481 F. App'x 252
6th Cir.
2012

Pearlie M. GREEN; Gregory A. Burks, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. MUTUAL OF OMAHA INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 11-5128.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Sept. 28, 2012.

492 F. App‘x 252

Before: BOGGS and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges; and BARZILAY, Judge.*

prisonment followed by lifetime supervised release.

In this timely appeal, Smith contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment because he did not have notice of the requirement to register as a sex offender under SORNA, in violation of the Due Process Clause. “In reviewing a motion to dismiss an indictment, we review the district court‘s legal conclusions de novo and its findings of facts for clear error or an abuse of discretion.” United States v. Trent, 654 F.3d 574, 578 (6th Cir.2011), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 132 S.Ct. 1542, 182 L.Ed.2d 219 (2012).

Smith argues that he did not have notice of SORNA‘s registration requirement because he was never required to register as a sex offender under Indiana law, even though he did so anyway. See Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 384 (Ind.2009) (holding that application of the Indiana Sex Offender Registration Act to a defendant who committed his offense before its enactment violated the state constitution‘s prohibition on ex post facto laws). However, the lack of a state registration requirement “does not affect the independent obligation of a sex offender to register under [SORNA].” Trent, 654 F.3d at 591. Moreover, Smith‘s admissions regarding that independent obligation defeat his lack of notice argument. In his plea agreement, Smith admitted that, as a result of his child-molesting convictions, he “is required to register under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act for his lifetime,” that “he knew of his obligation to register in Kentucky,” and that he “knowingly failed to register in Kentucky despite an adequate opportunity to do so.” Smith acknowledged those admissions regarding SORNA‘s registration requirement during the plea colloquy. “He cannot now take the position—contrary to his plea—that he didn‘t know about that requirement.” United States v. Stock, 685 F.3d 621, 626 (6th Cir.2012).

Accordingly, we affirm the district court‘s order denying Smith‘s motion to dismiss the indictment.

PER CURIAM.

In this diversity insurance-contract dispute arising under Tennessee law, plaintiffs Pearlie M. Green and Gregory A. Burks appeal the district court‘s order granting defendant Mutual of Omaha Insurance Company‘s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Plaintiff Green applied for and obtained an Accidental Death Insurance Policy from Mutual. The policy covered the applicant, the applicant‘s “Spouse,” and the applicant‘s dependent children. On the insurance application, Green listed Robert Billups as her spouse and plaintiff Burks as the beneficiary. As it turned out, Green and Billups were not legally married. Thus, when Billups died in a motorcycle accident two years later, Mutual, after a brief investigation of the matter, denied coverage and refused to pay benefits arising from his death because he was not an insured person under the policy.

Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in the Tennessee state court alleging seven claims, in-cluding, inter alia, breach of contract, violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, and fraud. Mutual removed the case to federal district court on the basis of diversity of citizenship and then filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the complaint. The district court granted defendant‘s motion as to all of the claims and dismissed the complaint in its entirety. Plaintiffs now appeal.

After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, this court determines that a panel opinion further addressing the issues raised would serve no jurisprudential purpose. We therefore affirm the district court‘s decision for the reasons stated in that court‘s opinion.

AFFIRMED.

Notes

*
The Honorable Judith M. Barzilay, Senior Judge, United States Court of International Trade, sitting by designation.