This is аn appeal from the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, In Equity, where appellee, O. E. Murchison, filed a bill of complaint described as being a bill of inter-plеader or bill in the nature of a bill of interpleader. Named as respondents are Jack Cox, d/b/a Cox Electric Company, to be referred to hеreafter as Cox Electric Company; H. O. Peavy and Peavy Lumber Company, hereafter referred to as Peavy Lumber Company; F. B. Wilson and Wilson Brothers Tilе Company, to be referred to as Wilson Brothers Tile Company; L. C. Shepherd and M. C. Shepherd, d/b/a Shepherd Brothers Plastering Company, to be referred to as Shepherd Brothers Plastering Company; and R. N. Dalrymple.
It is alleged in the bill of complaint that complainant appellee here, entered into a. construction contract with Dalrymple and that complainant is obligated to said respondent in the sum of $988; that complainant is willing to pay thе indebtedness. to the party or parties entitled thereto but a controversy has arisen as to who is entitled to receive the fund, for each of thе-respondents has notified complainant claiming such fund. Complainant deposited the sum of $988 into the registry of the court.
After the bill of complaint was filed,. Cox Electric Company filed a pleading labeled “Answer and Claim” that contained' a general prayer of relief, wherein said respondent disclaimed any specific interest in the amount interpleaded, but that respondent showed he had obtained a judgment against R. N. Dalrymple which judgment had beеn duly recorded and the satisfaction of said judgment was not dependent upon respondent establishing a claim to the interpleaded ¿mount.
The amount of $788.94 was the claim propounded to the fund by respondent Peavy Lumber Company. With its claim said respondent averred that on April 23, 1959 notice was given complainant that a materialmen’s lien was claimed and such notice was filed on April 24, 1959. The claim of $260 was propounded and filed by respondent Wilson Brothers Tile Company, and this claim showed unto the court that notification of a materialmen’s lien by respondent against complainant was servеd on May 23, 1959 and filed in the office of the Judge of Probate of Montgomery County within four months after furnishing said materials. Respondent Shepherd Brothers Plastering Company filed their answer in which the sum of $90 was claimed to be due to them from complainant or Dalrymple.
*253 The cause was submitted for final decree upоn the pleadings and complainant’s exhibit, a certificate of the judgment obtained by respondent Cox Electric Company against respondent Dalrymple for the sum of $345.29 and $19 costs. From the final decree, it appears that the court found that the recorded judgment of April 20, 1953 in favor of Cox Electric Company was a judgment lien in existence prior to the commencement of the work for which materials and labor were furnished by the other respоndents and said lien attached to the money subsequently acquired by respondent Dalrymple; that respondent Cox Electric Company had a claim in and to the amount interpleaded prior to the claims of respondents. Therefore, the court decreed that the following disbursements be made оut of the sum of $988: (1) To Cox Electric Company, $504.94; (2) To complainant, $125 as reasonable attorney’s fees; (3) The sum of $66.28 as court costs; (4) The balance оf said sum of $988 in the following percentages, said percentages representing their pro rata share of the balance of said fund as lien-holders who stand on equal footing with one another: To Peavy Lumber Company, 69% ($208.-25); to Wilson Brothers Tile Company, 23% ($69.41); and to Shepherd Brothers Plastering Company, 8% ($24.14). Comрlainant was discharged and fully released from any liability to any of the respondents, and an injunction issued preventing any suit or claim in law or equity for any obligаtion to Dalrymple.
We are of the opinion that a proper case of interpleader was made out, and there was no error in the trial court’s allowing attorney’s fees to appellee as claimed in the bill of complaint. Johnson v. Malone,
Admittedly, the certificate of judgment wаs issued and registered in compliance with §§ 584 and 585 of Title 7, Code of 1940, which had the effect' of an execution in the hands of the sheriff as an instrumentality of preserving a lien in favor of the judgment creditor on all property of the judgment debtor subject to levy and sale under execution in the county wherein such judgment is registered. This lien attaches when the certificate is filed. Peterson et al. v. Drennen Motor Car Co.,
The second paragraph of § 519, Title 7, Code of 1940, subjects to levy and sale under execution “personal property of the defendant (except 'things in action), whether he has absolute title thereto, or the right only to the possession thereof, etc.” (Emphasis supplied.)
We said in White v. Gibson,
“This court has several times held that this lien only applies to and covers propеrty which is subject to levy and sale under an execution.”
See also Robinson v. Eppes,
In common parlance of the law, a thing in action is designated a chose in action and means literally a thing in action. A thing in action is properly distinguished from a thing of which the owner has the actual or constructive possession, but for which an action may be brought to reduce it to possession. It is commonly termed a chose in action, and is a personal right to demand money or propеrty by an action.
In 42 Am.Jur., Property, § 26, the following is stated:
“A chose in action has been defined as a personal right not reduced into possession, but recoverable by a suit at law. It has bеen defined also as a thing of which one has not the possession or actual enjoyment, but only a right to or a right to demand by an action at law. It has bеen said that a chose in action more properly includes *254 the idea both of the thing itself and of the right of action annexed to it. There can in thе nature of things be no present possession of a thing which lies merely in action.”
See also Am.Jur., supra, § 27.
Therefore, the question arises, was the unpaid balance which is undisputеdly owing to the general contractor, R. N. Dalrymple, subject to levy and sale under execution, or was it exempt as a result of being a “thing in action”? We think that the unpaid balance due the general contractor pursuant to the construction contract between the owner and the generаl contractor, was a thing in action and not subject to levy and sale under execution. The sum due under the unpaid balance to the general cоntractor did not become money in the hands of the judgment debtor and become property subject to levy and sale under execution. Therefore, we are at variance with the decision of the learned trial court in subjecting the impleaded funds to the satisfaction of the judgment lien of Cox Elеctric Company to the prejudice of the materialmen whose liens are upon the building and land and the unpaid balance due the original cоntractor.
The following cases affirm the correctness of this conclusion: Crane Co. v. Sheraton Apartments, Inc. et al.,
It rеsults, therefore, that the judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded with directions that the lower court adjudicate the rights of the respective parties in accordance with this holding. So ordered.
Reversed and remanded with directions.