Pearson v. StatePearson v. State
The appellant, Curtis Pearson, pled guilty to unlawful distribution of a controlled substance (cocaine), a violation of
I.
The appellant argues that the trial court improperly enhanced his sentence on the unlawful distribution conviction pursuant to
II.
Citing Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 119 S.Ct. 1215, 143 L.Ed.2d 311 (1999), the appellant also argues that, because the indictment did not allege that the sale occurred within three miles of a school and within three miles of a public housing project, this court should set aside the schoolyard and public housing project enhancement portions of his unlawful distribution sentence. However, he raises this argument for the first time on appeal. Therefore, it is not properly before this court. See United States v. Nealy, 232 F.3d 825, 830-31 (11th Cir.2000). Furthermore, because the application of the enhancements did not increase the appellant‘s sentence beyond the statutory maximum for unlawful distribution of a controlled substance, any error was harmless, and the Supreme Court‘s decisions in Jones and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), do not require that the enhancement portions of the sentence be set aside. See United States v. Shepard, 235 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir.2000); United States v. Gerrow, 232 F.3d 831 (11th Cir.2000).
III.
Finally, the appellant argues that the trial court should have allowed him to withdraw his guilty pleas because he allegedly did not understand the possible range of punishment and the actual sentence imposed for each offense. However, the record of the guilty plea proceedings shows that the trial court thoroughly explained the possible range of punishment for each offense, including the difference between consecutive and concurrent sentences, the enhancements that might apply, and the fines that might be imposed. In addition, the appellant signed “Explanation of Rights and Plea of Guilty” forms that clearly indicated the possible range of punishment for each offense. Finally, the trial court fully explained the sentences, including enhancements and fines, it imposed in each case. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the appellant‘s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. See Palmer v. State, 745.So.2d 920 (Ala.Crim.App.1999).
For the above-stated reasons, we affirm the trial court‘s judgment.
AFFIRMED.
McMILLAN, P.J., and WISE, J., concur; SHAW, J., concurs in the result, with opinion, which COBB, J., joins.
SHAW, Judge, concurring in the result.
I disagree with the Court‘s harmlesserror analysis in Part II of its opinion. Therefore, I concur in the result only.
COBB, J., concurs.