643 A.2d 319 | Conn. Super. Ct. | 1994
Our constitution, Alexander Hamilton observed two centuries ago, is "founded upon the total *92
or partial incorporation of a number of distinct sovereignties." A. Hamilton, "The Federalist" No. 82, reprinted in 2 The Debate on the Constitution (1993) p. 493. Such a union, he observed, "cannot fail to originate questions of intricacy and nicety.' Id. One such recurrent question involves the jurisdiction of state courts to hear federal causes of action. The specific question presented here is whether this court has jurisdiction to hear a cause of action under
The taxpayers in the present actions have each filed an appeal from a decision of the commissioner of revenue services (commissioner) pursuant to General Statutes §
The commissioner has filed a motion to dismiss the final count in each case. (None of the earlier counts are challenged at this stage.) His argument has two components. He argues first that an action under 1983 cannot be maintained to challenge the assessment of a state tax in state court. He argues next that, while acting in his official capacity he is not subject to a suit in state court for money damages under § 1983. These arguments will be considered in turn.
Before turning to the merits, however, it is important to note that the motions to dismiss rely entirely upon the allegations set forth in the taxpayers' appeals and do not seek to introduce any additional facts outside of the record. See Practice Book § 143. The commissioner expressly declined to submit evidence in support of his claims. Under these circumstances, the truth of the taxpayers' factual allegations must be assumed. "A motion to dismiss properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a course of action that should be heard by the court." (Emphasis in original.) Baskin's Appeal from Probate,
Section 1983 provides in relevant part: "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United *94
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. . . ." "A broad construction of § 1983 is compelled by the statutory language, which speaks of deprivations of `any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.' (Emphasis added.)" Dennis v.Higgins,
While there is no doubt in view of the precedent just cited that state courts have jurisdiction over § 1983 claims generally, whether state courts can or must assume jurisdiction over challenges to the assessment of the state taxes under § 1983 "is not entirely clear."Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, supra,
First,
The commissioner does not argue that 1341 in and of itself deprives this court of jurisdiction to hear the taxpayers' § 1983 claims. His argument rather is one of inference and balance. Because the federal courts cannot hear § 1983 actions of this character, it would be, in his estimation, anomalous for the state courts to hear such actions and thus, at least in this regard, to have a jurisdiction superior to that of the federal courts.
This argument misapprehends the basic structure of our judicial system. "[F]ederal courts . . . are courts of limited jurisdiction marked out by Congress."Aldinger v. Howard,
In a judicial system characterized by this architecture, it is not at all anomalous for state courts to have jurisdiction over matters that federal courts cannot lawfully adjudicate. Domestic relations matters are an obvious example. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards,
Second, §
This most emphatically does not mean, however, that the existence of §
"The Attorney's Fees Awards Act was enacted in reaction to Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. WildernessSociety,
The congressional purpose in enacting § 1988 is important because citizens who are unconstitutionally taxed by the state are subjected to a violation of their constitutional rights. As long as these taxpayers assert their rights in state court, there is no policy reason not to encourage their civil rights litigation (if that litigation is meritorious) to the same degree that other civil rights litigation is encouraged. Economically, such an application of the civil rights laws should provide an additional incentive for the state to comply with the commands of the constitution. Moreover, in the absence of a provision for attorney's fees, the state could more easily extract small sums unconstitutionally from its taxpayers. A taxpayer subjected to an unconstitutional tax of a few dollars would be better off paying it than incurring the necessary legal fees to challenge it. See W. Taylor, note, "Section 1983 in State Court: A Remedy for Unconstitutional State Taxation," 95 Yale L.J. 414, 415-16 (1985). Section 1988 provides a litigation incentive for taxpayers faced with unconstitutional tax assessments regardless of the economic resources of those parties. See Gore v. Turner,
The fact that the § 1983 action here is obviously brought with the recovery of attorney's fees in mind *99
does not make it illegitimate. The Supreme Court has construed § 1988 to preclude the bringing of a separate action seeking "not to enforce any of the civil rights laws listed in § 1988, but solely to recover attorney's fees." North Carolina Dept. of Transportationv. Crest Street Community Council, Inc.,
The taxpayers' use of § 1983 in these actions finds a closer analogy in the frequent addition of claims based on the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA); General Statutes §
Third, the decision of our Supreme Court in Zizka in no way precludes this court's jurisdiction to hear the § 1983 claims of the taxpayers here. This conclusion follows from a structural analysis of the respective cases.
