John Peck appeals from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County granting the motion for summary judgment of the Delaware County Board of Prison Inspectors (Prison Board or BPI) on the basis that the Prison Board is Peck’s “statutory employer” and, therefore, may not be sued in a negligence action by him. We reverse.
Peck was a corrections officer employed by Wackenhut Corrections Corporation (Wackenhut) when he slipped in a puddle of water and fell while attempting to close a heavy prison door in the vicinity of a “slop” sink on B Block. As a result of the fall, he suffered injuries to his left shoulder requiring two surgeries. Subsequently, he filed a workers’ compensation claim against Wackenhut, as his employer, and has been receiving workers’ compensation benefits for approximately three years.
Peck sought to supplement his compensation award by bringing a tort action against the Prison Board, alleging that it was negligent in the care, custody and control of the prison premises, and that this negligence resulted in his injuries. The Prison Board countered that it was Peck’s statutory employer with attendant tort immunity, and filed a motion for summary judgment, which was granted by the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas on November 9, 1999. This appeal ensued. 1
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Where, as here, a party moves for summary judgment based on a “statutory employer” defense, and relies on a contractual obligation to sustain that status, it has the burden of proving that there was a contract, that its regular business consists of the work that is the subject of the contract, and that it entrusted part of its regular business to the subcontractor employer of the injured employee.
Cranshaw Construction, Inc. v. Ghrist,
An employer who permits the entry upon premises occupied by him or under his control of a laborer or an assistant hired by an employe or contractor, for the performance upon such premises of a part of the employer’s regular business entrusted to such employe or contractor, shall be liable to such laborer or assistant in the same manner and to the same extent as to his own employe.
77 P.S. § 52 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court construed this section of the Act decades ago in
McDonald v. Levinson Steel Co.,
1. An employer who is under contract with an owner or one in the position of an owner;
2. Premises occupied by or under the control of such employer;
3. A subcontract made by such employer;
4. Part of the employer’s regular business entrusted to such subcontractor;
5. An employee of such subcontractor.
Id.,
In McDonald, the defendant, the Levin-son Company, was erecting a steel crane shed for its own use on property that it controlled under a lease. In furtherance of the work, it contracted with three companies — Uhl to do the steel work, Dunn to construct concrete piers, and with yet a third company to do the roofing required for the project. Plaintiffs decedent, an employee of Uhl, was killed at the construction site when a concrete pier broke. Uhl paid decedent’s workers’ compensation benefits. The plaintiff brought an action against Levinson for damages at law, alleging that Levinson was negligent in providing a defectively constructed pier upon which the decedent was to work. A jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, and Levinson appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that Levinson had failed to satisfy the first requirement under Section 203 — that there be a contract between Levinson and the owner of the property. The Court rejected Levin-son’s argument that it operated in a “dual capacity” by holding that an owner cannot contract with itself. In an important and frequently cited passage of dicta, the Court said:
*1193 The state, county, or municipal authorities, for compensation purposes, are regarded much as business corporations. These are constantly letting contracts for the erection of public works, roads, etc. It would be inconceivable to suppose that the state was the principal contractor responsible to the employees of its contractors and subcontractors under the Compensation Act; yet in all these undertakings the various municipalities are doing work in the course of their regular business on their own premises. They, as owners, are not principal contractors or employers under the act.
McDonald,
Under
McDonald,
and after a survey of the sparse, though relevant, case law on the subject, we are convinced that the Prison Board, as a statutorily created government entity, is not a statutory employer in circumstances such as those that exist here. The Prison Board, as the entity charged with the care, custody and control of the correctional facility, is the owner or one standing in the shoes of the owner. In
Brooks v. Buckley & Banks,
The court there said that the City was an employer as to its own employees, but as to its contractor’s employees, it was acting as an
owner
and not an employer or principal contractor.
Id.
at 5,
The current matter is also akin to our decision in
Nonemaker v. County of York,
Common Pleas granted the county’s motion for summai-y judgment concluding that the York County Prison Board “was fully and exclusively responsible for any injuries which [Nonemaker] may have suffered.” Id. at 676. While we reversed on other grounds, we said that the Prison Board “is an independent entity which is responsible for the acts of its agents and which may be sued in its own name.” Id. at 677 (emphasis added).
We also unearthed two federal decisions relative to our determination in this present appeal. In
Pierson v. Members of the Delaware County Pennsylvania Council,
We also find the reasoning in
Allen v. United States,
The government argued, much as the Board argued here, 3 that, even though DOE owned the site, it contracted with SBA which then contracted with Harris, making SBA a statutory employer. The court said:
The argument is ingenious but specious. Whether DOE or SBA contracted with Harris is simply a matter of bureaucratic organization. The end result is that the United States owns the site and the United States contracted for service at the site. The name of the agency or agencies is irrelevant. Because the United States is the owner it cannot be the statutory employer regardless of the number of interagency contracts.
Id. at 16 (emphasis added). That same cogent reasoning must also be applied to the present appeal; the name of the agency is irrelevant because the owner of the county prison is the County of Delaware, and it is simply a matter of bureaucratic organization that the Prison Board operates the prison on behalf of the County. We, therefore, hold that the Prison Board stands in the shoes of the owner of the Delaware County Prison and is not the statutory employer of Peck.
The Prison Board is also not a statutory employer here because Peck’s employer, Wackenhut, is an independent contractor.
Simonton v. Morton,
Where a contract is let for work to be done by another in which the contractee reserves no control over the means of its accomplishment, but merely as to the result, the employment is an independent one establishing the relation of a contractee and contractor and not that of master and servant.
Our Supreme Court also considered the legal principles attendant to independent contractor status in
Smith-Faris Co. v. Jameson Memorial Hospital Ass’n,
[T]his control did not take away the [construction company’s] independence; it merely removed that independence a few degrees further away from absoluteness than it otherwise would have been.... Only when the independence of a contractor is so completely taken away as to make his selection of the means and methods of carrying out his work subject to his employer’s will does he become a mere employee or agent.
Id.
at 260,
In summary, we hold that Common Pleas erred in granting summary judgment for the County, and we reverse the grant of summary judgment in favor of the Prison Board and remand the matter to the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas for further proceedings in this matter.
ORDER
NOW, January 22, 2001, the order of the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas in the above-captioned matter is hereby reversed, and this matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Jurisdiction relinquished,
Notes
. On review of an order granting summary judgment, an appellate court needs to deter
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mine only whether there is a genuine issue of triable fact.
Department of Environmental Protection v. Delta Chemicals, Inc.,
. Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. §§ 1-1041.4; 2501-2626.
. The Prison Board argues that "the Commonwealth created the ‘contract’ between the ‘statutory employer’ (BPI) and the owner of the prison, the County of Delaware.” (Prison Board’s Brief, p. 7.)