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Peavler v. BOARD OF COM'RS OF MONROE COUNTY
492 N.E.2d 1086
Ind. Ct. App.
1986
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*1 testimony Hen note the of Chief We also testimony is allowable Non-expert

derson. competence and the mental

on the issue of experts pre does

opinion of medical considering from and trier of fact

clude the evidence, reaching a

weighing such the conclusion of the opposite to

conclusion Guardianship Carrico v. expert. In re

Bennett evidence, reason 625. From all (though reason people may conclude able people disagree) that Dowler

able emotionally sufficiently unsta had become policeman as a to be unreliable

ble as

stress situations. reasons, is re- this cause

For the above the trial court is ordered to

versed and review. petition judicial

deny Dowler's

Judgment reversed.

ROBERTSON, P.J., RATLIFF, J.,

concur. PEAVLER,

Richey Wayne Appellant,

BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF COUNTY, Appellee.

MONROE

No. 1-185A15. Appeals

Court of

First District.

May 1986.

Rehearing July Denied *2 in the failure to or maintain a curve

warning sign, and/or speed reduced limit or advisory speed limit on portion a a county road. We reverse and remand.
FACTS On July 1982, Richey Wayne Peavier (Peavier) and various friends attended a party at the residence of Brad (Brad) Owen in Bloomington, Indiana. Most people in attendance drank several beers. In the early morning hours of July 1982, some of the revelers traveled to Griffey Reser- voir to swim. Peavier rode in Brent (Brent) Owen's car, intending to return with two other friends, Jeff and Dave. Pe- avier testified he did not feel intoxicated nor did anyone have any apparent trouble driving to the reservoir.

There were other groups of young people swimming at the reservoir that morning. Sometime before their departure, an alter- cation arose between Brent and young a man named Donald LeGroux (LeGrouz). Brent apparently received several blows to the head during the scuffle. However, evi- dence at trial conflicted as to whether Pe- avier was aware fight or the injuries Brent Upon sustained. returning to the parking area, Peavler discovered that Jeff and Dave already departed had and so Pe- avier climbed into the front passenger seat of Brent's car. put Brent his gear car in and backed into LeGroux's vehicle. Brent then quickly headed north on Road, Hinkle with pursuit. LeGroux in Hinkle Road is a Fisher, James R. Clemens, Robert B. Ice, winding, hilly, curving road lacking a clear Miller, Donadio Ryan, & Indianapolis, for zone. Peavler and Brad both asked Brent appellant. to slow down as he drove. Brent testified that he went through a series of curves Cook, Michael C. Dale W. Eikenberry, Wooden, McLaughlin Sterner, & Indianapo- and was aware of sharp a curve still ahead lis, Lantz, Thomas J. Montgomery, Elsner because he had traveled Hinkle Road on six Pardieck, & Seymour, appellee. eight prior occasions over the preceding years. two As the car went into the curve

