196 Conn. 53 | Conn. | 1985
Lead Opinion
This case arises out of a two-car accident in Torrington on September 27, 1979, in which the plaintiff, Roger Peck, Jr., a passenger, was injured. In the ensuing negligence action instituted in 1981, Peck sued both drivers, Paul Jacquemin and Ira J. Roy. On December 27, 1982, he settled the case with Jacquemin, the driver in whose car he was a passenger, for $100,000. The remaining defendant Roy (hereinafter the defendant) alleged, by way of special defense, that he was entitled to a setoff in that amount if damages were assessed against him.
In pressing his claim at that time, the defendant’s trial counsel (who is also appellate counsel) argued to the court that he was entitled, in the presence of the jury, to question the plaintiff, who was then testifying, as to whether he had settled with Jacquemin by executing a release to him in return for the payment of $100,000.
Thereafter, defense counsel did examine the plaintiff before the jury concerning the Jacquemin settlement.
On appeal, the plaintiff raises two issues: (1) whether Public Acts 1982, No. 82-406, § 3 (General Statutes § 52-216a as amended), was applicable when the cause of action arose before the effective date of this statute but where settlement with one joint tortfeasor occurred after that effective date;
It is readily apparent from a common sense reading of § 52-216a that its legislative objective was to pro
The present statute, which was enacted in response to our decision in Seals, became effective on October 1, 1982. General Statutes § 2-32. The accident which gave rise to the plaintiffs cause of action in this case occurred on September 27, 1979. The plaintiff, Peck, instituted the present action against the defendants Jacquemin and Roy on June 26,1981, and it was returnable to court on July 21, 1981. The plaintiff executed a release in favor of the defendant Jacquemin on December 27, 1982, in return for the payment of $100,000. On January 18, 1983, the plaintiff filed a
We agree with the plaintiffs argument that he did not seek to have the statute applied retroactively.
We now address the issue whether § 52-216a as amended is unconstitutional under Seals v. Hickey, supra. The parties agree that this statute was enacted in response to our decision in Seals. The plaintiff maintains that the statute passes constitutional muster under Seals. On the other hand, the defendant disagrees and argues, inter alia, that the statute does not cure the constitutional infirmity we pointed out in Seals.
At this point, certain relevant tenets of statutory construction may be set out. “ ‘It is an elementary rule of construction that statutes should be considered as a whole, with a view toward reconciling their separate parts in order to render a reasonable overall interpretation; the application, moreover, of common sense to the statutory language is not to be excluded. United Aircraft Corporation v. Fusari, 163 Conn. 401, 411, 311 A.2d 65 (1972); Garbaty v. Norwalk Jewish Center, Inc., 148 Conn. 376, 382, 171 A.2d 197 (1961). We must avoid a consequence which fails to attain a rational
It is also basic to statutory construction that “statutes are to be construed to give effect to the apparent intention of the lawmaking body.” Robinson v. Unemployment Security Board of Review, 181 Conn. 1, 6, 434 A.2d 293 (1980); see Verrastro v. Sivertsen, supra, 220; 2A Sutherland, Statutory Construction (4th Ed. 1984) § 45.05. “ ‘In interpreting the meaning of a statute, we attempt to determine the intent of the legislature as expressed by the common and approved usage of the words in the statute.’ ” Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Gode, 187 Conn. 386, 393-94, 446 A.2d 1059 (1982); General Statutes § l-l(a). “The intention of the legislature is found not in what it meant to say, but in the meaning of what it did say.” Colli v. Real Estate Commission, 169 Conn. 445, 452, 364 A.2d 167 (1975); Muha v.
In Seals, the defendant claimed that § 52-216a as interpreted by us in Fritz v. Madow, supra, denied him his constitutional right to trial by jury.
In our decision in Seals, we said that “[t]he dominant purpose of § 52-216a was to prevent the agreements
The statute itself is in four sentences. The first sentence repeats verbatim that corresponding portion of the original which remained after the constitutional attack in Seals. “The reenactment of a statute is a continuation of the law as it existed prior to the reenactment insofar as the original provisions are repeated without change in the reenactment.” 1A Sutherland, Statutory Construction (4th Ed. Sands) § 23.29. The
In Seals, we pointed out that the portion of the statute remaining after the constitutional attack offered “absolutely no direction to the court concerning what steps it may take after the verdict has been returned” and because that statute was “clearly inseparable . . . the entire statute must fall.” (Emphasis added.) Seals v. Hickey, supra, 355. In enacting the present statute, that portion has been included and, together with additional language, does give direction concerning what steps a trial court may take after the verdict is returned. The present statute does so, in a fashion that is constitutional under Seals. The defendant’s constitutional attack upon it must fail.
