Pearce v. LindstromPearce v. Lindstrom
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Parker
OPINION
PARKER, Judge.
Robert Lindstrom appeals an order vacating a judgment pursuant to
FACTS
The Pearces retained attorney Robert Lindstrom to handle the foreclosure of a second mortgage. Lindstrom commenced a foreclosure by advertisement proceeding, and in October 1985 the Pearces obtained the property at the foreclosure sale. The foreclosure proceeding was held invalid due to the failure to comply with the notice requirements of
The Pearces commenced a legal malpractice action against Lindstrom, claiming that he had negligently mishandled the foreclosure. Pursuant to Rule 5 of the Special Rules of Practice for the Fourth Judicial District, the case was submitted to mandatory, nonbinding arbitration after the Pearces certified it as ready for trial.
As residents of Kansas, the Pearces petitioned for and received special permission not to attend the arbitration hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the arbitrator awarded the Pearces $1,630.75. The award was filed on December 14, 1988, thereby beginning the 20-day period prior to the entry of judgment during which a party could request a trial de novo under Special Rule 5.12. Neither party requested a new trial, and judgment was entered on January 18, 1989.
On January 23, claiming the award was inadequate and unsupported by the facts, the Pearces moved to vacate the judgment under
1. Can
2. Assuming that
DISCUSSION
I
Lindstrom argues that Rule 5.11 of the Special Rules for the Fourth Judicial District is the exclusive means available to set aside an arbitration award. Therefore, he argues that
Pursuant to
The judgment so entered shall have the same force and effect in all respects as, and is subject to all provisions of law relating to, a judgment in a civil action or proceeding, except that it is not subject to appeal and it may not be attacked or set aside except as provided in subdivision (d).
(Emphasis added). Subdivision (d) allows a motion to vacate within six months if the arbitrator was subject to disqualification or upon a ground set forth in
Rule 5.11(d), promulgated by the Fourth Judicial District and approved by the supreme court, purports to limit the grounds upon which a judgment may be vacated through appeal.
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or the party’s legal representative from a final judgment (other than a divorce decree), order, or proceeding and may order a new trial or grant such other relief as may be just for the following reasons: (a) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect * * *.
The Rules of Civil Procedure, then, allow a party relief from
any
final judgment, with the sole explicit exception of divorce decrees. Exceptions expressed in a law shall be construed to exclude all others.
Lindstrom argues that the interests of justice do not require that the Pearces’ award be set aside. He claims that the primary purpose of
We conclude that Lindstrom misinterprets the nature of Special Rule 5 arbitration. Rule 5 provides for
mandatory,
nonbinding arbitration; the parties have not contracted to settle their dispute through arbitration. They are mandated to participate. If arbitration is to be mandatory and not contractual, it must also be nonbinding or it would implicate the constitu
Lindstrom relies on this court’s decision in
Gruman v. Hendrickson,
416 N.W.2d 497 (Minn.Ct.App.1987). In that case this court, in dictum, stated that appellant’s reliance on
II
Having determined that a
Trial courts will grant relief under
(a) is possessed of a reasonable defense on the merits, (b) has a reasonable excuse for his failure or neglect to answer, (c) has acted with due diligence after notice of the entry of judgment, and (d) that no substantial prejudice will result to the other party.
Hinz v. Northland Milk & Ice Cream Co., 237 Minn. 28, 30, 53 N.W.2d 454, 456 (1952); see also Charson v. Temple Israel, 419 N.W.2d 488, 491 (Minn.1988) (applying Him test). Unless every element of the test is satisfied, a new trial based on excusable neglect must be denied. Isanti County Family Services v. Swanson, 394 N.W.2d 180, 184 (Minn.Ct.App.1986).
The Pearces have met their burden of proof under
Him.
They were initially awarded $1,630.75 at the arbitration, which indicates that the arbitrator found merit to their claims. The delay in their request for a trial de novo apparently was caused by their attorney’s negligence in failing to communicate the arbitration result to them before the end of the 20-day period for new trial requests. The Pearces filed their
DECISION
The trial court did not err in vacating the arbitration award under
Affirmed.