RATLIFF, Judge. question, in Brent remembered hitting his brakes and not removing his foot from the STATEMENT OF THE CASE pedal. brake The car left the road and Richey Wayne appeals nega- a erashed in the surrounding trees and foli- judgment tive entered on jury verdict in age. At the time of the accident Brent had his against suit the Board of Commission- a blood alcohol level of .186% Peavler's ers of Monroe County alleging negligence blood alcohol level was .105%. Peavler suf- and, rehearing result neck a broken fered note, accident, quadriplegic. denied. We must is now an erroneous suit Peavier filed April On influenced the result presumed to have Board of against the Circuit Court Monroe appears that verdict trial unless it (the of Monroe Commissioners proper in been different not have County failed to alleging that County) *3 (1982), v. Moore Zimmerman structions. signs, re- warning curve or maintain 690, dif N.E.2d 693. Stated Ind.App., 441 advisory signs and/or limit speed duced that an instruction ferently, it is assumed particular portion signs on the limit speed has influenced the that misstates the law cause was venued The Hinkle Road. of or record at unless the evidence result trial trial, there was con- County. At Jackson verdict, the under demonstrates that Brent had testimony to whether flicting as instruction, dif could not been proper have occasions, a curve seen, previous ever on Zimmerman, at 693. Further ferent. question or curve in sign near the warning cured more, giving is not a bad instruction Evidence Hinkle Road. anywhere else on The giving instruction. Id. by a correct sign warning a curve was indicated there is giving an erroneous of sign posted on per hour thirty mile only jury's where the grounds for reversal Hinkle Road but side of the southbound based the could have been verdict question. section northbound on the if will look to see and this court conflicting testimony re- There was also Id. appellant has demonstrated harm. the placing policy in County's garding the jury mis determining whether the was In post common to it was signs and whether the and record led we examine evidence of a road but one side speed on limit the proper instructions if under determine was also testimo- There not the other side. Spratt have been different. verdict could unreasonably dan- ny that the curve was 1059, (1984),Ind.App., 468 N.E.2d Alsup v. unmarked, com- an it was gerous because denied; Zimmerman, 1063, at 693. trans. banking in the improper pound curve with 22, On October lane of travel. northbound state is well settled that the It the verdict for 1984, returned a jury general duty to exercise reasonable has a Thereafter, perfected this County. construction, mainte design, care in the appeal. nance, highways for the repair of its Magnuson v. safety public. State ISSUE 743, 747, (1986), Ind.App., 488 N.E.2d re- fifteen issues for presents Appellant (1981), v. Willian pending; State trans. However, of one of our resolution view. 668, 670; v. State Ind.App., 423 N.E.2d appeal: this dispositive of these issues 227, 235, (1979), Ind.App. 179 Thompson denied; 198, 205, Elliott N.E.2d trans. giv- 385 erred in trial court Whether 213, 2, 210, 342 (1976), Ind.App. mod- No. 168 County's Instruction v. ing the State 677, denied; duty 674, Board jury any that ified, N.E.2d trans. which directed of County Briggs Delaware Comm'rs of post a curve part on the of 130, 96, N.E.2d (1975), Ind.App. on 337 sign for traffic 167 warning northbound acci- where the (1976), Ind.App. at the curve 852, 873, Hinkle Road 167 rehearing on discretionary. 96, 373, Coun wholly denied. was 340 N.E.2d dent occurred duty the same municipalities have ties and AND DECISION DISCUSSION control. their care over roads within of 96, 337 N.E.2d (1975), Ind.App. rule, Briggs 167 instructions general As a county is held to or 852. The state Grad v. as a whole. construed must be 614, would be exercised 611, of care which 395 standard (1979), Ind.App. 182 Cross under the ordinary prudent person 873; an 870, Comm'rs Board 747, El at (1975), Magnuson, 167 cireumstances. Briggs County v. Delaware N.E.2d at liott, Ind.App. at 342 852, 866, 168 on course, 677. Of before liability can be im County (1981), Ind.App., 416 N.E. posed, the state must have actual or con 1300; Briggs, at 337 N.E.2d at 874. structive knowledge of dangerous con In Tell City the majority decided that the dition. Willian, 670; at Briggs, at city's decision whether to erect a stop sign N.E.2d at 873. or yield sign was a discretionary act im mune Where potentially Indiana's dangerous Tort Claims conditions Act.2 exist on As noted in roadways, signs concurrence, are some times employed installation assist warning signs motorists safely at dangerous traveling those roadways. may locations placement be a ministerial act. Tell signs various depends particular City, 965; at State v. Magnuson (1986), duty owed state, Ind. App., county or munici State v. Willian pal entity to its citizens. Inherent in deter Ind.App., 423 N.E.2d 668. To reit mining duty this question erate, in Magnuson whether we held that while the *4 the act is discretionary or ministerial. decision to widen a highway was discretion long-standing distinction between ary discre the installation of signs or devices to tionary or ministerial functions is found in warn of a culvert protruding into the lane Adams v. (1919), Schneider 71 Ind.App. of travel was ministerial. In Willian, we 249, 124 N.E. 718: found that the absence of "slippery when "A duty is discretionary when it involves signs wet" in an area that had been re on part the of the officer to determine paired was proper evidence supporting a whether or not he perform should a cer- finding of negligence in the design, con act, and, tain so, if in struction, or maintenance of the highway. particular what way, and in the absence of corrupt mo- Willian, at 6783. Therefore, it has been tives in the exercise of such discretion he held that portion where a of a roadway is is not liable. duties, His however, in the shown to be inherently dangerous, duty the performance act, of the after he has once post proper warning signs becomes min determined that it shall done, be are min- isterial in nature. Moreover, the mere isterial, and for negligence in per- such placement of a warning sign pre does not formance, which results in injury, he clude a finding of negligence. previous As may be liable in damages." ly noted, the state still general has a duty Adams, 255-56, at 124 N.E. at 720. Sever- to exercise reasonable care in designing, opinions al of this provide court guidance in constructing, and maintaining its high determining placement whether of a traffic ways. State v. Magnuson (1986), Ind. sign is a discretionary or ministerial duty. App., 448 743; N.E2d State v. Willian (1981), Ind.App., 423 This court has already State v. determined Thompson (1979), that the decision 179 Ind.App. 227, whether or not to certain signs control particular at denied; Elliott v. State (1976), locations is 168 Ind.App. discretionary. City Tell of City v. (1986), Noble trans. denied. Ind.App., To further distinguish, 489 N.E.2d Tell 958, 964, City reh. pending.1 However, placement involved the once stop of a sign traffic control or regulatory which is a legislative placed is action, the enforce at a location the essential legal ment of which penal character of in As a nature. the county's liability legislative becomes ministerial action duty that is clearly discre thereby creating duty part on tionary. the Here, of the we are concerned county to reasonably maintain signs those not with placement the of traffic control it has determined posted. should be signs Har involving penalties, but with pos the vey v. Board Comm'rs Wabash sible duty post of advisory of or warning City Tell 1. v. Noble thorough For a Ind.App.,489N.E.2d discussion of discretionary and ministerial acts and immunity granted (reh. the pending). governments to local determining in whether or 2. Indiana 34-4-16.5-3(6, Code 7) (Burns section not to devices, erect traffic control City see of Supp.1985). In- case, tendered Peavler's present dan- In the allegedly informing motorists signs No. 2 stated: struction Moreover, County gerous conditions. duty post may be there Board of Commis- duty that of the concedes "It is the inherently dangerous to exercise Monroe