The statute struck down in Seals, while prohibiting the reading to the jury or introduction into evidence in any other way of the agreements or releases referred, did, nevertheless, provide the following: “[EJxcept the court at the conclusion of the trial may deduct from the verdict any amount of money received by any party to such action pursuant to such agreement not to sue or such release of claim. ...” This provision gave the court unbridled discretion in dealing with the verdict and thereby violated the defendant’s constitutional right to trial by jury under article first, § 19, of the Connectict constitution. That language not only no longer appears in the present statute, but the additional language in the second and third sentences, when we view the statute as a whole, offers proper constitutional guidelines to the trial court after the verdict.
In § 52-216a as amended after Seals, the word “if” begins the second and third sentences both of which
In each of these sentences, the condition imported into the trial court’s conclusion of excessiveness or inadequacy is that it must so conclude “as a matter of law,” prior to proceeding further either by remittitur or additur with the new trial option. The terms “as a matter of law” are legal terms and, absent any legislative intent shown to the contrary, are to be presumed to be used in their legal sense.
The requirement, therefore, that this conclusion be reached “as a matter of law” serves under the circumstances to overcome the defendant’s claim. The legal significance of this requirement is obvious; it does not import unbridled discretion, but rather mandates the correct application of relevant legal principles to circumstances in making the conclusion, which, if clearly erroneous, constitutes reversible error. Read in conjunction with that portion of the Seals statute that was reenacted in the present statute, it makes eminent common sense to say that, by enacting the present statute, the legislature expressed what it intended that the trial court do after the verdict. In making its postverdict determination on the issue of any claimed excessiveness or inadequacy, the trial court was directed to consider the amount of money paid to a plaintiff as the result of either “[any] agreement with any tortfeasor not to bring legal action or a release of a tortfeasor in any cause of action.” General Statutes (Rev. to 1983) § 52-216a. This makes the statute, unlike the one we construed in Seals, “workable.” Seals v. Hickey, supra, 355.
Turning to the last sentence of the statute which permits the introduction of agreements or releases in a trial to the court, we must construe a part of a statute, so far as reasonably possible, as operative and harmonious with every other part of the statute. Atwood v. Regional School District No. 15, 169 Conn. 613, 621, 363 A.2d 1038 (1975); Kerin v. Goldfarb, 160 Conn. 463, 467, 280 A.2d 143 (1971); McAdams v. Barbieri, 143 Conn. 405, 418, 123 A.2d 182 (1956). “Courts should not adopt a construction of the statute leading to ‘difficult and possibly bizarre results.’ ” (Citations omit
There is error, the judgment is set aside and a new trial is ordered limited to the issue of damages.
In this opinion Parskey, Dannehy and Quinn, Js., concurred.
This pleading set out the following:
“BY WAY OP SPECIAL DEFENSE
“Plaintiff received payment from Paul Jacquemin in the amount of $100,000 and, if damages are assessed, this defendant is entitled to a setoff in the amount of said payment.”
In its entirety, this pleading set out the following:
“REPLY TO SPECIAL DEFENSE
“Plaintiff admits that portion of the Defendant’s special defense that he received payment from the co-defendant Jacquemin. But denies the allegation that he is entitled to a set-off in the amount of said payment because by operation of law there is no contribution allowed among tortfeasors.”
We will discuss this memorandum in more detail later in this opinion.
General Statutes (Rev. to 1983) § 52-216a, entitled “Reading of agreements or releases to jury prohibited. Adjustments for excessive and inadequate verdicts permitted,” provides: “An agreement with any tortfeasor not to bring legal action or a release of a tortfeasor in any cause of action shall not be read to a jury or in any other way introduced in evidence by either party at any time during the trial of the cause of action against any other joint tortfeasors, nor shall any other agreement not to sue or release
During this argument defense counsel informed the court that it was not “my intention to introduce the release.” The plaintiff had already received the $100,000 settlement from Jacquemin.
During the argument in the absence of the jury the following occurred:
“The Court: Isn’t it quite clear that this statute was enacted subsequent to the Supreme Court decision declaring the former statute unconstitutional? Isn’t it substantive in nature and not procedural?
“Mr. Rozbicki [plaintiffs counsel]: Well, of course, my claim would be that it is procedural.
“The Court: It changes the common law, does it not?
“Mr. Williams [Defendant Roy’s counsel]: It does, Your Honor. And not only do we claim it changes the common law, we raise specifically the claim that it unconstitutionally interferes with the defendant’s right to a trial by jury.”
