17 Ala. 636 | Ala. | 1850
This was a trial of the right of property in certain slaves, levied on as .the property of William B. Townsend, and claimed by William E. Peake. To show title to the slaves, the complainant introduced a deed,bearing date the 26th of March 1835, executed by William B. Townsend, Martha S. Jenkins, and Benjamin Reynolds, which, after reciting that a marriage was intended shortly to be solemnized between the said William B. Townsend and Martha S. Jenkins, conveyed to the said Benjamin Reynolds, as trustee, certain slaves, to
If this deed is to be construed by the laws of Alabama, there could not be a doubt but that Townsend, the husband, would take the entire interest in the slaves, during the life of himself and wife and the survivor of them, for it is the settled law in this State that the husbaud and wife cannot be joint tenants or tenants in common of a chattel, either in law or in equity. In the case of Moss v. McCall, 12 Ala. 630, it was decided, that where property is conveyed to a trustee for the mutual support of husband and wife, and the profits are directed to be paid to the husband and wife for their joint maintenance, the entire interest is vested in the husband, and that the wife takes no interest in the trust. Again, in the case of Cook v. Kennedy, 12 Ala. 49, slaves were conveyed to a trusree for the joint use of husband and wife, during life, and after their death, remainder over to the children of the marriage; it was decided, that the husband took the entire life estate,' to the exclusion "of the wife. Indeed this very deed was before this court, in the case of Bender v. Reynolds, 12: Ala. 446, and it was held, not to create a separate estate in the wife, but that the slaves, having, come into the possession of the husband, were liable to be sold for his debts under execution at law. But it did not appear in that case that the laws of South Carolina, where the deed was executed, differed from the laws of Alabama. In the case of Pollard v. Merrill et al. 15 Ala. the deed, which was an antenuptial agreement, conveyed the property of the intended wife to trustees, to have and to hold the same for the separate and exclusive use of the wife and the intended husband, during their joint lives, with remainder over to the children of the marriage, and it was expressly declared by the deed, that the property should in no wise be liable to the debts of the husband. After the marriage the property, which consisted of slaves, came into the possession of the husband, and it was decided that they could be sold under execution at law against the husband. All these decisions rest upon the principle, that there cannot be a community of interest between husband and wife in goods, either at law or in equity,
- But the deed was executed in South Carolina, and in reference to the rights that the husband and wife take under it, we must look to the laws of that State, and by them the deed must be construed; for it is a principle, acknowledged by all courts, that the lex loci contractus must govern, not only as to the validity of the contract, but also in its construction and interpretation, by which the rights ofthe parties are ascertained.-^Story’s Conf. Laws, §§ 275-6; Carnegee v. Morrison, 2 Metc. 381. Judge Story, in speaking of marriage'contracts, says, the language of marriage contracts and settlements must be interpreted according to the law of the place where they are contracted.— Story’s Conf. Laws, § 576. Indeed a different rule would not only lead to infinite difficulty and perplexity, but what is still worse, it would lead to a destruction ofthe legal rights of the parties to "the contract, and instead of ascertaining and enforcing their rights, which is the duty of courts, we would destroy them. We must therefore inquire what are the laws of South Carolina in reference to this deed, and what rights, if any, did Mrs. Townsend take under it. The claimant introduced the depositions of three practicing lawyers of South Carolina, all of whom .swear that by the laws of South Carolina the interest of the husbánd in the slaves could not be sold at law, and that he takes a joint and equal interest with his wife in the trust created by the deed, and they refer to the cases decided by the courts of last resort in that State as the foundation of their opinion. In the case of Rice v. Burnett, 1 Speers’ Eq. 579, the deed of marriage settlement conveyed the real and personal estate of the intended ■wife to a trustee for her sole use, until the marriage should take
■ Having attained the conclusion that the wife has an equitable interest in the property, it becomes necessary to ascertain in whom the legal title remains. This, however, is an easy task.
The view we have taken shows that the court erred in its instructions to the jury, and the judgment must, therefore be 'reversed and the cause remanded.