warning signs where sioners Appellee, Brief for exist. conditions construction, road re- in the care reasonable 11. its at roads within maintenance pair and in a condi- keep them as to so jurisdiction trial Hence, that find we for use reasonably safe that tion any instructing jury in erred court This -duty-is-not-a-discretion- motorists. place a County to part of duty on the near the area Road sign on Hinkle warning which missioners-is-statutorily-immune-from discretionary. As noted was question of Commissioners Hability. The Board circumstances above, certain of this if the breach may held liable be may minis warning signs be placement Plaintiff's cause of proximate duty is a in trial court's Consequently, terial. jury. injuries." province invaded struction as to whether suggestion no make Record, We at County here was discretion decision modified given as was This for the That is an issue ary ministerial. or might While the court. the trial However, find that we decide. jury to manner, it a better drafted have been based could have been jury's verdict and was of law statement a correct was Moreover, instruction. erroneous tendered, error sufficient, preserve *5 rendered may have instruction correct Therefore, County's assertions appeal. Therefore, Peavlier has verdict. different any error preserve failed that Peavler warrant, necessary harm demonstrated the erroneous regard to with ing reversal. merit. is without by the court given argues that County further The for a remand and reverse We therefore any error with preserve failed Peavler . opinion. with this in accordance new trial issue because instruction at regard the in object to properly did not P.J., ROBERTSON, concurs. instruc proper or tender a at trial struction County correct theAs the matter. tion on opinion. separate NEAL, J., dissents with instructions out, objections ly points dissenting. NEAL, Judge, v. Sumner specific. Dettman must be Indi N.E.2d (1985),Ind.App., City 474 In Tell dissent. respectfully I 51(C). Procedure, Trial Rule (1986), Ind.App., ana Rules 489 Noble City v. Instruc objection to find that Peavler's We from city is immune held that 958 we the error sufficiently preserved tion No. 34-4- IND.CODE tort under Hability for review. for for (7) Act 16.5-3(6) Tort Claims and sign at an intersec- to erect STOP failure par on a an instruction to tender Failure discretionary act is such an tion because object to right to point waives ticular opinion was based legislative. Our and v. Anderson being covered. not point contained statutory scheme Ind.App. (1972), 154 Taylor regulating 9-4, act the uniform court Conversely, a trial IND.CODE 781, 785. act, traffic In that highways. refuses to it error when reversible commits signs of all correct consist that is a devices control give a tendered by au- or erected marking placed devices law, to the applicable statement officials body, or other public thority of a adequately case, and is facts of reg- purpose having jurisdiction, are which other instructions by the covered traffic. guiding ulating, warning & Electric Gas Indiana given. Southern de- control erect traffic authority to 96, Such (1977), 177 v. Steinmetz Co. body public be exercised vices denied. or the only commissioners by ordinance

after traffic surveys and studies are con- cluded. Because grant power to the legislative

local body preceded by the "may",

word the exercise thereof was dis-

eretionary.

The majority attempts to distinguish be-

tween regulatory signs, i.e., stop signs, and

warning signs. power to erect any kind of a traffic control device, including warning signs, upon public highway must

be exercised legislative local body by ordinance, which is a discretionary act.

No such distinction exists.

I would affirm the trial court's judgment. TAYLOR,

Edward Appellant

(Petitioner, Below),

STATE of Appellee

(Respondent Below).

No. 4-1185A323.

Court of Appeals

Fourth District.

May20,1986.

Susan K. Carpenter, Public Defender, Yaser, Vickie Deputy Defender, Public Indianapolis, appellant. Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Jay
Rodia, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
MILLER, Judge. Edward Taylor appeals the denial of his post-conviction relief petition, alleging the

Case Details

Case Name: Peavler v. BOARD OF COM'RS OF MONROE COUNTY
Court Name: Indiana Court of Appeals
Date Published: May 19, 1986
Citation: 492 N.E.2d 1086
Docket Number: 1-185A15
Court Abbreviation: Ind. Ct. App.
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