The examination of the plaintiff by defendant Roy’s counsel included the following:
“Q. Mr. Peck, you brought a lawsuit against Paul Jacquemin; is that correct, sir?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. And very recently that lawsuit was resolved; is that correct, sir?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. And Mr. Jacquemin paid a sum of money in exchange for a release of your lawsuit; is that correct?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. And the sum of money that he paid you in exchange for a release was $100,000.00? Is that correct, sir?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Mr. Williams: Okay. I have no further questions.
“Mr. Rozbicki: I have a couple.”
The court charged the jury in part as follows:
“The defendant, as I indicated, has filed a special defense that the plaintiff received payment from Paul Jacquemin in the amount of one hundred thousand dollars. The plaintiff has admitted receiving the payment and denied that he’s entitled to a setoff.
* * *
“So, in this case, where the plaintiff received from Mr. Jacquemin the sum of one hundred thousand dollars, that sum must be considered in mitigation of any damages which may be awarded to the plaintiff. Therefore, if you find the total amount of damages that should be awarded to the plaintiff to be more than one hundred thousand dollars, you should deduct that sum and award the balance as damages to the plaintiff.
“If, on the other hand, you find that the total amount of damages that should be awarded to the plaintiff is equal to the amount received from Mr. Jacquemin or less than that amount, then you should return a verdict for the defendant.”
The plaintiff excepted as follows:
“Mr. Rozbicki: And then, of course, with regard to Your Honor’s charge on contribution and setoff. Of course, I took exception to that beforehand, and I formally take exception to that presently.”
This motion for additur was as follows:
“MOTION FOR ADDITUR
“The plaintiff, in conjunction with his motion to set aside the verdict, filed herewith, claiming that the verdict rendered in the above-entitled case is inadequate, and pursuant to § 52-228a of the General Statutes, respectfully moves the Court to enter an additur, as supported by the evidence, of such an amount as the court deems reasonable.”
We point out that the first issue does not require us to determine whether Public Acts 1982, No. 82-406, § 3, is substantive or procedural and,
In any event, it is settled that “[a] law is not retroactive merely because part of the factual situation to which it is applied occurred prior to its enactment; rather, a law is retroactive only when it operates upon transactions which have been completed or upon rights which have been acquired or upon obligations which have existed prior to its passage. 2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 2202, p. 117 (3d ed. 1943); 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 412, p. 980.” (Emphasis added.) Frisbie v. Sunshine Mining Co., 93 Idaho 169, 172, 457 P.2d 408 (1969); Cox v. Hart, 260 U.S. 427, 435, 43 S. Ct. 154, 67 L. Ed. 332 (1922); John McShain, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 205 F.2d 882, 883 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 900, 74 S. Ct. 227, 98 L. Ed. 400 (1953); United States Steel Credit Union v. Knight, 32 Ill. 2d 138, 142, 204 N.E .2d 4 (1965); Wood v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 297 N.C. 636, 650, 256 S.E.2d 692 (1979). One court has said that “[a] statute is not retroactive merely because it draws on antecedent facts for a criterion in its operation. ’ ’ United Engineering & Foundry Co. v. Bowers, 171 Ohio St. 279, 282, 169 N.E.2d 697 (1960); see Cox v. Hart, supra.
The withdrawal of action was dated December 27, 1982, and stamped as filed in the clerk’s office on January 5, 1983.
The defendant in this court makes certain claims in his brief, as well as before us, which we will not consider because he did not make them in the trial court. It is true that the plaintiff claims in his brief that General Statutes § 52-216a is procedural and not substantive and that, therefore, it may be applied “retroactively.” It is also true that he also argues in his brief, as he did before us, that this statute (and its predecessor) was one “regulating settlements [and that it] applies to settlements entered into after the effective date of the statute.” This approach commends itself not only as one of basic fairness but also as a route to eschew nettlesome constitutional and statutory questions touching on applicability in the first instance. We chose this approach.
It is interesting to note that in both Seals v. Hickey, 186 Conn. 337, 441 A.2d 604 (1982), and Fritz v. Madow, 179 Conn. 269, 426 A.2d 268 (1979), decisions that involved the precursor of § 52-216a as amended, no question of retroactivity was raised by the parties in those cases, although the circumstances in both indicate the statutory application pattern claimed by the plaintiff in this case. In both Seals and Fritz, the statute was applied to accidents occurring before, but settlements occurring after, the effective date of the statute.
