds of the town in defending $uch suits.
Upon filing the bill and affidavits, a preliminary injunction was granted as prayed.
Afterwards, on September 16, 1889, upon motion of respondents and affidavits filed by them, the injunction was dissolved. On the 17th day of the same month, upon motion of the complainant, and after hearing argument, the Court granted an order vacating the order of September 16th dissolving the injunction, and reinstating the injunction. On the same day (September 17th), solicitors for respondents filed their objections and exceptions to the granting of the order vacating the order dissolving the injunction, and granting the injunction.
The objections and exceptions to the rulings of the Court were:
That the bill sets up no title to such relief in the complainant,
That it is not properly sworn to.
That this Court has no jurisdiction of such matters.
That there is no reason for the interference of a Court of Equity herein, or the granting of such a writ.
That the bond is too small.
1. That the Judge erred in permitting the filing of the bill in said cause.
2. That the Judge erred in entertaining said cause, and in granting the restraining order of September 2, 1889.
3. That the Judge erred in granting the order of September 17, 1889, vacating the order previously and solemnly made by him on the 16th day of September, 1889, dissolving the restraining order granted by him on September 2, 1889.
4. That the Judge erred in refusing to grant the motion of September 17, 1889.
5. That the Judge erred in receiving, filing and approving the paper called an injunction bond, on September 17, 1889.
6. That said Judge erred in granting the restraining order of September 17, 1889.
7. That said Judge erred in refusing the motion to dissolve the restraining order granted on September 17, 1889.
As to the first assignment of error, we are unable to comprehend the reasoning of counsel for appellants in their contention that the Court erred in allowing the bill filed, because, under the statute, the bill had to be filed before the granting of the injunction, and the Judge could have known nothing of the bill ■ before it was filed, and could, therefore, have committed no error, as he had no control over the bill until it was filed.
Second, we see no error in granting the preliminary injunction. There is enough in the record,we think, to show that before the restraining order was granted, the bill had been filed, and that the allegations of the bill were sufficient to grant the order upon. It is urged that the bill was not
It is contended, that the Court below erred in granting the order vacating the order dissolving the injunction upon mere motion.
Rule 60, equity practice in the Circuit Courts, requires all applications for rehearing to be by petition, and as the application in the case under consideration was upon motion, if the respondents had objected in the Court below upon the ground that the application for rehearing was upon motion, instead of petition, the objection would have been decisive of the case. But this objection was not made in the Court below, and in failing to make the objection at the proper time, the respondents waived it. The objection comes too late when, as in this case, it is made for the first time in the Appellate Court.
It is further contended that the Court erred in granting
As to the allegéd illegality of said election, we express no opinion; that question cannot be raised by injunction-
There is but one other question to be considered, which is, did the Court below err in granting the order prohibiting the application of the corporation funds to the payment of the expenses of said suits ? We think not. It is contended for counsel for appellants, that municipal corporations have the right to sue and be sued, to employ counsel to bring and defend suits, to protect its officers, and to indemnify them against acts done in the discharge of their duty, and cite McClellan’s Digest, 247; 13 Cal., 531; 1 Dillon on Municipal Corporations, Section 98; 12 N. H., 278; 14 Gray, 340; 8 R. I., 431; 6 Vt., 95.
This contention is partly correct, and it is supported by the authorities cited. The right of a corporation, when it is interested, to sue and defend suits is indisputable, and that municipal officers will be protected so long as they keep strictly within the discharge of their duties, is equally true; but all corporations, whether public or private, derive their powers from legislative grant, and can do no act for which authority is not expressly'given, or may not be reasonably inferred. 1 Dillon on Municipal Corporations, Section 90. And now, admitting the right of corporations to sue and to defend suits, and to protect their officers in the lawful discharge of their duties, to be correct, still, where did the Town Council of Daytona derive their powers
An ordinance, making an appropriation of the funds of a town or city, derived from taxation, for purposes wholly beyond the purview of municipal grant, is a wrongful appropriation of the funds held in trust for the tax payers and people to pay the alimony and legitimate expenses of the town or city, and is, in short, ultra vires, null and void. Resident tax-payers have the right to invoke the interposition of a Court of Equity to prevent an illegal disposition of the moneys of a municipal corporation, or the illegal creation of a debt which they, in common with other property holders, may otherwise be compelled to pay. 10 Am. and Eng. Encyclopaedia of Law, 962, and numerous authorities there cited; Lanier vs. Padgett, 18 Fla., 842; Cotten et al. vs. County Commissioners of Leon County, 6 Fla., 610; Murphy vs, City of Jacksonville, 18 Fla., 318.
The judgment of the Court below is affirmed.