delivered the opinion of the court:
This appeal from the circuit court of Grundy County involves the Illinois Judges Retirement Act as in force аnd effective in 1941. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, chap. 37, pars. 441.1 et seq.) The question is whether a judge, who is otherwise eligible for a pension, is debarred from drawing his pension during his incumbency in an office or post for which he draws a salary payable from State funds.
The plaintiff, William G. Peacock, for many years cоunty judge of Grundy County, retired in July, 1954, and filed his application for annuity with the defendant, Judges Retirement System of Illinоis. But since he was then employed as an assistant Attorney General, the defendant’s board of trustеes denied his application. Proceeding by way of the Administrative Review Act, the plaintiff secured a reversal of the board’s decision in the circuit court. The defendant appeаls directly to this court. Cf. Bohm v. State Employees’ Retirement System,
The parties agree that the 1941 аct embodies a contract as to judges whose rights to pensions accrued under its provisiоns, and the act as it then existed controls the instant case.
Pertinent provisions of that act are as follows:
Article 2 Preamble: “The following words and phrases as used herein, unless different meanings are plainly indicated by their context, shall havе the following respective meanings: * * * ”
“§ 2.3: Employer: The State, the County or the City or Municipality cеrtifying payments of salary for, or paying salary to, any Judge of any of the following courts: * * * County Court * *
“§ 2.7: Sаlary: The total compensation paid to a Judge by the State, a County or City or Municipality, оr any two or more of such governmental units, for personal services as a Judge.”
"§ 5.1: Retirement Annuitiеs: Any Participant whose employment as a Judge by all Employers as defined in this Act is terminated, regardless of age at the time and regardless of cause, shall be entitled to a Retirement Annuity beginning оn the date specified by such Participant in a written application therefor, providеd: * * * '(d) The Participant is not receiving nor is entitled, at the time, to receive any salary from any employer as defined in this Act for services currently performed.”
As noted, section 5.1 makes a рarticipant in the system eligible for an annuity when his employment as a judge by all employers as dеfined in the act is terminated, provided certain conditions exist. One of these conditions is contained in subparagraph (d) : “The Participant is not receiving nor is entitled, at the time, to receive any salary from any employer as defined in this Act for services currently performed.” (Emphasis added.)
The dispute is over the meaning of the word “salary,” the defendant contending that it covеrs salary received from the State for services as an assistant Attorney General and the рlaintiff insisting that the word is limited to compensation received for personal services as a judge.
We agree with the defendant’s contention. For while it is true that “salary” is defined as compеnsation paid by the State, a county or city for personal services as judge, the statute рrovides further that such definition is not controlling where a different meaning is plainly indicated by the context. (See art. 2 preamble set out above.)
Section 5.1(d) refers to one who is not receiving any salary from “any employer as defined in this Act,” which, of course, includes the State. (Sec. 2.3.) But whilе the statute expressly limits the definition of “employer” to that set out in the act, this is not done with respect to the word “salary.” The inference is that the intention is to exclude from participation under the system any person receiving a salary from any employer defined in the act, nо matter what type of occupation he may be engaged in. This conclusion is buttressed by the fаct that benefits of the act are limited by the very first part of section 5.1 to “any Participant whоse employment as a Judge by all Employers as defined in the Act is terminated.” There was no neеd to include subparagraph (d) at all if it was meant to only exclude those still employed as a judge. Mindful of the general rule of construction that a statute should be so construed, if possible, thаt no word, clause or sentence is rendered superfluous or meaningless, (see, e.g., Pattesоn v. City of Peoria,
Finally, this construction is consistent with the general purpose of the statute to furnish “an orderly method of retiring, without hаrdship and prejudice, Judges who have become aged or otherwise incapacitated.” (Art. 1, sec. 1.2.) It could hardly have been contemplated that a retired judge should be paid such an annuity by the State at the same time that he is employed by the State and receiving a salary for his services.
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the circuit court of Grundy County is reversed.
Judgment reversed.