The defendant filed a Practice Book § 3012 (a) statement; that rule affords to an appellee the opportunity to present for review alternate
We will not consider these claims of the defendant. In so concluding it is significant to point out that compliance with § 3012 (a) is not to be considered in a vacuum; particularly to be considered is its linkage with § 3063 which provides in part that this court “shall not be bound to consider a claim unless it was distinctly raised at trial or arose subsequent to trial.” This linkage evinces a fair treatment of the parties and the trial court. While we are not required to do so under our rules, we have decided to address certain other claims made by the defendant in his § 3012 (a) statement although he did not make them in the trial court.
In the present case, the claimed unconstitutional interference with the defendant’s right to trial by jury in violation of article first, § 19, of the Connecticut constitution is the only constitutional claim articulated by him in the trial court.
In Seals v. Hickey, 186 Conn. 337, 441 A.2d 604 (1982), we construed General Statutes § 52-216a as it then existed. It was entitled “Reading of agreements or releases to jury prohibited” and it provided: “An agreement with any tortfeasor not to bring legal action or a release of a tortfeasor in any cause of action, shall not be read to a jury or in any other way introduced in evidence by either party at any time during the trial of such cause of action against any other joint tortfeasors, nor shall any other agreement not to sue or release of claim among any plaintiffs or defendants in such action be read or in any other way introduced to a jury, except the court at the conclusion of the trial may deduct from the verdict any amount of money received by any party to such action pursuant to such agreement not to sue or such release of claim. Nothing in this section shall prohibit the introduction of such agreement or release in a trial to the court.”
That portion of General Statutes § 52-216a provided: “An agreement with any tortfeasor not to bring legal action or a release of a tortfeasor in any cause of action, shall not be read to a jury or in any other way introduced in evidence by either party at any time during the trial of such cause of action against any other joint tortfeasors, nor shall any other agreement not to sue or release of claim among any plaintiffs or defendants in such action be read or in any other way introduced to a jury . . . .’’See Seals v. Hickey, 186 Conn. 337, 355, 441 A.2d 604 (1982).
We note the titles appended to each of the two statutes. The one we struck down in Seals was entitled “Reading of agreements or releases to jury prohibited.” The one now before us is entitled “Reading of agreements or releases to jury prohibited. Adjustments for excessive and inadequate verdicts permitted.” The title and stated purpose of legislation are, while not conclusive, valuable aids to construction. Anderson v. Ludgin, 175 Conn. 545, 554, 400 A.2d 712 (1978); Cedar Island Improvement Assn. v. Clinton Electric Light & Power Co., 142 Conn. 359, 370, 114 A.2d 535 (1955). Where, however, the language of the act “is clear and not subject to interpretation, titles are of less significance.” Algonquin Gas Transmission Co. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 162 Conn. 50, 55, 291 A.2d 204 (1971). Given the new language in the present statute, we consider the title of some assistance in our construction.
We note that the statute in Seals employed the words “shall” and “may” with the latter term being found only in that portion which gave the trial court the unbridled or unfettered discretion. See Jones v. Civil Service Commission, 175 Conn. 504, 509, 400 A.2d 721 (1978). On the other hand, the present statute contains the word “shall” seven times and “may” not at all.
The same applies, of course, to the terms “remittitur” and “additur” in this statute.
Moreover, nothing we say today in any way changes the time-honored rule that an injured party is entitled to full recovery only once for the harm suffered. See Dwy v. Connecticut Co., 89 Conn. 74, 92 A. 883 (1915); Prosser,
Concurrence Opinion
concurring. Although I agree with the rescript, which finds error and orders a new trial limited to damages, I disagree with the majority’s construction of Public Acts 1982, No. 82-406, § 3, to modify the common law rule that prior payments made by one joint tortfeasor are to be credited in reduction of any judgment rendered against another joint tortfeasor. I also take issue with the novel analysis of our nonretroactivity statute, General Statutes § 55-3, that declares its provisions inapplicable because “the plaintiff in such a matter has no right to the payment of damages from the defendant(s) until entitlement to damages has been so adjudged after a trial to a jury or a court.” (Emphasis in original.)