Zizka involved a one count complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief and monetary damages filed in the Superior Court. The sole cause of action was based on § 1983. The trial court dismissed the action and, on appeal, the Supreme Court found no error. The Supreme Court acknowledged that "[s]tate courts have concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts over § 1983 claims," Zizka v. Water Pollution Control Authority,
supra,
The authorities cited by Zizka are of considerable interest. Backus v. Chilivis, supra,
Similarly, Carpenter v. Planning Zoning Commission,
supra,
Subsequent Connecticut Supreme Court cases that have relied on Zizka have also involved plaintiffs who have bypassed their statutory remedies. In Hartfordv. Faith Center, Inc.,
All of these cases have involved taxpayers who have deliberately bypassed their statutory appellate remedies. The taxpayers here have done nothing of the sort. Rather, they have done precisely what the Owner-Operators
decision implies they should have done — they have pursued their § 1983 actions in the same action as their tax appeals. Id. These cases, unlike Backus v.Chivilis, supra,
Finally, although I have concluded that jurisdiction over the § 1983 claims presented here is not precluded by the Tax Injunction Act of 1937, §
The commissioner has phrased this issue as inquiring whether this court is required to entertain a § 1983 action over which it has concurrent jurisdiction. I do not agree that this is the question. The first question that must be asked is whether this court should voluntarily entertain such an action. Aside from the arguments discussed previously, the commissioner has presented no reason why such jurisdiction should not be voluntarily assumed. "Most state courts have freely accepted jurisdiction over section 1983 and have entertained claims brought under that section." W. Taylor, supra, 95 Yale L.J. 420. The arguments for mandatory jurisdiction are very strong, as the note just cited goes on to demonstrate, but those arguments need not be weighed by a court that views it as appropriate to assume voluntarily the jurisdiction conferred upon it by the federal government.
In taking this course, the court is faithful both to Connecticut jurisprudence and to the genius of our federal *104
system. It is, first, "a general principle of our law that the plaintiff has the right to enforce in our courts, any legal right of action which he may have, whether it arises under our own law or that of another jurisdiction."Reilly v. Antonio Pepe Co.,
This view is most compelling when the individual rights sought to be enforced arise under the constitution or laws of the federal government. The genius of our federal system, Alexander Hamilton observed in The Federalist, is that the state governments and the national government are not foreign jurisdictions but "kindred systems and . . . parts of ONE WHOLE." (Emphasis in original.) A. Hamilton, "The Federalist," No. 82, reprinted in 2 The Debate on the Constitution (1993) p. 495. The United States Supreme Court recognized long ago that "[t]he laws of the United States are laws in the several States, and just as much binding on the citizens and courts thereof as the State laws are. The United States is not a foreign sovereignty as regards the several States, but is a concurrent, and, within its jurisdiction, paramount sovereignty. . . . Legal or equitable rights, acquired under either system of laws, may be enforced in any court of either sovereignty competent to hear and determine such kind of rights and not restrained by its constitution in the exercise of such jurisdiction." Claflin v. Houseman,
Congress, by granting § 1983 jurisdiction to the state courts, "has made them instruments for interpreting the public policy of the nation in the matter at hand . . . ." Lapinski v. Copacino, supra,
The commissioner's second contention focuses on the question of whether he is an appropriate defendant in this § 1983 action. Section 1983, on its face, imposes liability only on "person[s]" who deprive citizens of their constitutional rights. In Will v. Michigan Dept.of State Police,
This is not an action for monetary damages. As noted earlier, the taxpayers seek a declaratory ruling that they are not obliged to pay the taxes in question. Will *106 does not address the status of actions for declaratory relief. The distinction drawn in Will, however, is one between actions for prospective relief and actions for retroactive monetary relief. Because declaratory judgments can grant prospective relief, it follows that an action for this form of prospective relief should not be treated as an action against the state.
The eleventh amendment is not directly involved in this case since that amendment does not apply in state courts. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, supra,
Both lines of cases — i.e., the construction of § 1983 in Will and in Kentucky v. Graham, supra,
The court in Young was keenly "interested in the practical workings of the courts of justice throughout the land, both Federal and state . . . ." Id., 142. The *107 practical effect of its ruling is to hold that state officials may be prospectively restrained from doing acts that they have "no legal right to do." Id., 159. This doctrine is "indispensable to the establishment of constitutional government and the rule of law." 17 C. Wright, A. Miller E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure (2d. Ed. 1988), § 4231, p. 568. To construe this broad and vital proposition so as to allow injunctive actions but prohibit declaratory actions seeking prospective relief would be to draw a wholly artificial distinction with no basis in either principle or practice. I conclude that a declaratory action for prospective relief should not be treated as an action against the state for purposes of § 1983.
The commissioner argues that, even though the § 1983 action against him is outwardly an action for declaratory relief, its "essence" is a suit for monetary damages. In making this argument he relies on Edelmanv. Jordan,
The commissioner argues finally that an allowance of attorney's fees under § 1988 would so closely resemble monetary damages that such an award should not be permitted. Technically, this argument is also premature, since there is presently no "prevailing party" to whom attorney's fees may be awarded. It is appropriate to note, however, that this argument could not be viable under any circumstances. Attorney's fees are not "compensation." They are a congressionally authorized device for securing effective representation in meritorious civil rights litigation. Any contrary interpretation would eviscerate the Attorney's Fees Awards Act.
For the foregoing reasons, the motions to dismiss are denied.