51 S.C. 480 | S.C. | 1898
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
The plaintiff herein brought this action to recover damages, alleged to have been sustained by the breaking in of a bridge, while their traction engine was crossing it. The complaint will be set out in the report of the case. The defendant denied all the allegations of the complaint except those contained in paragraphs 1 and 2 thereof. The case was tried before his Honor, Judge Watts, and a jury, ac the March, 1897, term of the Court for Spartanburg County. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs for $312.
When objection was made to the testimony tending to' prove the elements of damage mentioned in this exception, his Honor ruled that the plaintiffs had the right to prove
There is, however, another reason why the testimony should not have been admitted. The statute limits the amount of the recovery to the actual damages sustained through the injurious act. The distinction between damages, in the general acceptation of the term, and consequential or special damages, is so marked that the latter cannot be recovered unless the facts relied upon to sustain them are specifically alleged. Loeb v. Mann, 39 S. C., 465; Alston v. Huggins, 2 Tread., 688. As a general rule, in torts for injury to property, exemplary or punitive damages are not allowed. The plaintiff can only recover such damages for the injury sustained as are the immediate, direct and proximate result of the wrongful act. Mr. Sedg-wick, in his work on Damages, star page 82, says: “But, as a general rule, it may be said, that in cases of tort, without aggravation, where the conduct of the defendant cannot be considered so morally wrong, or grossly negligent, as to give a right to exemplary or vindictive damages, the extent of remuneration is restricted, according to the principles which we have been considering, to the immediate
The fourth exception complains of error as follows: IV. “In allowing one of the plaintiffs, J. M. Pearson, to testify that J. D. Leonard, then the county supervisor, had told him to go ahead, get the engine out of the river, fix it up, and make out their account and present it to the board of county commissioners, and in allowing said witness to further testify that J. D. Leonard had told him not to make out his account too heavy, because some of them (meaning some of the board of county commissioners) would kick on it, and that that was why he made it out as he did.” This exception becomes immaterial under the view that the plaintiffs are limited in their recovery to such damages as resulted immediately, directly, and proximately from the alleged wrongful act of the defendant.
The fifth exception complains of error as follows: V. “In allowing one of the plaintiffs, J: M. Pearson, to testify that J. D. Leonard, the then county supervisor, knowing that he was going to move his engine over some of them, had told him ‘that the covered bridges were all right,’ and that the bridge through which the engine fell was a covered bridge.” This exception is disposed of by what was said in considering the third exception.
The sixth exception complains of error as follows: VI. “In allowing the witness, James Darwin, to testify why the
The eighth exception is as follows: VIII. “In allowing the plaintiffs to introduce testimony to prove, as an element of damages for which they might recover in this action, that they had made a board bill of some thirty-odd dollars with Capt. Means, and that they still owed that bill.” This exception is disposed of by what was said in considering the first exception.
The tenth exception is as follows: “In allowing the witness, W. Butler Thornton, to testify, in reply, what in his opinion would be the proper sizes of the timbers to be used in building a bridge; what sizes he commonly used; that he did not cut under them, and why.” The ground of objection to this testimony is not stated in the exception, and it will not be considered.
The eleventh exception is as follows: XI. “In allowing one of the plaintiffs, J. M. Pearson, to testify, in reply, that he had not heard anything that'would go to show that the
It is the judgment of this Court that the judgment of the Circuit Court be reversed, and the case remanded for a new trial