I
The majority opinion, though less than clear on the point, apparently construes § 52-216a as amended by Public Acts 1982, No. 82-406, § 3, to permit a jury verdict to be reduced by amounts received by a plaintiff from other joint tortfeasors only when such additional compensation together with the verdict would result in a recovery of damages that are excessive as a matter of law. Presumably such payments from others would also be considered in determining whether a verdict is inadequate as a matter of law. Between these extremes of excessiveness and inadequacy as a matter of law, the outer limits of permissible jury discretion in awarding damages, compensation already received from other tortfeasors is to be entirely ignored and treated as a bonus in addition to the fair and reasonable award for the damages sustained as determined by the jury without awareness of such prior payments. In order to avoid any infringement upon the constitutional right to jury trial in civil cases, the same change in the substantive law perceived by the majority
Once again this court has given substantive impact to a procedural enactment designed solely to insure that a jury will not be influenced in reaching its verdict against a defendant tortfeasor by learning that a plaintiff has settled his claim against another tortfeasor. In Fritz v. Madow, 179 Conn. 269, 273, 426 A.2d 268 (1979), the court construed the use of the word “may” rather than “shall” in the original version of General Statutes § 52-216a, providing that the court “may deduct from the verdict any amount of money received” (emphasis added) from another tortfeasor, as “placing the adjustment of the jury verdict solely within the sound discretion of the trial court.” Belatedly recognizing that the imposition upon the trial court of a duty to interfere with the discretion of a jury to award damages within the broad territory lying between excessiveness and inadequacy as a matter of law infringed upon the constitutional right of trial by jury in civil cases, the court in Seals v. Hickey, 186 Conn. 337, 441 A.2d 604 (1982), proceeded to declare § 52-216a unconstitutional rather than revise its initial construction of the statute.
In this current encounter with the legislative response to Seals v. Hickey, supra, in the form of the amendment to § 52-216a effectuated by Public Acts 1982, No. 82-406, § 3, the court, in pursuance of the
The amendment of § 52-216a effectuated by Public Acts 1982, No. 82-406, § 3, eliminated the provision, found to be objectionable in Seals, that “the court at the conclusion of the trial may deduct from the verdict any amount of money received by any party” pur
The legislative history of Public Acts 1982, No. 82-406, § 3, contains no suggestion of any intention to modify the common law rule that credits payments from other tortfeasors upon an award of damages. The purpose of the amendment expressed during its consideration by the legislature was simply “to make Connecticut law consistent with the law in other states and on a federal level in the determination of jury verdicts.” 25 H. R. Proc., Pt. 19,1982 Sess., pp. 6177-78 (remarks of Rep. Alfred J. Onorato). The debate related wholly to the wisdom of provisions for remittitur and additur generally, not as specially pertaining to the multiple tortfeasor situation. Id., pp. 6177-89. The legislature viewed the amendment as wholly procedural. If such a significant change in the common law as that effectuated by the opinion were contemplated, it is inconceivable that the legislative record would contain no indication of any intention to change the substantive law.
No question arises as to the constitutionality of § 52-216a under my construction of the statute either
Accordingly, I would remand the case for a new trial limited to damages. In such a trial knowledge of the prior settlement should be kept from the jury. The amount received, however, should be deducted by the court from the jury determination of reasonable damages for the injuries sustained, unless this reduction would render the total compensation of the plaintiff inadequate as a matter of law.
II
I also disagree with the opinion of the majority in disposing of the retroactivity claim raised by the defendant Roy, holding that because liability for damages is not adjudged until after a trial, “[i]t follows, therefore, that a defendant has no ‘obligation’ in accordance with § 55-3 to pay damages until that time.” (Emphasis in original.) We have previously held that “[a] right of action, including one for personal injuries, is a vested property interest, before as well as after judgment .... ” Massa v. Nastri, 125 Conn. 144, 147, 3 A.2d 839 (1939). The corresponding obligation of a defend
Under my construction of § 52-216a as simply a procedural enactment not modifying the substantive rights of the parties as they existed before the passage of Public Acts 1982, No. 52-406, § 3, but merely changing the procedure for implementation of those rights, no problem of retroactivity arises. Neither the common law presumption nor that created by § 55-3 against retrospective construction is applicable to a statute that is merely procedural in character and does not impose new obligations or affect the substantive rights of the parties. Toletti v. Bidizcki, supra, 536; Zalewski v. Waterbury Mfg. Co., 89 Conn. 46, 48, 92 A. 682 (1914). Even under the majority’s view that the public act effectuated a change in the substantive law, the amended statute would not be given retrospective effect by applying it to this case. Although the automobile accident occurred on September 27,1979, about three years before the effective date of the public act, October 1,1982, the event which gave rise to its application, the settlement of the plaintiff’s claim against the other driver, Jacquemin, did not take place until November 27,1982, after the act had become effective. I fail to comprehend, therefore, any occasion for the
Accordingly I concur only in the result.
Although the majority opinion in a footnote disclaims any intention to impose this standard of the maximum permissible jury award in multiple tortfeasor cases, it does not disavow its construction of General Statutes § 52-216a to permit a reduction in a verdict for damages against one tortfeasor by amounts received from other tortfeasors only when the total would be excessive as a matter of law. The opinion also professes to adhere to “the time-honored rule that an injured party is entitled to full recovery only once for the harm suffered.” Any sum received as compensation in addi